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This thesis investigates the implications of binding phenomena for the develop-
ment of a reductionist theory of grammatical dependencies. The starting point is
the analysis of binding and control in Hornstein (2001, 2009). A number of revi-
sions are made to this framework in order to develop a simpler and empirically
more successful account of binding phenomena.
The major development is the rejection of economy-based accounts of Con-
dition B effects. It is argued that Condition B effects derive directly from an anti-
locality constraint on A-movement. Competition between different dependency
types is crucial to the analysis, but is formulated in terms of a heavily revised
version of Reinhart’s (2006) “No Sneaking” principle, rather than in terms of a
simple economy preference for local over non-local dependencies. In contrast
to Reinhart’s No Sneaking, the condition presented here (“Keeping Up Appear-
ances”) has a phonologically rather than semantically specified comparison set.
A key claim of the thesis is that the morphology of pronouns and reflexives
is of little direct grammatical import. It is argued that much of the complexity
of the contemporary binding literature derives from the attempt to capture the
distribution of pronouns and reflexives in largely, or purely, syntactic and se-
mantic terms. The analysis presented in this dissertation assigns a larger role to
language-specific “spellout” rules, and to general pragmatic/interpretative prin-
ciples governing the choice between competing morphemes. Thus, a core as-
sumption of binding theory from LGB onwards is rejected: there is no syntactic
theory which accounts for the distribution of pronouns and reflexives. Rather,
there is a core theory of grammatical dependencies which must be conjoined with
with phonological, morphological and pragmatic principles to yield the distribu-
tional facts in any given language.
In this respect, the approach of the thesis is strictly non-lexicalist: there are
no special lexical items which trigger certain kinds of grammatical dependency.
All non-strictly-local grammatical dependencies are formed via A- or A-chains,
and copies in these chains are pronounced according to a mix of universal prin-
ciples and language-specific rules. The broader goal of the thesis is to further
the prospects for a “reductionist” approach to grammatical dependencies along
these lines.
The most detailed empirical component of the thesis is an investigation of
the problem posed by binding out of prepositional phrases. Even in a framework
incorporating sideward movement, the apparent lack of c-command in this con-
figuration poses a problem. Chapter 3 attempts to revive a variant of the tradi-
tional “reanalysis” hypothesis. This leads to an investigation of certain properties
of pseudopassivization and preposition stranding.
The analyses in this thesis are stated within an informal syntactic frame-
work. However, in order to investigate the precise implications of a particular
economy condition, Merge over Move, a partial formalization of this framework
is developed in chapter 4. This permits the economy condition to be stated pre-
cisely, and in a manner which does not have adverse implications for computa-
tional complexity.
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This dissertation aims to make a contribution to a long-standing research project
within generative syntax: that of reducing the apparently numerous and di-
verse set of grammatical dependencies to a small and uniform core. There are
many historical precedents for a project of this sort. For example, Chomsky’s
(1977) analysis of tough constructions and comparative deletion in terms of wh-
movement, or the Case-theoretic unification of raising and passive. My own
starting point is the theory of grammatical dependencies presented in Hornstein
(2001). This theory treats all non-local1 grammatical dependencies as chain de-
pendencies, where chains themselves are minimally distinguished into A-chains
and A-chains.
My primary empirical focus is binding phenomena. Chapter 2 presents
an analysis of local anaphoric binding and variable binding. To account for the
possibility of binding out of PP, chapter 3 develops a variant of the traditional re-
analysis hypothesis. This chapter also presents an analysis of preposition strand-
ing in terms of reanalysis, and contains some remarks on the typological relation
between pseudopassivization and preposition stranding.
Chapter 4 is primarily concerned with placing certain aspects of Hornstein’s
framework on a more secure formal footing. In particular, the precise nature of
the Merge over Move economy condition was never clarified in Hornstein (2001).
This condition figured crucially in Hornstein’s analysis of obligatory control, and
it will be exploited here in the analysis of certain binding phenomena. Chapter
1 That is, all dependencies which are not established under sisterhood. (Hornstein does not,
for example, attempt to treat subcategorization and selection as chain dependencies.)
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4 shows that the Merge over Move condition can be stated within a formal syn-
tactic framework which models the core properties of the informal framework
of the first three chapters. The chapter builds on recent work of Thomas Graf’s
(Graf, 2010, 2011) to show that the condition can be stated in a computationally
constrained manner.
Before getting started, it may be helpful to give a brief summary of the
classification of grammatical dependencies within the reductionist theory devel-
oped in this dissertation. Roughly speaking, non-local syntactic dependencies
divide into two classes: A-movement dependencies and A-movement dependen-
cies. The following phenomena fall within each class:
(1) A-movement:
(i) Raising, passivization, and other standard cases of A-movement.
(ii) Obligatory control.
(iii) Local binding dependencies.
(2) A-movement:
(i) Wh-movement in questions relative clauses and comparatives; tough-
movement.
(ii) (Some) non-local binding dependencies.
The focus of this thesis is (1iii) and (2ii). The other phenomena will not receive
much attention. I will assume that they are to be analyzed along the lines sug-
gested in Hornstein (2001, 2009).
1.0.1 Outline of a simple argument for reduction
What sort of arguments might be provided for the classification in (1)-(2)? It
seems appropriate to begin with what was historically one of the first arguments
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for a reductionist theory: Lidz and Idsardi (1998). The aim of this subsection is to
use some of the observations in Lidz and Idsardi’s paper to bring out the appeal
of the reductionist approach, and to give some indication of the overall character
of the account of binding phenomena to be presented in the rest of this chapter.
Lidz and Idsardi argue that obligatory control and anaphoric binding are
both A-chain dependencies. They therefore reject the following commonly as-
sumed constraint on A-chains:2
(3) An A-chain cannot span more than one theta position.
Within early GB theory, this condition derived from architecture of the theory:
all thematic roles had to be assigned at D-structure, and so any position which
was the target of Move α could not be a thematic position (Chomsky, 1981). The
foundations of (3) are less secure in later Minimalist work, but the constraint
is still widely assumed. Chomsky (1995, 312-316) derives (3) from Last Resort
together with a prohibition on assigning θ-roles to non-trivial chains, whereas
Chomsky (2004) suggests that (3) is a consequence of the “duality of interpreta-
tion.”3
It is a curious property of GB theory (and one which carries over to many
Minimalist theories) that in precisely those contexts in which A-chain dependen-
cies are ruled out by (3), the theory furnishes another kind of dependency which
is not subject to (3). For example, although (3) rules out the A-chains in (4a)
and (4b), GB theory provides two additional kinds of dependency – binding and
2 The condition stated in (3) should not be conflated with the θ criterion, which is stronger,
and which was not uniformly assumed within the GB literature. (For example, it was sometimes
relaxed to deal with secondary predication.)
3 Chomsky (2004, 111): “There are two kinds of Merge (external and internal) and two kinds
of semantic conditions at C-I (the duality noted earlier). We therefore expect them to correlate.
That appears to be true. Argument structure is associated with external Merge (base structure),
everything else with internal Merge (derived structure).”
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control – to plug the gap. This is illustrated in (5a) and (5b):
(4) a. * John1 loves t1.
b. * John1 wants t1 to win.
(5) a. John1 loves himself1.
b. John1 wants PRO1 to win.
That binding and control should step in precisely when A-chain formation is
barred by (3) naturally gives rise to the suspicion that (3) does not in fact hold,
and that the dependencies in (5a) and (5b) are just A-chain dependencies. This is
a particularly attractive hypothesis in the case of control, since PRO, like trace, is
phonologically null.4 In the case of binding, the presence of an overt reflexive in
(5a) presents a technical barrier to an A-chain analysis, since GB theory provides
no obvious means by which a trace can be phonetically realized.5 This problem
is, however, parochial to a very particular theory of movement and traces, and
there is no real difficulty in formulating the hypothesis that “NP-t[race], PRO
and anaphor are allomorphs conditioned by properties of the chains they occur
in” (Lidz and Idsardi, 1998, 119).
If Lidz and Idsardi’s proposal is workable, the resulting simplification of
the theory of grammatical dependencies is striking. Two subtheories have been
removed (the theory of binding dependencies and the theory of control depen-
dencies) and the constraint on A-chain dependencies in (3) has been dropped. In
exchange, all that has been added is a rather simple set of rules governing the
pronunciation of A-chains. Lidz and Idsardi do not make any specific proposals
regarding what these rules are, but in the worst case, we have a set of language-
4 Though in fact it is not clear that the tails of control dependencies are always phonetically
null cross-linguistically (Polinsky and Potsdam, 2006).
5Indeed, the original conception of traces as truly empty categories, Chomsky (1981), Chomsky
(1982), strongly suggests that traces should never be phonetically realized.
4
specific rules along the following lines:
(6) English A-chain pronunciation:
(i) Pronounce only Case positions.
(ii) Pronounce the highest Case position fully.
(iii) Pronounce other Case positions as reflexives.
There is independent evidence that languages have arbitrary and idiosyncratic
rules of pronunciation. Well-known examples include the wanna-contraction
rule of English and the rule conditioning French du:
(7) a. want + to→ wanna
b. de + le→ du
As pointed out by Chomsky and Lasnik (1978) with regard to (7a), such rules
raise no serious issue of explanatory adequacy so long as all non-trivial condi-
tions on their application follow from principles of UG. Chomsky and Lasnik
argue that given the correct theory of UG, the simple statement of the contrac-
tion rule in (7a) yields a full account of the distribution of wanna. This implies
that the child need only be able to entertain hypothetical language-specific rules
stated in terms of simple predicates such as “adjacent to.” It does not seem unrea-
sonable to assume that “chainmate” is also is a notion which children may make
use of in formulating language-specific rules.
There are of course a number of prima facie reasons for not taking binding
and control to be A-chain dependencies. The following data will serve as an
illustration of the problems faced by the reductionist approach:
(8) a. John1 expects that pictures of himself1 will go on display.
b. John1 climbed the wall without PRO1 falling.
c. PROarb to leave now would be a bad idea.
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d. Every boy1 knows that someone who likes him1 is nearby.
(8a) and (8b) appear to show that the locality constraints on binding and con-
trol are not as strict as those on raising (since there is no raising out of subject
DPs or raising out of adjuncts). The availability of “arbitrary” readings for some
instances of PRO, exemplified in (8c), appears to show that PRO (in contrast
to anaphor and trace) has no grammatical need of an antecedent. Finally, (8d)
shows that pronouns may be bound from within strong islands, suggesting that a
treatment of pronominal binding in terms of A-movement cannot be on the right
track. Many of these apparent problems for the reductionist approach have been
addressed in the existing literature.6 Those which have not, such as (8d), will be
addressed in detail in chapter 2.
1.0.2 Reduction, simplicity and Minimalism
What exactly is meant by the claim that all of the phenomena in (1) are A-chain
dependencies, or that all of the phenomena in (2) are A dependencies? Clearly,
the phenomena in each class are not one and the same. Raising and control, for
example, certainly have different properties. The claim is rather that phenom-
ena within each class instantiate the same underlying grammatical dependencies.
This point can be illustrated using less controversial cases, two of which have al-
ready been mentioned. Chomsky (1981) presents a unified theory of raising and
passivization, according to which both constructions instantiate dependencies
established via Case-driven A-movement. There is, of course, no claim that rais-
6 This is particularly the case with regard to control. See e.g. Culicover and Jackendoff (2001);
Jackendoff and Culicover (2003); Landau (2003); Culicover and Jackendoff (2006); Landau (2007);
Bobaljik and Landau (2009) for criticisms of the Movement Theory of Control, and Boeckx, Horn-
stein, and Nunes (2010) for the most recent statement of the theory and responses to many of
these criticisms.
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ing and passive have identical properties, only that the differences between the
two are not within the purview of the core theory of grammatical dependencies.
The analysis of comparatives and tough-movement in Chomsky (1977) illustrates
the same point. The hypothesis that each of these constructions involves abstract
wh-movement is not equivalent to the hypothesis that they are identical, which
is obviously false.
Why is a reductionist theory desirable? This question can be given both a
general and a specific answer. The general answer appeals to a broadly applica-
ble methodological principle: that we wish each component of our theory to bear
as much empirical weight as possible. If phenomena are “bought” by the out-
lay of theoretical capital, then the thrifty use of this capital is a scientific virtue.
We can get better value for money by by replacing a bundle of separate theories
with a single unified theory. The benefits of theoretical thrift have been articu-
lated within many different conceptions of the scientific method. Popper (1959)
justified it on the grounds that hypotheses which bear more empirical weight are
more falsifiable. Early formulations of inductive logic incorporated a prior order-
ing of hypotheses in terms of simplicity (see e.g. Carnap 1945, 84; Jeffreys 1961;
Howson 1988). A tiny sample of more recent approaches includes those based
on Akaike’s Theorem (Akaike, 1977; Forster and Sober, 1994), and a variety of
Bayesian approaches (e.g. Lowe, Gardner, and Oppy 2007).
As this proliferation of proposals suggests, in spite of the universal appeal
of simplicity, it is difficult to come up with a persuasive rationale for assigning
a high value to simple theories. A general problem for any attempt to do so
founded on realist assumptions is that it is difficult to argue for a deep connection
between simplicity, unity and truth. The point is amusingly made by Kelly and
Glymour (2004, 103):
Twenty years ago, one of us (Glymour, 1980) proposed that the unified the-
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ory is better confirmed because it is cross-tested in more different ways than
the disunified theory by the same data. This has a tough, Popperian ring:
the simpler or more unified theory survives a more rigorous, self-inflicted,
cross-testing ordeal. But a theory is not a long-distance runner who needs
training and character development in order to win – it just has to be true.
Since reality might be disunified and complex (indeed, it is more complex
than we used to suspect), how is the quest for truth furthered by presuming
the true theory to be simple and severely cross-testable? If there is no clear
answer to this question, then science starts to look like an extended exercise
in sour grapes (if the world isn’t the way I want it to be, I don’t care what it’s
like) or in wishful thinking (I like simplicity, so the world must be simple).
It may, however, be possible to defend simplicity as a requirement for successful
explanation, and explanation may impose requirements that truth does not.7 In
any case, without taking any particular stance on these difficult issues within
the philosophy of science, I shall proceed on the assumption that a reductionist
theory is to be preferred if it can be shown to be empirically viable.
This leaves open the question of what exactly it is for a theory to be em-
pirically viable. Controversy may arise in cases where a new unified theory does
not cover all the empirical ground of its predecessors – our natural reductionist
urges may be checked by our guilty empirical consciences. The tradeoff between
7 Walsh (1979, 244): “...if we demand that there should be no ingredient in an explanatory
theory about the natural world that does not directly correspond to some aspect of the world,
are we not requiring that an explanatory theory should be nothing other than a straightforward
report? But no report, supposing we could get it, and supposing we could certify it as reliable,
can be an explanation...[H]owever much the preference for the more elegant explanation because
of its greater intrinsic perspicuity should be a requirement of the human intelligence [as opposed
to a requirement following from the nature of reality], it is nonetheless a legitimate requirement.
Why should we be unhappy to recognize that explanation is a human intellectual enterprise?
How, after all, could this be otherwise?”
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empirical coverage and other desirable theoretical properties remains a fertile
source of controversy within the philosophy of science.8 The working linguist
must rely on his or her judgment in making such tradeoffs, and – needless to
say – judgments often differ as to whether a particular data point is of central
or peripheral importance. The approach of this dissertation is empirically quite
conservative. The vast majority of the data points for which theories of (1)-(2) are
standardly held responsible will be taken at face value. Needless to say, however,
binding theory is now a vast area of research, and this dissertation will only get
to grips with a tiny subset of the phenomena discussed in the literature.
Before moving on, it is perhaps worth noting that simplification and reduc-
tion are in principle distinct goals. The following abstract example illustrates
this point. Suppose we are given a pre-theoretic division of certain phenomena
into two classes, A and B. John proposes two theories, T1 and T2, which account
for A and B respectively; Bill proposes a single theory, T3, which accounts for
both A and B. In general, it need not be the case that T3 is simpler than T1 and
T2 taken together. This being said, it seems clear that on the whole, replacing
two theories with one is not a bad simplification strategy. The theory developed
here is, I hope to show, simpler than alternatives which treat each of (1) and (2)
as separate phenomena.
8 A particularly clear illustration of this issue, though one that does not make any direct con-
nection with syntax, is the problem of fitting a curve to a set of data points. As Forster and Sober
(1994, 5) put it, “...scientists seem willing to sacrifice goodness-of-fit if there is a compensating
gain in simplicity...Aesthetics to one side, the fundamental issue is to understand what simplicity
has to do with truth.” Forster and Sober make the important point that in choosing a smooth
curve over a “bumpy” one, the scientist is not necessarily ignoring data, or trading in accuracy
for simplicity: “If we think of the true curve as the ‘signal’ and the deviation from the true curve
as the ‘noise,’ then fitting the data perfectly involves confusing the noise with the signal. It is
overwhelmingly probable that any curve which fits the data perfectly is false.”
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This is all I will have to say about the general methodological impetus to re-
duction. A second impetus is provided by the Minimalist Program outlined in in
(Chomsky, 1993) and subsequent work. This program of research is many things
to many people, and I will not attempt to argue for any particular understanding
of it here. However, there is one way of understanding the Minimalist impulse
which is relevant to present concerns. This can be summed up in the following
hypothesis:
(9) Minimalist Hypothesis: There are reasons other than general theoretical
parsimony to assign a high value to simple theories of Universal Gram-
mar.
Just as children may need an “evaluation measure” to rank competing grammars
(Chomsky, 1965), linguists need an evaluation measure to choose between com-
peting syntactic theories. For the reasons just outlined, we expect that this will
include some general preference for simple, unified theories over their complex,
multifaceted cousins. What Minimalism is telling us is that an evaluation mea-
sure which assigns a high value to simple theories merely on general methodolog-
ical grounds underestimates the value of simplicity in the domain of syntactic
theory.9
1.1 Previous work
Clearly, this is not the first attempt to develop a unified theory of grammatical de-
pendencies. In its technical details, this dissertation is most obviously indebted
to Nunes (1995) and Hornstein (2001). The overall research program is also very
9 This relates to the distinction made in Chomsky (2002) between “methodological optimal-
ity,” which is the ordinary scientific practices of theory evaluation and selection, and “substantive
optimality,” which is the language-specific thesis that language faculty is “well-designed for in-
teraction with systems that are internal to the mind.”
10
similar to that pursued in Koster (1987) and Neeleman and van de Koot (2002).
It may therefore be helpful to say a little more regarding points of agreement and
points of difference between the present work and earlier proposals. The follow-
ing two positions are, I think, held by the authors just cited, and will be assumed
and/or defended in this dissertation:
(i) Shared Constraints: There are substantial constraints shared by all gram-
matical dependencies as such. One example is Koster’s “Uniqueness of the
Antecedent” condition, which requires that no dependent element (e.g. a
trace) can be dependent on more than one antecedent.
(ii) Configurationality: Both A- and A-type dependencies are established via
configurational relations in tree or tree-like structures. These relations are
constrained by a structural condition along the lines of c-command (Rein-
hart, 1976).
The first of these positions is necessarily taken in any reductionist theory of gram-
matical dependencies. The second, in contrast, is not obviously inevitable given
reductionism. Clearly, a unified theory of grammatical dependencies must either
hold that all grammatical dependencies are configurational or that all are not, but
a priori, there is no particular reason to favor one or other of these options. In
principle, one could imagine a theory broadly similar to the one stated here, but
stated over more abstract representations, such as the f-structures of LFG (Bres-
nan, 2001). The issue of whether configurational relations such as c-command
are of deep grammatical significance is, unfortunately, too big to address here.
While this dissertation will argue directly for (i), it will present few explicit ar-
guments in favor of (ii) (though see §2.2.2, §3.4.1.1). The reader must judge for
his or her self the extent to which the decision to state the theory in configura-
tional terms is successful.
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Within the recent binding literature, there have also been more limited
moves towards a reductionist approach. In particular, Safir (2004) has argued
(countering the trend started by Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and Dalrymple
(1993)) that there is a single universal domain for local anaphoric binding.
1.2 Theoretical background and overview
The role of this section is to introduce the syntactic framework assumed in this
dissertation, and to outline some key features of the analyses of the phenomena
in (1)-(2). A more formal statement of a portion of this framework will be given
in chapter 4.
1.2.1 Features and Chains
There will be many references to features and feature types in what follows. Ev-
ery feature has a type (e.g. Case, θ, Wh). A feature may also have a value (e.g. Acc,
Agent), The distinction between values and types is primarily of significance for
Case and θ features. Many other features, such as Focus, appear to have only
a single value, so the type/value distinction is of less importance for features of
this sort.
There is one respect in which this dissertation is very much non-reductionist:
it does not attempt to reduce Copy+(Re)Merge talk to chain talk, or chain talk
to Copy+(Re)Merge talk. Thus, some conditions are stated representationally
in terms of chains and others are stated derivationally, according to whichever
seems more perspicuous in the case at hand. The question of whether these two
ways of talking are “notational variants” is an interesting and much-discussed
topic, but one which I leave for future research. My suspicion is that there is not
much value in posing these questions in relation to informally stated theories. As
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chapter 4 illustrates, derivations are easily reified as trees, such that conditions
on derivational steps become constraints on licit derivation trees. Conversely, a
set of licit derivation trees can be specified by defining an automaton which ef-
fectively “builds” trees from the bottom up. Given that these various ways of
doing things are formally equivalent, it is difficult to see how there could be any
empirical question of whether derivational theories are superior to representa-
tional ones or vice versa. Admittedly, the issue of whether or not two theories
can be empirically equivalent is a highly complex and controversial one. One
should not infer too hastily from formal equivalence to empirical equivalence.
Indeed, according to some philosophers of science, even if two theories are em-
pirically equivalent it does not necessarily follow that the available empirical ev-
idence lends equal support to each (“One of a number of empirically equivalent
theories may be uniquely preferable on evidentially probative grounds,” Laudan
and Leplin 1991, 45010). I therefore leave it as an open question whether the
derivational vs. representational issue might become subject to evidential adju-
dication at some point in the future. At present, however, I see no reason to favor
derivational theories over representational theories or vice versa, nor any reason
to disfavor mixed derivational/representational theories.
10A fuller statement of Laudan and Leplin’s position (p. 460): “...empirical evidence is chiefly
seen as a thesis about the semantics of theories; underdetermination, by contrast, is a thesis about
the epistemology of theories. It has been supposed that, if theories possess the same empirical
consequences, then they will inevitably be equally well (or ill) supported by those instances.
We shall contest this supposition, and with it, the reduction of evidential relations to semantic
relations, on which it rests...[W]e shall find that the relative degree of evidential support for
theories is not fixed by their empirical equivalence.”
13
1.2.2 Movement and copying
Following Nunes (1995, 2001), Hornstein (2001), I assume that syntactic struc-
tures are constructed via two primitive operations: Merge and Copy. A derivation
begins with selection of a numeration, which is a multiset of lexical items. Merge
may apply to two items α and β in the numeration to yield either [α α β] or [β
α β], according to whether it is α or β that projects. In addition to applying to
items in the numeration, Merge may also apply to its own output. The Copy op-
eration, which simply copies constituents, may apply both to the output of Merge
and to its own output. Movement is effected by Copying a constituent and then
(Re-)Merging it in a new location. In this way, Move is decomposed into Copy and
Merge. It will nonetheless be necessary to take Move to be an operation in its own
right, since there are certain conditions on Move (e.g. Minimality) which cannot
be decomposed into conditions on Copy and Merge. (Re-)Merge is constrained
by the extension condition:
(10) Extension Condition: Merge may only target a lexical item, or the root
of a workspace.
I will assume that covert movement is to be analyzed as pronunciation of a lower
copy (Bošković, 2001; Nunes, 2004). It is beyond the scope of this dissertation
to address the question of why of different movements are overt or covert. I will
assume that there is some diacritic on each head which hosts a moved phrase
(parallel to a ±EPP specification in Agree-based frameworks) which determines
whether or not movement is overt. The technical details are discussed further in
§2.12.
Derivations make use of multiple workspaces. The use of multiple workspaces
is necessary to construct non-uniformly left/right-branching trees using a binary
Merge operation. For example, a tree such as (11) has a derivation involving two
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(12) Merge of ‘the’ and ‘boy’ in Workspace 1:
[DP the boy]
Merge of ‘the’ and ‘girl’ in Workspace 2:
[DP the girl]
Merge of ‘saw’ in Workspace 2:
[V saw [DP the girl]]
Merge of Workspace 1 with Workspace 2:
[VP [DP the boy] [V saw [DP the girl]]]
Given multiple workspaces, we can distinguish instances of Merge which
add an item from the numeration to a workspace from instances of Merge which
merge two workspaces together to form a single workspace. For example, merger
of T with vP is an instance of the former, and merger of a DP with T is an instance
of the latter.
Departing from much of the Minimalist literature following Chomsky (2000),
I will follow earlier Minimalist work in assuming that the Head-Complement and
Spec-Head relations are the structural configurations licensing feature valuation
(together with whatever structural configuration it is that relates H1 and H2 in
the complex head [H1−H2 H1 H2]). Thus, there is no analog of Chomsky’s Agree
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operation, except insofar as the Head-Comp relation can be seen as a highly local
version of Agree.11
Movement is constrained by Minimality (Rizzi, 1990b, Chomsky, 1995).
Many different formulations of this condition are to be found in the literature,
and for much of this dissertation it will not matter very much which formulation
of Minimality is chosen. However, one or two of my other assumptions about
movement and feature checking will have implications for the formulation of
Minimality; these will be discussed in §1.2.6
It is important to clarify the manner in which Minimality constrains side-
ward movement. Following Hornstein (2009), I will assume that sideward move-
ment out of a workspace is constrained by Minimality. That is, the following kind
of movement is illicit:
(13)









11 If Merge creates a labeled constituent, the Spec-Head relation can be viewed as a second
instance of the Head-Complement relation. This conception of the Spec-Head and Head-Comp
relations has recently been defended in Hornstein (2009).
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Movement into a workspace, on the other hand, is not constrained by Minimality.
Intuitively, the moved element in (13) “moves over” the higher A in Workspace
2, but once it moves into Workspace 1, there is no limit in principle on the extent
to which future Merge operations may embed it. However, we will see in the next
subsection that the Merge over Move constraint restricts the ability of sideward
movement to establish dependencies between deeply nested positions.
1.2.3 Merge over Move and Sideward Movement
Merge over Move can be stated as follows:
(14) Merge over Move: A head or phrase X may not move at a stage S of a
derivation D if there is a convergent derivation D ′ such that
(i)D and D ′ begin from the same numeration,
(ii)D ′ is identical to D up to S,
(iii) at S of D ′, a head or phrase merges in the position that X moves to
at S of D, and
(iv) X later moves in D ′ to value the same features that it did at S of D.
The requirement that D ′ be convergent makes Merge over Move a defeasible con-
straint. Unlike Minimality, it is not a hard-and-fast constraint on the application
of Move, but rather a preference for convergent derivations which delay move-
ment as long as possible. The particular statement of Merge over Move in (14) is
slightly unorthodox in imposing condition (iv) on comparison derivations. It is
necessary to impose this condition within the framework of this dissertation due
to the assumption that movement through multiple Case positions is possible.
This aspect of Merge over Move will be discussed further in §2.8.1, and at the
beginning of chapter 3.
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Merge over Move was first mooted as a condition on derivations in Chomsky
(2000). It was used, in conjunction with phase theory, to explain certain facts
about the distribution of expletive there. This is quite distinct from the use that
it is put to in Hornstein (2001). Hornstein exploits Merge over Move to rule out
illicit cases of object-oriented control such as (15):
(15) * [TP [TP John1 kissed Mary2] [PP without t2 blushing]].
To see how Merge over Move blocks (15), consider the point in its derivation
where Mary moves sideward from the adjunct to the object position:
(16) Workspace 1:
[PP without t2 blushing]
Workspace 2:
[v′ kissed Mary2]
At this point, the DP John (or at least, the material for constructing it) remains
in the numeration. Thus, Merge over Move requires that John be merged as the
object of kiss instead of Mary. Subsequently, Mary moves sideward into [Spec,vP]
to pick up the unassigned theta role, and then raises to [Spec,TP] to get Case. The
Merge-over-Move-compliant derivation therefore yields subject-oriented control:
(17) [TP [TP Mary1 kissed John2] [PP without t1 blushing]].
Consider now the the derivation of (18), shown in (19). In particular, the
point at which John is moved between the two workspaces:






Movement of “John” from workspace 1 to workspace 2:
[noticing t1] (workspace 1).
[vP John1 [v′ kissed Mary]] (workspace 2).
Workspace 1:
[PP without Bill noticing t1]
Merger of the adjunct:
[TP [TP John1 [vP t′1 [v′ kissed Mary]]] [PP without Bill noticing t1]]
At the point John moves, Bill remains in the numeration. Since Bill could merge
either as the subject of the matrix clause or as the subject of noticing, it is a vio-
lation of Merge over Move to move John before of performing one of these Merge
operations. On the other hand, merging Bill as the matrix subject would be a
derivational dead end. (Since it would stop John raising from [Spec,vP] to get
Case.) We are left, then, with the possibility of merging Bill as the subject of
noticing. The end result is the grammatical (20):
(20) [TP [TP Bill1 kissed Mary] [PP without t1 noticing John]].
This example highlights one of the most important effects of Merge over Move:
that it induces Minimality violations which could otherwise be obviated by early
sideward movement. In general, before it is possible to move a DP out of a given
workspace, Merge over Move forces as much material as possible to merge within
that workspace. If there are additional argument DPs to be merged, then these
will end up above the DP before it has a chance to move out. Owing to Minimal-
ity, these additional DPs then prevent the lower DP from escaping. As a rough
generalization, only the highest DP in a given workspace is able to escape via
sideward movement.
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1.2.4 Selection and the syntax/semantics boundary
Consider (21), where ‘#’ indicates a selectional violation:
(21) # [TP [TP [DP The swarm of bees]1 dispersed John2] [PP without t1 sting-
ing]].
If the selectional restrictions of disperse were to enforced in the syntax (e.g. by
feature checking of some sort), this would raise difficulties for the analysis of
adjunct control outlined in the preceding section. Recall that the derivation of
(21) will begin with construction of the adjunct:
(22) [PP without [the swarm of bees] stinging]
At this point in the derivation, Merge over Move prevents the swarm of bees mov-
ing to the matrix object position, since John remains in the numeration and can
be merged as the object instead. However, if merging John as the object of disperse
is a syntactic violation, this option is discarded, since Merge over Move compares
only convergent derivations. Hence, nothing would block (23):
(23) * [TP [TP John2 dispersed [DP the swarm of bees]1] [PP without t1 sting-
ing]].
Since (23) is an illicit instance of object control, this would clearly be the wrong
result.
It seems, then, that an account of adjunct control in terms of sideward
movement crucially depends on the syntax being blind to selectional restrictions:
the derivation in (21) must count as convergent so far as Merge over Move is con-
cerned. The conclusion that selectional restrictions are extrasyntactic is familiar,
and quite well supported on independent grounds (see e.g. Grimshaw 1979).12
But to my knowledge, theories combining sideward movement and Merge over
12 This being said, Newmeyer (1986, 113-114fn16) notes that Chomsky continued for some
time to maintain the position of Chomsky (1965) on selectional violations of this sort (that they
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Move are unique in the extent to which they commit hostages to the theory of
selection. They provide grounds that are principled – but non-semantic – for
keeping selection out of the syntax.
A similar argument can be made favoring valuation of features over check-
ing (Chomsky 1995, 2000). If, for example, DPs bear a valued-but-unchecked
Case feature when they are initially merged, then a DP marked accusative will be
unable to move to a nominative Case position and vice versa. But then, if Mary
were to merge with unchecked accusative Case features in (15), and John with
unchecked nominative, the defeasible nature of Merge over Move would let in
the illicit derivation of object-oriented adjunct control.
1.2.5 Locality constraints on sideward movement and Merge over
Move
This dissertation will not make use of phases as defined in Chomsky (2000, 2001,
2008) and developed in much subsequent work.13 Thus, the Phase Impenetrabil-
ity Condition will play no role in constraining movement. Movement is primarily
constrained by Minimality, Merge over Move, and a condition preventing move-
ment out of adjuncts and subjects. For the purposes of this dissertation, it will not
matter very much what this latter condition is. One option would be to adopt the
theory of Nunes and Uriagereka (2000), which is based on the multiple Spellout
theory of Uriagereka (1999).
Though it has no equivalent of the Phase Impenetrability Condition, the
present framework does incorporate a novel locality constraint on sideward move-
are ruled out in the syntactic component). The basis of Chomsky’s argument was the unaccept-
ability of sentences such as “# The boy who was turned by magic into a swarm of bees dispersed.”
13 For a brief critical overview of the development of phase theory, see Boeckx and Grohmann
(2007).
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ment which has a domain-based flavor:
(24) Constraint on Movement: Movement from a position α to a position β
is possible only if α and β are “neighbors.”
The notion of a neighbor can be defined as follows:
(25) α and β are neighbors iff the shortest path from α to β goes along at
most one “bad” branch, where a bad branch is a left branch (i.e. a
branch between a specifier and the XP node dominating it) or a branch
leading from an adjoined element to its host.
The definition in (24) has a rather representational flavor: one cannot know
whether α and β are neighbors until both are present in the same tree. However,
the condition can also be formulated in derivational terms via Uriagereka-type
cyclic Spellout. Uriagereka proposes that the internal structure of adjuncts and
left branches is frozen for further syntactic operations as soon as they merge. This
presumably implies that copy deletion must apply to a phrase before it merges as
a left branch or adjunct, since afterwards it will be too late to “look into” the
phrase to see which of the copies internal to it should be pronounced. Now sup-
pose that there is a slight exception to this condition: it is permissible to look
inside a left branch or adjunct at the very moment at which it is merged. This
will allow copies which move sideward between neighboring workspaces to be
matched, such that some of them can be targeted by deletion (or by language-
specific spellout rules). In contrast, sideward movement across non-neighboring
workspaces will have the effect of introducing pairs of copies which cannot be
matched, since there will be no single application of Spellout which can see both
copies. If failure to match copies leads to a crash at PF, it follows that sideward
movement between non-neighboring workspaces is impossible.14
14This raises the interesting question of whether even language-specific spellout rules can look
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The purpose of the constraint in (24) is twofold. In chapter 4, we will see
that it contributes to an effort to make sideward movement formally tractable.
Its main empirical function is to rule out illicit control derivations such as the
following:
(26) * [The man who met [John]] wants [[John] to win].
Without (24), the following derivation would be available for (24):15
(27)
[wants John to win] Workspace 1
met Workspace 2
Sideward movement of ‘John’ from workspace 1 to workspace 2
[wants [John] to win] Workspace 1
[met John] Workspace 2
Construction of matrix subject DP continues:
[wants [John] to win] Workspace 1
[the man who met John]
Matrix subject DP merges:
[[the man who met John] wants [John] to win]
This derivation is ruled out by (24) because construction of the matrix subject DP
requires merging (at least) two separate workspaces together. The relative clause
into strong islands. See §2.12.
15 There is some question as to whether (26) is available as a derivation of (24), since Merge
over Move might independently block movement deep into the relative clause. This issue is
discussed in detail in Drummond (2009). Here, I will tentatively assume that Merge over Move
is not sufficient to block all illicit derivations of this sort.
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must be constructed in its own workspace and then merged with the workspace
containing the NP. At this point, Spellout will be able to “see” inside both the NP
and the relative clause, but this will only enable it to see one copy of John. Simi-
larly, when John merges as a specifier in the embedded clause, Spellout will apply,
but it will only be able to see the copy of John in the embedded clause. Thus, since
there is never an opportunity to match the two copies of John and delete one of
them, the derivation in (27) inevitably leads to a linearization conflict.






Movement of “John” from workspace 1 to workspace 2:
[noticing t1] (workspace 1).
[vP John1 [v′ kissed Mary]] (workspace 2).
Workspace 1:
[PP without Bill noticing t1]
Merger of the adjunct:
[TP [TP John1 [vP t′1 [v′ kissed Mary]]] [PP without Bill noticing t1]]
Here, Spellout will apply at the point where the adjunct merges with the TP. At
this point Spellout has already applied to [John] – it had to be spelled out before
it could remerge as [Spec,TP] – but it has not applied to any constituent contain-
ing [John]. Thus, when spellout applies to TP, it will be able to see both instances
of [John], match them, and select one for deletion. The logic is similar for par-
asitic gap constructions, if we adopt the sideward movement analysis of these
presented in Nunes (1995), Hornstein (2001). It seems, then, that (24) allows the
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key derivations which have proposed in the literature on sideward movement,
while at the same time ruling out unwanted derivation such as (27).
The Merge over Move condition assumed in this dissertation is not evalu-
ated locally on a phase-by-phase basis, in contrast to Chomsky (2000). It might
seem that if Merge over Move is evaluated over the entire derivation, this should
prevent all but the highest DP in any given sentence from being a binder. For
example, compare (29a) and (29b):
(29) a. John1 persuaded himself1 that Mary would like Bill.
b. John persuaded Mary that Bill1 would like himself1.
It might seem that (29b) should be blocked by (29a) under Merge over Move,
since at the point in the derivation of (29b) where Bill moves from the position
of himself to the embedded subject position, John and Mary remain in the numer-
ation and could be merged instead to derive (29a), which is convergent. This is
where condition (iv) of the Merge over Move condition in (14) is crucial. When
this condition is imposed, (29a) is not in fact a comparison derivation for (29b)
because Bill does not move in (29a). The only potential comparison derivations
are those in which Bill moves at a later point in the derivation. However, all of
these derivations violate Minimality, as shown in (30). Thus, owing to the con-
vergence requirement, none of them are considered for comparison.
(30) a. * John persuaded Bill1 that Mary would like himself1.
b. * Bill1 persuaded John that Mary would like himself1.
The same result can be derived from a more orthodox statement of Merge over
Move in a theory which makes use of doubling constituents to derive binding re-
lations (Drummond, 2009). In such theories, the DP which is to move is initially
merged in a doubling constituent. This DP is forced to move to additional θ and
Case positions because it is the doubling constituent, not the DP itself, which
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receives the θ and Case features associated with the original position. In these
theories, then, it is not necessary to complicate Merge over Move to ensure that
both (29a) and (29b) are licit derivations. However, I will argue in the next sub-
section that there are a number of problems with doubling constituent theories
which outweigh this advantage.
1.2.6 No “value judgments” in the syntax
The treatment of control in terms of Movement necessitates taking θ-roles to
be features on a par with Case and φ features. As a first pass, we may assume
that verbs and other predicative heads bear unvalued θ features which may be
valued by a valued θ feature on a DP. Since it is the predicate which is “defective,”
checking of θ features may drive movement through multiple θ positions.
The account of binding phenomena presented here will require DPs to move
through multiple Case positions as well as multiple θ positions. This is po-
tentially problematic on standard assumptions, since it is widely assumed that
movement to a Case position “freezes” a DP for further A-movement as a side-
effect of Greed or “Enlightened Self-Interest” (ESI, Lasnik 1995). Many movement-
based theories of binding (Kayne, 2002; Zwart, 2002) have made use of “dou-
bling” constituents to explain why movement through multiple Case positions
is possible. The technical details vary, but the basic idea is that there is some
additional element (typically the reflexive itself) which absorbs the Case in the
downstairs position, so that the antecedent is only really ever associated with
a single Case position. In this dissertation, I will return to something closer to
the theory presented in Lidz and Idsardi (1998), in which the chains responsible
for establishing binding dependencies really do pass through two Case positions.
Some arguments against doubling analyses will be presented in §1.2.7.
If movement through multiple Case positions is possible, this rather sug-
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gests that movement is not in fact restricted by Greed/ESI – perhaps this only
appears to be the case if we assume that binding dependencies are not encoded
via movement.16 I will adopt the following hypothesis:
(31) Value-blind syntax: The computational system is unable to distin-
guish valued and unvalued features.
On this view, the computational system “blindly” associates heads and phrases
which have one or more features of the same type on the optimistic assumption
that doing so might enable a licit valuation relation. Matching of feature types
licenses movement but does not necessitate it. Valuation itself is performed at
the interface, and at this point, valued and unvalued features must match in the
usual manner in order to avoid a crash.
The hypothesis in (31) has the consequence of significantly reducing the
number of possible formulations of Minimality. Since the syntax is blind to fea-
ture values, Minimality must be stated solely with reference to feature types.
There is essentially only one reasonable definition of Minimality having this
property which (i) incorporates the A-over-A condition as a special case, and (ii)
permits movement through multiple θ and Case positions. This is as follows:
(32) Minimality: γ cannot move over/out of β if the feature types of γ are
a (possibly improper) subset of those of β.
The definition in (32) applies as expected in simple cases. For example, it rules
out raising of John over Mary in (33), since (by hypothesis) the feature types of
Mary are identical to those of John:
(33) * [John] seems Mary to like [John].
16Another possibility, raised in Ura (1998), is that feature checking/valuation is always op-
tional. Thus, a DP which is in a Case position may simply elect not to check case in that position,
and then go on to move to a higher Case position. For various technical reasons having to do with
the linearization of chains, this proposal cannot be adopted in this dissertation.
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There are, however, some slightly unexpected consequences with regard to +wh-
phrases. If John in (33) had an additional +wh-feature, for example, then its
feature types would not be a subset of those of Mary, and Minimality would not
block the movement indicated in (33). Care must therefore be taken to ensure
that derivations such as (34) are ruled out:
(34) Who seems Mary to like [who].
This particular derivation is in fact illicit, since movement of who “uses up” the
only position where Mary could have received Case. Since the feature types of
who are a superset of those of Mary, the presence of who above Mary ensures that
Mary cannot possibly move to any higher Case position. This illustrates the point
that it is only the operations of the narrow syntax which are “value blind”: there
is a final reckoning at the interface which is sensitive to the valued/non-valued
distinction in the usual way.
A more serious problem is posed by the classic instance of superraising in
(35):
(35) * Who seems it was believed [who] to be intelligent.
Here, it seems that Minimality should permit raising of who over the it exple-
tive. This suggests that Minimality as defined in (32) cannot be maintained to-
gether with the standard account of expletive it as a contentless item merged in
[Spec,TP] as a last resort. Rather, we must adopt the idea – common within pre-
GB era work, and revived by Marantz (1991) – that expletive it is the associate
of a clause. Traditionally, the clause was assumed to have extraposed, but within
the present system, it is simpler to treat the “extraposed” clause as a pronounced
lower copy. That is, a derivation such as (36) may be spelled out in one of two
ways:
(36) [That John is intelligent] was widely believed [that John is intelligent].
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⇓
It was widely believed [that John is intelligent].
OR
That John is intelligent was widely believed.
They key point is that an it expletive is always a pronunciation of the higher copy
of a clause which has raised to subject position. Looking again at (35), we see that
on this analysis of expletive it, the derivation involves a left-branch condition
violation:
(37) * Who seems [who to be intelligent] was believed [who to be intelligent].
Assuming that countercyclic movement is impossible, who must have moved out
of the higher copy of the clause, which is in [Spec,TP]. Since this is a strong island,
(35) is correctly predicted to be impossible.
Another potential difficulty is posed by a different kind of superraising ex-
ample:
(38) * [CP Who [TP seems [CP [who] [TP that John likes [who]]]]]?
Here, the additional features of the wh-phrase should permit it to move over John.
If the tail of the wh-dependency is spelled out as a pronoun, (39) is derived:
(39) * Who seems that John likes him?
One possible means ruling out (38) is to assume that finite clauses in argument
positions require Case. If this is so, then movement of who to the matrix subject
position has the effect of blocking movement of the embedded clause to this po-
sition (where it would be pronounced as it). In §2.5, we will see that derivations
similar to (38) are possible when the embedded clause does not require Case.17
17 It may be worth noting that the illicit movement in (38) could also be blocked in a less
interesting way just by imposing a requirement that chains have at least as many θ positions as
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We have seen that in the case of A-movement, (31) does not lead to overgen-
eration because A-movement through multiple Case positions simply surfaces as
reflexive binding. A similar effect can be seen in the case of A-movement, with
the additional proviso that A-movement spanning multiple Case positions is re-
alized as pronominalization (see §2.1.3). Thus, an apparently “crazy” derivation
such as (40a) (which is permitted by Minimality as stated in (31)), surfaces as the
grammatical (40b):
(40) a. Who do you think [CP [who] [TP [who] said [CP [who] that [TP [who]
likes [who]]]]].
b. Who do you think said that he likes himself?
The aforementioned problem arises in connection with the implication of (31)
that there are no freezing effects on A-movement. This implication may appear
to be falsified by the fact that it is not possible for a single wh-phrase to license
both an embedded and matrix question:
(41) * Who did you wonder [CP [who] that John married [who]]?
However, (41) is plausibly taken to be ruled out on interpretative rather than
strictly syntactic grounds. Lower copies of moved wh-phrases are either not in-
terpreted at all, or interpreted as variables if they are in Case/θ positions. The
copy of who in embedded [Spec,CP] is therefore not interpreted, and cannot li-
cense a question interpretation of the embedded clause. In other words, (41) is
out for the same reason as (42):
(42) * I wonder that John is married.
Case positions. This requirement might follow from certain conceptions of Case as a “visibility”
marker. In (38), the second Case on who (i.e. the one assigned by matrix T) would serve as a
(false) indication that who is associated with a local θ position. Rebecca McKeown has proposed
that Case-marking on DPs functions as an indication that all local θ positions below the DP are
to be interpreted as variables bound by that DP.
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I would now like to explore two possible examples of licit movements which
are permitted by the formulation of Minimality in (32), but which would be ruled
out by more standard versions of the constraint. The first example involves EPP-
driven movement to [Spec,TP] in English. It seems that the derivation in (43)
should be both in accord with Minimality as stated in (32) and eventually con-
vergent:
(43) Who did you persuade [Mary] [TP [who] to [vP [Mary] kiss [who]]]
This derivation proceeds as normal but for the fact that who checks the EPP fea-
ture of the embedded non-finite T instead of the external argument of the em-
bedded clause (Mary). Since it is difficult to find any empirical consequence of
this slight deviation from the norm, the availability of derivations of this sort
does not seem problematic.
A more interesting putative example of this kind of movement is the French
“stylistic inversion” construction (Kayne and Pollock, 1978). One popular analy-
sis of Romance postverbal subjects has the subject remaining in a vP/VP-internal
position. For example, Belletti (2001) proposes that the subject’s focused sta-
tus somehow obviates the need for ordinary Case licensing. If a language has
available a general means of satisfying the EPP without raising the subject to
[Spec,TP], then this analysis, in its simplest form, predicts inverted subjects to be
available quite generally. The extent to which this prediction is correct varies be-
tween Romance languages and dialects. From the present point of view, French
is an interesting case because it does not have null subjects, and has postverbal
subjects only in wh-questions, clefts and related constructions:18





























That there should be a connection between operator movement and subject in-
version is somewhat mysterious on the face of it. We have just seen, however, that
in the present framework, wh-phrases may move to check EPP features in config-
urations where Minimality would prevent an ordinary DP from doing so. A first
pass analysis of French stylistic inversion can therefore be outlined as follows.
French, like many other Romance languages, has some means of Case-licensing
certain argument DPs without moving them out of vP. But, in contrast to Spanish
and Italian, French has no general means of satisfying the EPP without move-
ment of an argument to [Spec,TP]. Thus, the availability of vP-internal licensing
for external arguments can only be exploited when a wh-phrase (or other A oper-
ator) is available to check the EPP feature.19 This analysis makes the interesting
prediction that only those operators which are of a category suitable for filling
[Spec,TP] should be able to license inversion.
In the present framework, Minimality is not taken to be a hard-and-fast
constraint on movement. Rather, following much recent literature20, it is a PF
constraint – a constraint on the spellout of chains. UG provides a “default” mech-
anism for spelling out chains which results in deletion of all but the highest copy.
19 Although the option of vP-internal licensing may be exploited when a wh-phrase is avail-
able, it need to be. Thus, stylistic inversion is correctly predicted to be optional in French. This
however raises a difficulty in extending the analysis to other Romance languages such as Span-
ish, where wh-movement obligatorily triggers postposing of the subject even though null subjects
are freely available. On present assumptions, it would be difficult to give a unified account of
inversion in French and Spanish wh-questions.
20 See e.g. Ross (1967), Ross (1969), Merchant (1999), Merchant (2001), Lasnik (2001c), Mc-
Closkey (2002), Fox and Lasnik (2003).
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This mechanism is restricted by Minimality: if a chain links two positions which
are too far apart, then the default pronunciation mechanism cannot apply. The
default pronunciation mechanism will be discussed in more detail in §1.2.8 in
this chapter, and in §2.12 of chapter 2. There is a potential loophole here which
must be closed. We surely do not want to permit very-long-distance A-movement,
even if the resulting chain is not spelled out using the default mechanism. Thus,
we must assume that only A-chains are permitted to violate Minimality. This
follows if there is a general principle requiring that movement make use of in-
termediate landing sites wherever these are available. I will argue in §2.5 that A-
movement may skip an intervening [Spec,CP] landing site. However, if C comes
in two flavors, one of which may host a derived specifier and one of which may
not, then apparent instances of [Spec,CP] being skipped by A-movement can be
understood to derive from the choice of a non-spec-hosting C.
We will see in §2.12 that Minimality may not be the only constraint which
turns out to be a constraint on the default spellout mechanism rather than a
constraint on movement per se.
1.2.7 The lexicon, chains and their role in grammatical dependen-
cies
If both (45a) and (45b) are instances of A-movement, then A-movement must
have diverse morphological realizations:
(45) a. John1 wants PRO1 to win.
b. John1 saw himself1.
The same must hold for A-movement, if both (46a) and (46b) are instances of it
(as I will argue that they are in §2.1.3):
(46) a. Who1 did John see t1?.
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b. Everyone1 thinks that he1 is intelligent.
The idea that the same kind of dependency may be pronounced in a number
of different ways found a comfortable home within early transformational for-
malisms. Transformations were free to introduce additional morphology, and
there was particular reason to hypothesize a deep distinction between “chop-
ping” rules and “copying” rules (Ross, 1967). This changed upon the introduc-
tion of the notion of an “empty category” (Chomsky, 1981, 1982). The origi-
nal conception of empty categories as truly empty did not survive long into the
80s. However, most formulations of GB theory incorporated some version of the
idea that dependencies with silent tails formed a natural class. These depen-
dencies were, for example, subject to proprietary licensing conditions such as
the Empty Category Principle. Within GB theory, this division of dependencies
created a certain amount of internal tension. The clear parallels between local
anaphoric binding and A-movement led to the hypothesis that A-trace was spec-
ified +anaphor, but this was never an entirely natural theoretical move. If empty
categories are not lexical items, it seems strange that they should share feature
specifications with lexical items such as himself. (Though to be sure, there is
no actual inconsistency or incoherence in this hypothesis.) On the other hand, if
traces are lexical items, there is no longer any principled reason why traces should
be phonologically null. That an empty category has no phonological features is a
special case of its having no features whatever, but since lexical items in general
may be overt, there is no obvious reason why the traces of A- and A-movement
should not be overt in some languages.
On top of these conceptual problems, the increasing use of covert move-
ment in late GB theory threatened to remove the empirical content of the as-
sumption that traces are phonologically null. For example, Chomsky (1992) pro-
posed that there was a covert head-movement dependency indirectly linking the
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anaphor to its antecedent in (47):
(47) SS: John1 likes himself1.
LF: John1 self-likes [him-t]1.
In practical terms, self -movement in (47) has the effect of establishing a move-
ment dependency between John and himself. The technical artifice of covert head
movement is necessary only to protect two core hypotheses of GB theory: (i) the
hypothesis that the trace of overt movement is phonologically null, and (ii) the
hypothesis that movement through multiple theta positions is impossible. The
late phase of GB theory is partly characterized by the development of technically
ingenious tricks for sneaking around (i)-(ii) and other core assumptions. An un-
charitable observer might come to the conclusion that by the early 90s, about
50% of GB theory existed to make it possible to establish dependencies of a kind
which the other 50% predicted to be impossible.
With the development of the Minimalist Program, binding and control briefly
took a back seat, and the earliest Minimalist work did not really address the way
in which these dependencies relate to movement. (Although Chomsky (1993) did
argue for a version of the theory of anaphoric binding exemplified in (47).) Inso-
far as there is a consensus on these issues in current Minimalist work, it appears
quite similar to that arrived at in GB theory: binding, control and A-movement
are distinct kinds of dependency, but are all established via Agree. Agree here
plays a similar unifying role to GB’s +anaphor feature. Another point of agree-
ment with GB theory is the assumption that binding, control and A-movement
are distinguished primarily by the properties of the downstairs element of the
dependency: PRO is distinct from himself is distinct from DP-copy. As in many
formulations of GB theory, two of these elements are lexical items (PRO, himself )
and the third is not (DP-copy).
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This “mixed” lexical/non-lexical view of grammatical dependencies must
be rejected in any reductionist theory of grammatical dependencies. In the theory
of Neeleman and van de Koot (2002), for example, the tail of every grammatical
dependency is a lexical item. Thus, DP-trace, PRO, himself, etc., are all distinct
lexical items. In contrast, Lidz and Idsardi (1998) do not take any of these to be
lexical items (himself being merely a spellout of DP trace). Not all movement-
based approaches to control and binding phenomena take this approach. In par-
ticular, Zwart (2002) and Kayne (2002) make use of “doubling” constituents, as
in the following examples:
(48) a. John likes [?P [John] himself].
b. John wants [?P [John] PRO] to win.
The use of such doubling constituents obviates the need for special rules for
spelling out lower copies, and allows the ban on movement through multiple
θ positions to be maintained. However, neither of these motivations for the use
of doubling constituents is very persuasive. There is good prima facie evidence
that languages have arbitrary spellout rules, so the need to appeal to such rules
does not count very strongly against a theory.21 With regard to the θ-theoretic
properties of the derivations in (48), the cost of preserving the ban on move-
ment through multiple θ-positions is the assumption that it is possible for a non-
expletive DP to initially merge in a non-θ position. (John presumably does not
receive a θ-role from himself.) There is also an interpretative issue raised by the
use of the doubling constituent. If a copy of John is present in the object position
of (48a), for example, it is not clear what interpretative contribution himself is
making; but the Full Interpretation condition of Chomsky (1995, 219) requires
21 I suspect that Kayne may have in mind a more general program of eliminating arbitrary
spellout rules. See for example Kayne (2010). Interesting as this program of research is, it surely
remains rather speculative at present.
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all lexical items present in the numeration to make such a contribution. In the
case of morphologically complex reflexives such as himself, it has sometimes been
argued that the self morpheme makes an interpretative contribution, but I will
argue in §2.2.1 and §2.2.2 that this is misguided.
1.2.8 Linearization of copies
Following Hornstein (2001), I assume that linearization by default deletes only
copies which have unvalued features. So for example, if a DP moves through
two θ positions and a Case position, it will be the two lower copies, which have
unvalued Case features, which will be deleted by default. Thus, although the
syntax is value-blind, the syntax/PF interface is, by hypothesis, not. Hornstein
proposes that linearization is governed by the following condition:
(49) Copy Deletion Determinism (Hornstein, 2001): Delete only “defec-
tive” copies (i.e. copies with unvalued features). Once all defective
copies of any given phrase have been deleted, exactly one copy must
remain.
To capture the fact that linearization in accord with (49) is only a default, and not
an absolute requirement, I propose to replace (49) with the following universal
rule:
(50) Universal Chain Spellout Rule: If a chain contains exactly one copy,
c, such that all c’s features are valued, then spell out the chain by pro-
nouncing c fully and leaving all other copies silent.
This rule provides one default, easily available means of pronouncing a chain.
Languages may, however, pronounce chains in other ways via language-specific
chain spellout rules; this will be discussed further in §2.12.
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A significant problem for the theory of Hornstein (2001) was that its anal-
ysis of parasitic gaps did not provide a persuasive account of why wh-phrases
are able to move through multiple Case positions. In the case of local anaphoric
binding, which also appears to involve chains spanning multiple Case positions,
Hornstein assumed that the self morpheme was crucially involved in absorbing
the extra Case, but there seems to be no overt analog of this morpheme in para-
sitic gap constructions. In the present framework, it is of course no surprise that
wh-phrases can move through multiple Case positions, since anything can. The
only question is why this does not lead to one of the traces of the wh-phrase being
pronounced as a pronoun. That is, why is (51a) available in addition to (51b)?
(51) a. Which book did you buy t after reading e?
b. ? Which book did you buy t after reading it?
In fact, this is readily explained by (50). A chain of the form (Case,θ,Case,θ)
cannot be pronounced using (50), since it contains three copies (all except the
lowest) which bear all and only valued features. In contrast, the highest copy in
the chain in (51a) is the only copy which has a valued +wh feature. Thus, the
Universal Chain Spellout Rule can apply in parasitic gap constructions – leaving
a gap – but not in ordinary cases of pronominalization. It is for this reason that
chains encoding pronominal binding dependencies are always pronounced via
language-specific spellout rules. This gives languages the option of pronouncing
lower copies in these chains as overt pronouns.
It should nonetheless be emphasized that language-specific chain pronunci-
ation rules may be deletion rules. Thus, the failure of the Universal Chain Spellout
Rule to apply does not necessarily imply pronunciation of a lower copy (either
fully or as an overt pronoun). A case in point, to be discussed in §2.12, is that of
null arguments in Japanese. I will suggest that these are in effect bound pronouns
very much like the him in English “Everyone1 thinks that he1 is intelligent,” but
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that the relevant pronunciation rule of Japanese simply deletes the lower copy
instead of inserting a pronoun.
1.2.9 Agr heads and Case
Following Koizumi (1993); Lasnik (1999), I will assume that accusative Case is
assigned by an Agr head between v and V. For the most part, this is not an as-
sumption crucial to any of the analyses to follow. However, it does play an im-
portant role in chapter 3.
1.2.10 Morphology
I will argue that the morphology of reflexives and pronouns is largely superfi-
cial, idiosyncratic and language-specific. UG may in some instances urge that a
particular copy be pronounced or deleted, and there may be semantic/pragmatic
consequences of each option, but in general, UG is silent on the morphology of
reflexives and pronouns. The familiar distinction between simplex and complex
reflexives provides an illustrative example. Consider for example the case of
Dutch zich vs. zichzelf. There is a sizable literature which argues for a fundamen-
tal grammatical distinction between the two forms and their licensing require-
ments (e.g. Everaert 1986, Reinhart and Reuland 1993). In contrast, following
earlier work of Zribi-Hertz (1989), Koster (1994), Geurts (2004), I will argue that
the two forms are (with a few caveats to be discussed later22) grammatically iden-
tical. Their distributional differences follow from general interpretative princi-
ples regulating the use of “strong” and “weak” pronominal and reflexive forms.
These principles spring not from the narrow syntax, but rather from the con-
straints imposed on interpretation by phonology and its interface with semantics
22 See section §2.10 for further discussion.
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and pragmatics.
As we have seen. the approach to binding phenomena developed here does
not treat anaphors or bound pronouns as lexical items, in the sense of items
which enter into the numeration. One consequence of this is to bar any appeal to
idiosyncratic lexical properties of anaphors or pronouns. A case in point is the
distinction in the availability of “statue” readings between Dutch zich and zichzelf
(Jackendoff 1992, Lidz 2001). Under the approach developed here, it seems un-
likely that it could be any special lexical property of zichzelf which licenses these
readings, since zichzelf is just “morphological junk,” not a distinct lexical item
with its own interpretative contribution. Two possibilities therefore remain. Ei-
ther the dependency established between zich and its antecedent is distinct in
kind from that established between zichzelf and its antecedent, or the availability
of statue readings is conditioned by extragrammatical principles. In this instance
I will go for the latter option (see §2.10.1).
1.2.11 C-command and sideward movement
The availability of sideward movement might seem to imply that it should be
commonplace for grammatical dependencies to be established outside of a c-
command configuration. In fact, the Merge over Move condition outlined in
§1.2.3 makes it very difficult to use sideward movement to obviate c-command.
For example, consider the phenomenon of binding out of PP, illustrated in (52):
(52) John talked to Mary1 about herself1.




[about Mary] Workspace 1)
to Workspace 2)
Sideward movement of ‘Mary’ to become the complement of ‘to’ :
[about [Mary]] (Workspace 1)
[to Mary] (Workspace 2)
Derivation continues and ‘John’ merges as subject:
[John ... [talked [to Mary] [about [Mary]]]]
However, this derivation violates Merge over Move. At the point where Mary
moves to become the complement of to, John remains in the numeration and
could be merged instead. The problem posed by (52) will be discussed exten-
sively in chapter 3.
Another case to consider is (54):
(54) * John1’s mother loves himself1.
Again, it may seem on the face of it that sideward movement should permit an
A-chain dependency in this configuration. The issue becomes rather ticklish ow-
ing to the existence of “sub-command” phenomena in Chinese and other lan-
guages which superficially appear to furnish grammatical counterparts to (54).
This topic will be taken up briefly in §2.11.1. The tentative conclusion is that
A-chain dependencies are not in fact possible in this configuration.
One might ask at this point whether there is any reason at all to abandon
a c-command condition in chain formation. In Nunes (1995), sideward move-
ment was restricted by a c-command requirement on chain formation: the head
of a chain had to c-command all of the other copies in it. The majority of the
analyses in this dissertation are in fact compatible with this requirement, and I
will not be concerned to reject it as a viable option. If such a requirement can be
imposed, the empirical motivation for Merge over Move is substantially reduced.
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There are, however, some stubborn phenomena which cannot be assimilated un-
der Nunes’ approach. In particular, the dependency in examples such as (55)
has all the properties of obligatory control (Hornstein, 2001), but it is clear that
neither copy of John c-commands the other:
(55) [[John] playing baseball] amuses John.
For this reason, I will tentatively assume that c-command is not an absolute con-
dition on chain formation. Movement within a single workspace is constrained
by c-command as a consequence of the extension condition (Hornstein, 2009).
Movement between workspaces (i.e. sideward movement) is only able to obviate
c-command in a small number of instances, owing to the constraints imposed by
Merge over Move.
1.2.12 A brief note on the A/A distinction
The distinction between A- and A-movement will be of some significance in what
follows, since the two kinds of movement map onto two distinct kinds of binding
relation: local anaphoric binding and variable binding. Nonetheless, the partic-
ular formulation of the A/A distinction is of somewhat peripheral importance to
the central claims of the dissertation, since my assumptions regarding the prop-
erties of A/A-movement will be quite conventional (modulo the hypothesized
availability of movement through multiple Case and θ positions). I will assume
that the specifiers and complements of heads which have Case, φ or θ features
are A-positions, and that all other positions are A-positions.23 I will further as-
sume that the number of A-positions that a given head may host is rationed by
the availability of Case, φ and θ features. Thus, a head which has no more than
23 This particular way of formulating the distinction is incompatible with recent suggestions
that C has φ features (Chomsky, 2008).
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one of any of these features24 can host at most one A-position, which will be its
complement unless its complement is filled by a subcategorized non-DP phrase,
and its (first) specifier otherwise. (For example, v’s complement is filled by VP,
so that it is v’s specifier which is an A-position, not its complement.)
24 In stating the distribution of A-positions in this manner, I am thinking of multiple nomina-
tive constructions, which may involve a single head bearing multiple Case features (and hence
having multiple A-specifiers) and of V, which may perhaps assign θ-roles to both its complement





This section will present a brief summary of the key hypotheses to be defended in
this chapter. §2.2 provides some background to show how my analysis of bind-
ing phenomena is situated with respect to key proposals in the existing literature.
The remaining sections go into more detail with regard to competition between
dependency types (§2.3), copy reflexives (§2.4), copy raising (§2.5), the Anaphor
Agreement Effect (§2.6), reflexives which function as Case absorbers (§2.7), the
role of Merge over Move in deriving subject-orientation facts (§2.8), epithets and
Condition C (§2.9), differences in binding domain and interpretation (§2.10), and
the extent to which sideward movement permits binding dependencies in viola-
tion of c-command (§2.11).
2.1.1 Terminological note
It will be useful to have a neutral term to cover bound and coreferential readings.
I will say that A is “construed with” if A is coreferential with B, or if A binds B (or
if some other similar interpretative relation holds between them). It should be
emphasized that this is not a theoretical term – I do not propose that the syntax
or the interpretative interfaces have any general notion of construal. The term
“construal dependency” will cover binding, coreference, etc.
There will be some discussion of pronouns of the type found in the follow-
ing sentences:
(56) Every farmer who owns [a donkey]1 beats it1.
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(57) Either this building doesn’t have [a bathroom]1 or it1’s very hard to
find.
(58) Everyone except John received [his paycheck]1 yesterday. John received
it1 today.
My main interest in these pronouns stems from the hypothesis that they are uni-
formly interpreted via processes at the CI interface, and not via A- or A-chains.
This dissertation will not make any attempt to investigate the interpretation of
examples such as (56)-(58), which is a vast topic in its own right. Given the
increasing semantic sophistication of this literature, the term “high-tech pro-
noun” seems appropriate as an (almost1) theory-neutral cover term for E-type
pronouns, paycheck pronouns and the rest. There is no claim that high-tech pro-
nouns are a natural class.2
2.1.2 Local anaphoric binding as A-movement
The instance of local anaphoric binding in (59) has the derivation shown in (60):
(59) John1 likes himself1.
1 The claim that these pronouns are distinct from ordinary bound pronouns is, of course, not
theory neutral.
2 It may be that there are several distinct classes of high-tech pronouns which are interpreted

















The copy of John in [Spec,AgrP] is spelled out as himself via an English-specific
chain spellout rule (see §2.12).
The following examples illustrate the effect of Minimality on binding:
(61) a. * John1 heard Mary hit himself1.
b. * John1 expects Mary to beat himself1.
Both (61a) and (61b) are ruled out because John has “moved over” Mary. The de-
viance of (62) is somewhat unexpected, since it does not appear to violate Mini-
mality:
(62) * John1 thinks that himself1 is intelligent.
I will argue in §2.6 that (62) is ruled out by the Anaphor Agreement Effect.
Following Pollard and Sag (1992); Reinhart and Reuland (1993), I will as-
sume that picture DP reflexives are not bound as local anaphors. As noted by
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Zwart (2002), this is plausibly taken to be a result of the A-over-A constraint
(which is a special case of Minimality in the present framework). Thus, none of
the following sentences illustrate local anaphoric (i.e. A-chain) binding:
(63) a. John1 likes pictures of himself1.
b. John1 thinks that pictures of himself1 are on display.
c. John1 was worried. Pictures of himself1 were on display.
I will not have much to say about these “exempt” or “logophoric” reflexives in
this dissertation beyond what has already been said in the literature.
A crucial distinction between the analysis of binding phenomena presented
in this dissertation and that of Hornstein (2001) lies in the treatment of Condition
B effects. As we will see, the theory presented here is not built on the hypothesis
that Condition B violations arise from the use of a pronoun when a reflexive could
have been used instead. That is, (64a) will not be taken to be ungrammatical
owing to the grammaticality of (64b):
(64) a. * John1 likes him1.
b. John1 likes himself1.
Rather, adapting a speculation in Drummond, Kush, and Hornstein (2011), I
will argue that Condition B effects result from an anti-locality constraint on A-
movement. This will be discussed in the following subsection.
2.1.3 Pronominal binding as A-movement
Drummond, Kush, and Hornstein (2011) suggest that certain instances of pronom-
inal binding may be derived by A-movement followed by “improper” movement
to an additional θ and Case position:
(65) [TP John thinks [CP [John] that [TP [John] is intelligent]]].
⇓
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“John thinks that he is intelligent.”
As in the case of local anaphoric binding, the presence of two Case positions in
the chain triggers a special spellout rule.3 The only difference is that a pronoun
is used instead of a reflexive. In some languages, only the head of the chain is
pronounced. For example, bound pronouns in English typically correspond to











‘Hanako said that e knew French.’
(67) John1 said that he1 knew French.
Overt Japanese pronouns typically resist binding by a c-commanding quantifica-
tional antecedent, but they do sometimes permit high-tech interpretations (Ku-













‘Every student that read a paper criticized it.’
Similarly, building on observations of Wiltschko (1998), Patel-Grosz and Grosz
(2009) note that German demonstrative pronouns disallow binding under c-command





















3 An interesting question is whether the use of a special spellout rule can be triggered solely
by the fact that a chain violates Minimality. The answer to this question would clearly have
implications for the correct analysis of resumptive pronouns, but I will not attempt to figure out
the answer in this dissertation.
4 Example (68) is from Kurafuji (1998, 136).
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‘If any man who has a wife comes home, he hugs her.’
These data illustrate what I take to be a very important point. The apparent sim-
ilarity between referential pronouns, bound pronouns and high-tech pronouns
is in part an accident of English morphology. In languages such as Japanese,
there is a reasonably clear split between pronouns of the first type (which to
a first approximation are always covert) and pronouns of the other two types
(which may or may not be overtly realized depending on a range of complex
factors5). This split is roughly what I take to be the split between pronouns
which spell out the tails of chain dependencies and base-generated pronouns
which are connected to their antecedents via interpretative processes at the LF
interface.6 When languages make a morphological distinction between “strong”
and “weak” pronouns, it tends to be the weak pronouns which are used to spell
out lower copies of chains spanning A-positions. This can also be seen in some
5For discussion of the Japanese facts see Kurafuji 1998.
6 It is also roughly the conclusion of Evans (1980) and Montalbetti (1984, 75), in the sense that
what Evans called “free pronouns,” “coreferential pronouns” and “E-type” pronouns are lumped
together and contrasted with bound pronouns.
49
languages with resumptive pronouns.7 For example, in Lebanese Arabic, which
has morphologically distinct strong and weak pronouns, it is only the weak pro-
nouns which can be used as resumptives under most circumstances (Aoun and
Choueiri, 2000). This dissertation will not investigate resumptive pronouns, but
within the present framework these would presumably be analyzed as the spell-
outs of lower copies of A-position-spanning chains.
The movements involved in deriving pronominal binding clearly violate
Minimality in some instances. For example, John moves over Mary in (71):8
(71) [John] said [CP [John] that [TP Mary likes [John]]]
⇓
“John said that Mary likes him.”
Recall from §1.2.6 that Minimality is not a hard-and-fast constraint on move-
ment, it is only a constraint on the default chain spellout mechanism. Thus, since
chains encoding pronominal binding are not spelled out via this mechanism in
7 This may follow from a universal constraint on chain spellout along the lines of Montalbetti’s
(1984, 94) “Overt Pronoun Constraint,” which requires, roughly, that covert pronouns be used in
preference to overt pronouns to express bound readings (see also §2.3). It may be that the real
distinction here is between strong and weak, rather than between overt and covert. The OPC
accounts for a number of interesting facts regarding the availability of bound readings for overt
subject pronouns in Spanish. Roughly speaking, these pronouns can receive bound readings if
they are linked to their antecedents indirectly via a covert pronoun. Many of these results could
also be captured by stating the OPC as a condition on chain spellout. However, I have found
that judgments on the Montalbetti facts are somewhat variable between Spanish speakers (as
Montalbetti also seems to find in some instances, p. 130fn17), so I have held off attempting to
formulate a version of the OPC in this dissertation. I would like to thank Juan Uriagereka for
bringing the importance of Montalbetti’s work to my attention.
8 In principle, one could hypothesize John has an additional feature which permits it to move
over Mary, but this is not nearly as plausible for pronominalization as it is in the case of, e.g., wh-
movement, since John sounds just like an ordinary DP, and is not moving to a special position.
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any case, the Minimality violation in (71) is of no consequence.
It should be emphasized that not all instances of variable binding are de-
rived via A-movement. In some cases, a base-generated pronoun may be in-
terpreted as a bound variable via interpretative processes at the Conceptual-
Intentional (CI) interface. Moreover, as we will see in §2.3, there is no preference
for the use of A-movement over these interpretative processes. Thus, the inter-
pretation of he in an English sentence such as (72) may be obtained either via
movement or via interpretative processes at the CI interface:
(72) Everyone1 thinks that he1 is intelligent.
In English, there is no overt distinction between pronouns which spell out the
tails of chains and base-generated pronouns. However, we have seen that lan-
guages such as Japanese there is an overt distinction. While we frequently find
pronouns which are never chain spellouts, we rarely if ever find pronouns which
are always chain spellouts. For example, we will see in §2.3 that Spanish overt
subject pronouns, in contrast to null subject pronouns, can never spell out the
tails of A-position-spanning chains. However, Spanish null subjects have a num-
ber of uses where they clearly are not chain spellouts, as for example when they























The question now arises of how base-generated null subject pronouns are distin-
guished from base-generated overt subject pronouns. One possibility is that they
are syntactically distinguished in their feature specifications. Another possibil-
ity is that both are merely bundles of phi-features, with the choice of whether or
not to realize these features overtly or not being made at the point of spellout.
As we will see in §2.3, the phonological form of a pronoun has consequences for
9 Although see Boeckx (2003) for a movement analysis of donkey anaphora.
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the kinds of dependencies it can enter into due to the effects of the “Keeping Up
Appearances” principle.
There is one aspect of the spellout mechanism for pronominalization which
must be clarified. Consider the following instance of reflexive binding:
(74) [CP Who [TP [who] loves [who]]]
⇓
“Who loves himself?”
Here we have a chain which spans two Case positions and an A-position, but
pronominalization does not apply. To explain why pronominalization does not
apply here, we must ensure that the reflexive spellout rule applies before pronom-
inalization gets a chance. I will assume that with regard to the application of
subsequent spellout rules, a spelled-out chain is equivalent to the trivial chain
formed of its head. So for example, in the case of (74), spellout proceeds as shown
in (75). Here, only copies with valued Case features are shown, for reasons to be
discussed in §2.12.
(75) Who A ... [who]A ... [who]A
Reflexive spellout rule:
[Who]A ... [who]A ... himself
Universal Chain Spellout Rule (50):
WhoA ... himself
2.1.4 Why Conditions A and B are mirror images
A classic puzzle in binding theory is posed by the complementary distribution
of pronouns and reflexives. The puzzle has both an empirical and a conceptual
component. The empirical component is raised by apparent exceptions to com-
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plementarity:10
(76) John1 saw a snake near him1/himself1. (Chomsky, 1965)






















‘John saw himself win the match in the film.’
This dissertation takes the position that the complementarity is real, once inter-
fering factors (such as logophoric reflexives) are controlled for. This position,
the cornerstone of the classic GB binding theory,11 has recently been defended in
Safir (2004). With regard to English, the key to defending the complementarity
hypothesis is the recognition that DP-internal reflexives are not locally A-bound.
The conceptual puzzle is to explain the source of the complementarity ef-
fects. In the GB binding theory, this complementarity derives from the statement
of Conditions A and B in terms of the same notion of Governing Category. How-
ever, this approach leaves open the question of why both conditions are sensitive
to the same locality domain. This has naturally led to proposals that one of the
two conditions is primary, with the other somehow a side effect of the application
of the primary condition. As to the question of which condition is primary. there
are arguments on both sides. Lasnik (1989) points to examples such as (79)-(80)
as evidence that Condition B effects obtain in the absence of a competing reflex-
ive:12
10 (78) is taken from Reuland 1994, 240.
11 Later extensions to the GB binding theory, such as Chomsky (1986), relaxed complemen-
tarity slightly. The empirical motivation for doing so derived from data involving DP-internal
reflexives and reciprocals. Since I am assuming that these are not in fact locally A-bound, Chom-
sky’s arguments for relaxing complementarity do not apply within the present framework.
12 I should note here that Lasnik is not arguing either that Condition A effects are the mirror
image of Condition B effects, or vice versa.
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(79) a. * The boys{1,2} like him1.
b. * The boys{1,2} like himself1.
(80) a. * We{1,2,...} like me1.
b. * We{1,2,...} like myself1.
On the other hand, there are many languages in which Condition B appears to





































‘You gave it to yourself.’
As shown in (81), the first- and second-person clitics behave as pronouns which
do not require a local grammatical antecedent. However, (80) shows that, unlike
English pronouns, these pronouns are compatible with a local grammatical an-
tecedent. It seems natural to hypothesize that Spanish te and me may be locally
bound because there is no dedicated first- or second-person reflexive clitic in
Spanish. This point has recently been emphasised in Safir (2004), in connection
with similar phenomena in some of the Germanic languages.
I believe that data of the kind in (79)-(80) carry more weight than data of
the kind in (81)-(82). This is because the latter are easily accounted for as a
instance of morphological syncretism. It often turns out to be necessary to posit
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such syncretism in any case, since first and second person pronouns quite often
take on special grammatical functions which are not plausibly compatible with
ordinary pronounhood. For example, Spanish me and te are able to take on some
of the special functions of the third-person reflexive clitic se. The verb ir (‘go’)
has a special “reflexive” form meaning “to go away” or “to leave.” In the first and






















It does not seem likely that the reflexive form of ir expresses a true two-place rela-
tion holding between a person who leaves and himself. But if it does not, me and
te in (83a) and (83b) cannot be ordinary bound pronouns. It seems that at least
some of the competition between reflexive and pronominal forms must take place
in the morphology, not the syntax. This considerably reduces the motivation for
assuming that any of the competition is syntactic. Further evidence against syn-
tactic competition comes from ellipsis. In ellipsis contexts, locally bound te and













‘I touched myself and John did too.’
b. I touched myself and John touched himself too.
c. * I touched myself and John touched me too.
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For these reasons, I think that the most promising approaches to explaining
the complementary distribution of pronouns and reflexives take Condition B as
the primitive. This move is advocated, for example, in Kayne (2002), and to a cer-
tain extent in Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and Reuland (2001). In the present
framework, a form of Condition B follows from the nesting of A and A domains.
To link two θ positions via pronominalization, it is necessary for an A position to
intervene between them. Since there are (by hypothesis) no A positions within v,
local pronominalization is impossible. A key advantage of this analysis of Con-
dition B effects is that it allows us, in a certain sense, to have our cake and eat
it with respect to the relation between Condition A and Condition B. The the-
ory presented here has analogs of both Condition A and Condition B: the former
is subsumed under locality conditions on A-chains; the latter follows from the
distribution of A-positions. Any account of binding phenomena must provide
some analog of Condition A, since there must be something to prohibit reflex-
ives from taking non-local antecedents. Within most frameworks, if a version of
Condition B is added to the theory in addition to Condition A, it must simply be
stipulated that the domains of Condition A and Condition B are identical. A key
advantage of the present proposal is that no such stipulation is necessary, since
the assumption that the A and A domains are nested is independently motivated.
There is one configuration in which the domains of Condition A and Condi-
tion B are predicted to diverge on the present analysis. The subject of an embed-
ded clause is plausibly taken to be A-local to the subject of its parent clause, but
there is also an intervening A-position – embedded [Spec,CP].13 Thus, we might
13 Note that it will make little difference whether or not there is an intermediate A-position
available on the edge of vP (Chomsky, 2000, 2001). The A-position must intervene between the
two thematic positions which are to be related. So for example, the presence of an A-position in
this location would not permit pronominal binding of a direct object by a subject, since although
the A-position on the left edge of vP would intervene between the subject in [Spec,TP] and the
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expect to find both anaphoric and pronominal binding relations between α and
β in the following configuration:
(85) [TP α ... [CP ... [TP β ]]]
In English, this prediction is difficult to test owing to the Anaphor Agreement
Effect (see §2.6). Since β cannot be a reflexive due to the AAE, only the option of
pronominal binding can be exploited. However, in languages permitting subject
anaphors such as Chinese, we do find that pronouns and reflexives are not in












This example is taken from Haddad (2007), who notes that ta-ziji is always locally
bound. Examples of this sort provide further evidence against the hypothesis that
Condition B effects derive from an economy competition between pronouns and
reflexives. Another potentially relevant data point is the breakdown in pronoun/
reflexive complementarity that we saw in (76), repeated here in (87):
(87) John1 saw a snake near him1/himself1.
These are somewhat less persuasive than the Chinese examples, since the reflex-
ive in (87) is quite plausibly treated as a logophor. However, there are some facts
weighing against a logophoric analysis, such as the fact that these reflexives do
not permit extrasentential antecedents:
(88) a. The boys1 were frightened. Near them1/*themselves1 they saw a
snake.
object position, it would not intervene between the thematic positions of the internal and external
arguments.
14 Though the facts become more complex when quantificational antecedents are considered;
see Huang (1983).
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b. The boys1 were frightened. Near the recently sculpted statues of
them1/?themselves1 they saw a snake.
If the reflexives in these examples are not logophors, it might be hypothesized
that the relevant prepositional phrases have specifiers which can be used as in-
termediate A-positions.
The mere impossibility of A-chain formation is, of course, not sufficient
in and of itself to derive a Condition B effect. There are other means of en-
coding construal dependencies, such as coreference and LF binding, which do
not depend on the possibility of A-chain formation. In §2.3, I will argue that a
phonological variant of Reinhart’s (2006) “No Sneaking” principle suffices to en-
sure that the antilocality condition on A-chain formation cannot be obviated by
means of coreference or LF binding.
2.2 Some perennial issues
Any approach to binding phenomena can be broadly characterized by the posi-
tion it takes on a number of touchstone issues. Of particular importance are the
following:
• Are Condition A effects the mirror image of Condition B effects, and if so
why?
• What is the status of DP-internal reflexives (as in e.g. pictures of himself )?
Are all or some of these exempt from the normal binding constraints?
• Is any notion of “coargument” relevant to binding theory?
• Is there a distinction between anaphoric binding and variable binding?
• Is the semantic distinction between binding and coreference significant in
the formulation of the binding principles?
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• The role of economy: can the availability of one kind of binding relation
block the availability of another? (E.g., does the availability of John1 likes
himself1 block John1 likes him1?)
The first two questions have already been addressed in the preceding section.
The following subsections will address the remaining questions. The last two
questions are further addressed in §2.3, which argues that the availability of a
chain dependency can, under certain phonologically conditioned circumstances,
have the effect of blocking other kinds of semantic dependency.
2.2.1 Against inherently “defective” or “referentially dependent”
elements
One way to begin a discussion of referential dependency is to pose the following
question. Why is it that the man can bind he in (89a), but he cannot be construed
with the man in (89b)?
(89) a. [The man]1 thinks that he1 is intelligent.
b. * He1 thinks that [the man]1 is intelligent.
One answer, of course, is that (89b) is a Condition C violation. But leaving aside
this possibility, there is an appealing “semantic” answer to this question: the
man can’t be bound by anything because it is a referential DP. This answer fig-
ures crucially in Reinhart (1983b). Reinhart rules out the possibility of he and
the man being coreferential in (89b) by means of a preference for binding over
coreference. But the impossibility of binding in (89b) is assumed to follow from
semantic considerations without the need to stipulate any additional syntactic or
interpretative condition.
The key idea here is that there are some DPs, such as he, which are by na-
ture “referentially dependent” or “defective”. These contrast with full DPs which
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(whether or not they are strictly speaking referential) do not depend on any other
DP to fix their interpretative contribution. A number of authors have proposed
multi-level hierarchies of referential dependency (e.g. Lasnik 1989, Safir 2004).A
particularly common and intuitive idea in this domain is that referential depen-
dence is tied to φ-featural deficiency (see e.g. Reuland 2001, 2005). For the
remainder of this subsection, I will lump this cluster of ideas together as the
“Theory of Lexically-Specified Referential Dependence” (TLSRD).
As intuitive as TLSRD may appear, it is difficult to state precisely, and there
is significant evidence against it. With regard to the coherence of TLSRD, a cru-
cial point is that “referentially dependent” cannot be understood to mean simply
“non-referential.” There are of course many elements which are non-referential
which nonetheless cannot receive bound interpretations (e.g. adjectives). Thus,
even under the simplest formulations of TLSRD, we have a three-way distinction:
things which refer, things which do not refer, and things which cannot refer in
and of themselves but which nonetheless seek out referents. This last category is
easy enough to conceive if we understand the need in question to be a syntactic
or grammatical one. But on this understanding, to say that something is referen-
tially dependent is merely to assign it a diacritic picking it out for the purpose of
some Condition-A-like syntactic principle. In other words, to say that something
is referentially dependent in this sense is essentially just to say that it is speci-
fied “+anaphor,” and no insight is gained by the change in terminology. On the
other hand, a semantic notion of referential dependency cannot do the necessary
work. Seeking a referent is not the same thing as seeking a referring expression,
and anaphors do the latter.
A significant empirical difficulty for TLSRD is raised by the ability of full
DPs to receive bound (or at least covarying) interpretations:
(90) Every woman who met [a man]1 asked [the man]1 out to dinner.
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Even if (90) illustrated a distinct epithetic use of the DP which was syntactically
distinguished from truly referential uses, we would still have to explain why this
epithetic form is not available in (89b). It seems unlikely that there could be any
semantic condition or consideration blocking this option. We are therefore led
to the conclusion that there is a grammatical condition which blocks the relevant
interpretation in (89b). This implies that the deviance of the indicated interpre-
tation does not follow on independent semantic grounds.
A further difficulty for the TLSRD arises in connection with the hypothesis
that referential dependency is tied to φ-featural deficiency. From a Minimalist
point of view, this hypothesis arguably follows immediately from Full Interpre-
tation together with the assumption that pronouns/reflexives are lexical items in
their own right. Chomsky (1995, 219) states Full Interpretation as follows:
(91) Full Interpretation: An LF representation must consist entirely of “le-
gitimate objects” that can receive an interpretation (perhaps as gibber-
ish).
If bound elements were fully φ-specified, it would be difficult to see how the
φ-features of both the antecedent and the pronoun could receive an interpre-
tation. (One might suppose that the φ-features of the bound element could be
interpreted as restrictors on the variable, but we will see shortly that this is em-
pirically untenable.)
Moreover, the hypothesis that bound elements areφ-featurally deficient ap-
pears on the face of it to be refuted by the existence of bound elements having
full φ-feature specifications, such as himself. For this reason, Reuland (2001)
is forced to assume that Dutch zichzelf and English himself enter into different
kinds of dependency. In both cases, zelf/self serves to obviate Semantic Condi-
tion B, but the requirement that zichzelf and himself have local antecedents is
derived in a different way for each. Since the φ-features of the zich portion of
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zichzelf are defective, these enter into an Agree15 relation with the antecedent,
and this forces an interpretation in which zich(zelf) is bound by the antecedent.
In contrast, English him (within himself ) is fully φ-specified, and so cannot enter
into an Agree relation with the antecedent. Thus, Reuland assumes that him is
bound as a variable (i.e., in the same way as him in “Everyone1’s mother thinks
that he1 is intelligent.”) The requirement that himself have a local antecedent is
then enforced by covert raising of self to the relevant predicative head. All of this
technology seems rather unmotivated, given that zichzelf behaves very much like
himself when “interference” from zich is ignored.
In later work (Reuland, 2010), Reuland, following Kratzer (2006, 2009),
has adopted the idea that some pronouns have φ-features which are not lexically
specified, but which are acquired in the course of the derivation. These acquired
φ-features are interpretatively vacuous, and hence do nothing to mitigate the
interpretative consequences of φ-featural deficiency. There is independent evi-
dence for this interpretative vacuity. For example, Kratzer points to the fact that
(92a) has a reading (92b):
(92) a. Only I take care of my children.
b. I am the only {x | x takes care of x’s children}
Here, the first-person φ-features of my appear to make no interpretative contri-
bution. Kratzer develops the notion of a “minimal pronoun”: a pronoun which is
introduced with no φ-features whatever. She argues that minimal pronouns may
acquire φ-features in the course of the derivation, and hence be spelled out as
superficially φ-complete expressions. Certain heads further condition the man-
ner in which the pronoun is spelled out. For example, a minimal pronoun in the
neighborhood of v will be spelled out as a reflexive.
15 I am being anachronistic in stating the theory of Reuland (2001) in terms of Agree, but see
Reuland (2005, 2011).
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Kratzer’s approach to binding theory is strikingly similar to the chain-based
approach. Both approaches maintain (i) that the φ-features on pronouns and
reflexives are superficial morphology; and (ii) that the distinction between (e.g.)
pronouns and reflexives is also a fairly arbitrary morphological one. However,
minimal pronouns raise a number of serious conceptual difficulties which do not
arise within the chain-based approach. In particular, the following questions
arise:
• If a “minimal pronoun” has neither φ-features, nor any referential content,
it seems to contribute nothing more than an index. But the property of
being an index is inherently relational: the only significant properties of
an index are (i) its position in a given representation and (ii) whether or
not it is identical to other indices in the same representation. Thus, it is not
obviously coherent to conceive of an index as a lexical item.
• Why does a “minimal pronoun” have to acquire φ-features from its an-
tecedent (rather than from some other item)? It is presumably not an in-
terpretative requirement that it must do so, since its (eventual) φ-features
make no interpretative contribution. But nor can it be a morphological
requirement, since any φ-feature bearing element is a fine source of φ-
features from a purely morphological point of view, whether or not it is
the pronoun’s antecedent.
• Given that minimal pronouns behave very much like lower copies, why
does UG provide both minimal pronouns and Copy+Merge for establish-
ing grammatical dependencies?
These problems can be traced back to the question raised at the beginning of this
subsection in relation to (89). There are essentially two ways to go about fleshing
out the intuition that there is something inherently “dependent” or “defective”
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about bound pronouns and reflexives. The first is to encode this defectivity as a
formal syntactic requirement, similar to the ±anaphor feature of GB theory. This,
however, has a rather stipulative flavor. Thus, especially with Minimalist consid-
erations in mind, it is tempting to try to find some semantic or “interface” notion
of referential defectiveness, perhaps tied to the interpretative consequences of φ-
feature deficiency. The aim is to construct a lexical item from whose nature the
requirement for a grammatical antecedent simply follows. But in reality it seems
unlikely that the requirement to enter into a particular kind of grammatical re-
lation could ever follow, directly, from the intrinsic properties of a lexical item.
Even supposing we have a clear semantic notion of referential defectivity, there
is no particular reason to think that a referentially defective element must obtain
a reference via a grammatically-licensed antecedent. The reverse is also true: in-
terpretative dependencies never follow directly from grammatical dependencies.
For example, Reuland (2005) argues that zich receives a bound interpretation
because its φ-features are valued by those of its antecedent. But this does not re-
ally follow without stipulation, given that φ-feature concord is observed in other
areas of the grammar (e.g. subject/verb agreement) without the same interpre-
tative effects. That a particular kind of interpretative dependency is linked to a
particular kind of grammatical dependency must always, in the final analysis, be
stipulated. A virtue of the chain-based approach is that it uses one and the same
interpretative stipulation for anaphoric binding, control and other instances of
A-movement: viz., the tail of a chain is interpreted as a variable bound by the
head.
2.2.2 Against predicate-centric approaches to binding theory
The publication of Reinhart and Reuland (1993) was a landmark in the devel-
opment of binding theory. The paper presented a persuasive critique of the GB
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binding theory, and proposed a return to a more traditional “predicate-centric”
approach to binding phenomena.16 The predicate-centric approach can be roughly
characterized by the following pair of hypotheses:
(i) The core principles of binding theory can be stated in terms of the notions
“predicate”, “argument” and the derivative notion of “co-argument.”
(ii) There is a special licensing condition on predicates which have two or more
co-indexed arguments (“reflexive predicates”).
It is important to distinguish Reinhart and Reuland’s predicate-centric binding
theory from theories stated in terms of argument structure. Although Reinhart
and Reuland clearly make reference to some notion of argument structure in their
definition of “reflexive predicate,” the binding conditions themselves are stated
as conditions on predicates. This is in contrast to the theory of, say, Pollard and
Sag (1992), in which it is only argument structures (in the form of “subcat lists”)
which are referenced in the statement of the binding conditions. The distinction
is not as academic as it may first appear. When binding conditions are stated over
argument structures, one may or may not choose to make use of the notion of
“coargument” in stating the locality constraints on local anaphoric binding. For
example, Pollard and Sag make use of this notion, whereas Bresnan (2001) (in the
course of stating a binding theory over argument-structure-like representations)
does not. In contrast, the decision to state the binding conditions as conditions
on predicates virtually forces one to adopt the hypothesis that the co-argument
domain is the domain of local anaphoric binding.
16 This approach is traditional in the sense that it is a development of the traditional observa-
tion that reflexive pronouns are used “when the subject of the sentence is identical to the object.”
Reinhart and Reuland were not the first to propose a formal version of this kind of analysis; see
e.g. Bach and Partee (1980).
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From the present perspective, the primary interest of Reinhart and Reu-
land’s theory is that its rather spare notion of “predicate” might reasonably be in-
corporated into a Minimalist theory.17 Since some notion of co-argument comes
more-or-less for free given certain assumptions regarding the architecture of the
CI interface, it would be not be surprising if certain grammatical relations were
local to the co-argument domain. Thus, if it can be shown that local anaphoric
binding is not in fact a co-argument relation this strongly suggests, given Mini-
malist background assumptions, that it is a chain-like relation of some sort.
Indeed, Reinhart and Reuland themselves advanced the hypothesis that
certain aspects of the distribution of pronouns follow from general conditions
on A-chains, and it was noted immediately by Fox (1993) that there is a high
degree of redundancy between Reinhart and Reuland’s Condition A and their
Chain Condition. Fox proposed that the former should be disbanded in favor of
a revised version of the latter. I will not summarize his arguments here, but in-
stead present some additional arguments against the predicate-centric approach
in §2.2.4-§2.2.5.
2.2.3 Summary of Reinhart and Reuland (1993)
For the reader’s convenience, this subsection contains the useful summary of
Reinhart and Reuland’s theory given in Reuland (2001, 451fn13).
(93) Definitions
a. The syntactic predicate formed of (a head) P is P, all its syntactic
arguments, and an external argument of P (subject).
b. The syntactic arguments of P are the projections assigned θ-role or




c. The semantic predicate formed of P is P and all its arguments at the
relevant semantic level.
d. A predicate is reflexive iff two of its arguments are coindexed.
e. A predicate (of P) is reflexive marked iff either (i) P is lexically re-
flexive or (ii) one of P’s arguments is a SELF anaphor.
(94) Binding conditions
a. Condition A: A reflexive-marked syntactic predicate is reflexive.
b. Condition B: A reflexive-marked semantic predicate is reflexive-
marked.
(95) Generalized chain definition
C = (α1, ...,αn) is a chain iff C is the maximal sequence such that
a. there is an index i such that for all j,1 < j < n, αj carries that index,
and
b. for all j,1 < j < n, αj governs αj+1.
(96) Condition on A-chains (condition on well-formedness)
A maximal A-chain (α1, ...,αn) contains exactly one link – α1 – that is
completely specified for grammatical features.
2.2.4 Binding across clause boundaries
The possibility of binding in the following configurations poses a challenge to
the predicate-centric approach:
(97) a. John1 expects [TP himself1 to beat Mary].
b. John1 wants very much [CP for [TP himself1 to win]].
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Reinhart and Reuland (1993) discuss examples such as (97a), but the proposed
analysis is somewhat unsatisfactory. Reinhart and Reuland’s statement of Con-
dition A is couched in terms of the rather stipulative notion of a “syntactic pred-
icate,” which is defined such that both John and himself are arguments of the
syntactic predicate headed by expects. The reflexive in (97a) therefore functions
to reflexive-mark this predicate. However, as Reinhart and Reuland note, on their
theory the reflexive should also reflexive mark the embedded predicate headed by
win (arguments: himself, Mary). Since this predicate is not in fact reflexive, (97a)
is incorrectly predicted to be ungrammatical. To rectify this problem, Reinhart
and Reuland propose that the embedded predicate raises covertly at LF to form
a complex predicate with expects:
(98) LF: John1 [to-beat]2-expects [TP himself1 t2 Mary].
In this structure, himself is an argument of the matrix syntactic predicate, but
Reinhart and Reuland claim (for reasons that I find somewhat obscure) that him-
self is not an argument of the embedded predicate or its trace t2. Thus, him-
self reflexive-marks the matrix syntactic predicate, as required, but it does not
reflexive-mark the embedded predicate. Presumably, given the grammaticality
of sentences such as (99a), the process of complex predicate formation must be
permitted to apply successive-cyclicly to yield arbitrarily complex predicates:
(99) a. John1 expects himself1 to expect himself1 to expect himself1 to beat
Mary.
b. LF: John1 [[[to-beat]2-to-expect]3-to-expect]4-expects [TP himself t4
[TP himself1 t3 [TP himself1 t2 Mary]]]
In defense of their predicate-raising analysis, Reinhart and Reuland point out
that predicate raising structures are overtly attested in other languages (e.g. Dutch).
Indeed, there does not even appear to be any grammatical upper bound on the
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size of the resulting verb cluster (Shieber, 1985). However, even if one is willing
to swallow LFs such as (99b), there is still the issue raised by the stipulative no-
tion of syntactic predicate. It is important to note that Reinhart and Reuland’s
predicate-raising analysis does not make it possible to dispense with this notion.
This is because mere raising of a predicative head at LF is not sufficient to bring
the matrix predicate into a head-complement configuration with the subject of
the embedded clause. To render the embedded subject the internal argument of
a new complex predicate would require a structural reorganization more drastic
than movement is able to effect. (There would also be the question of what to
do with the internal argument(s) of the embedded clause – would these have to
be dragged up into the complex?) In any case, as Reinhart and Reuland note (p.
679), examples such as (100) show independently that the notion of a syntactic
predicate is indispensable within Reinhart and Reuland’s theory:
(100) John1 seems to himself1 t1 to be intelligent.
Since John is not, under standard analyses, a semantic argument of seem, it cannot
be the case that John and himself are coarguments in any semantic sense. Thus, it
must be that they are arguments of the same syntactic predicate.18
Reuland (2011) gives a different analysis of English ECM subject reflex-
ives. In contrast to Reuland (2001), Reuland (2011) once again states Condi-
tion A in terms of “syntactic predicate” (though there is some discussion on how
this notion might be derived from simpler primitives). However, Reuland drops
the LF-raising analysis just discussed. Instead, he proposes that himself doesn’t
reflexive-mark the downstairs predicate because reflexive-marking is effected via
covert self -movement, and movement must be upward:
18 For this to be the case under Reinhart and Reuland’s definition of syntactic predicate, it
would be necessary to assume some kind of reanalysis of seem and to, but as chapter 3 will make
clear, I have no quarrel with this kind of analysis.
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(101) LF: John self-expects him-t to beat Mary.
This is an intriguing instance of binding theory coming full circle. Reuland as-
sumes, following Chomsky and Lasnik (1993), that self -movement is governed
by general locality conditions on movement. These conditions are, as far as I can
make out, imposed in addition to the locality conditions imposed by Reuland’s
Condition A (which is defined in terms of syntactic predicates). Within English,
the two sets of locality conditions are almost entirely redundant. Clearly, if the
theory is not to undergenerate, the locality constraints on self -movement must be
lax enough to allow self to move from any internal argument of a syntactic pred-
icate to the head of that predicate. If self -movement ever succeeds in moving
self outside of its original syntactic predicate, Condition A will be violated in any
case, so nothing of any consequence will result. If we simply remove Condition
A, together with the notion of syntactic predicate in terms of which it is stated, we
arrive at precisely the theory of Condition A presented in Chomsky and Lasnik
(1993)! For English at least, the latest revision of the predicate-centric approach
has arrived at precisely it’s point of departure – the late GB binding theory.
To put it another way, Reuland’s current theory of English reflexives holds
that: (i) there is a c-command constraint on reflexive marking and (ii) that there
are (not one but two!) non-semantically-defined locality constraints on the bind-
ing of reflexives. When examined closely, this is essentially a rather cryptic re-
formulation of earlier GB-theoretic analyses. The moral of the story seems to be
that English reflexives simply do not care which predicate they may or may not
be arguments of. Whatever the utility of predicate-centric theories in accounting
for binding phenomena in other languages, the attempt to apply the approach to
English has proved to be an almost unmitigated failure.When “predicates” are
defined in syntactic terms, and reflexive marking is conditioned on syntactically-
formulated structural constraints, then these predicates are nothing more than
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syntactic locality domains – Governing Categories.
A broadly similar point can be made regarding Reinhart and Siloni (2004).
Reinhart and Siloni come to the conclusion that reflexive interpretations can be
derived by an operation of “θ-role bundling” which applies in the syntax. This
operation is not restricted to operating within the domain of a single semantic
predicate, but is governed by fairly strict locality conditions. Again, it seems that
an adequate account of the binding patterns found in English and a number of
other languages requires an operation of some kind which is able to link multiple
θ positions which are not arguments of the same predicate. In this respect, the
current consensus of the literature seems to be that an entirely predicate-based
formulation of binding theory is impossible (even if certain binding phenomena
do require a treatment in these terms). This seems to be something of a retreat
from the position of Reinhart and Reuland (1993), which argued for a wholly
predicate-based approach.
To further the case against predicate-centric approaches, let us now return
to (97b) above, repeated here as (102):
(102) John1 wants very much for himself1 to win.
Examples of this sort are not discussed in Reinhart and Reuland (1993) (an omis-
sion pointed out in Fox 1993). However, Pollard and Sag (1992, 290) do present
an argument that reflexives in this configuration are (like picture DP reflexives)
exempt from the standard binding conditions:
The question then arises whether the anaphors in examples like the follow-
ing are subject to Principle A:
(103) a. John1 wanted more than anything else for himself1 to get the
job.
b. The men1 preferred for each other1 to do the hard work.
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On standard accounts, this question is answered affirmatively. But there is
good reason to question the correctness of such accounts. Whatever factors
(e.g. point of view) are at work to determine the coindexing in such exam-
ples, such factors are also at work in examples such as (104):
(104) a. What John1 would prefer is for himself1 to get the job.
b. The thing [Kim and Sandy]1 want most is for each other1 to
succeed.
In these examples, there is no possible appeal to Principle A, however for-
mulated, inasmuch as the antecedents are in remote syntactic domains. Yet
the indicated co-indexing seems just as obligatory as it is in (103).
It is not clear what we should conclude from this discussion, since (as Pollard and
Sag themselves go on to note) reflexives quite generally behave strangely within
cleft constructions. Thus the effect in (104) can be reproduced with direct object
reflexives:
(105) a. What John1 would prefer is himself1.
b. The thing [Kim and Sandy]1 want most is each other1.
Such examples may well show that reflexives of this sort are not subject to the
standard binding conditions (and thus imply that there are no real “connectiv-
ity” effects to be seen here; see e.g. Jacobson (1994)). But surely, if the data
in (105) fail to show that ordinary direct object reflexives are not subject to the
standard binding conditions, then the data in (104) cannot do the same for re-
flexives in the subject position of for...to infinitives. These reflexives show all the
usual signs of being non-exempt/logophoric. That is, in contrast with picture DP
reflexives, they are in complementary distribution with pronouns, do not permit
split antecedents and do not permit cross-sentential antecedents:
(106) a. John likes pictures of him/himself.
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b. John said that Mary would take pictures of themselves.
c. John was embarrassed. Nude pictures of himself were on display in
the gallery.
(107) a. John wants very badly for *him/himself to win.
b. * John said that Mary wants very badly for themselves to win.
c. * John was terrified. For himself to lose now was unthinkable.
Thus, it would seem that reflexives in the subject positions of for...to infinitives
should be brought under the yoke of the core binding principles. Since it is ex-
tremely implausible to analyze these reflexives as arguments of the matrix pred-
icate, this suggests that predicate-centric theories of binding cannot be on the
right track. Further support for this conclusion comes from languages which
have clearer examples of subject anaphors. For example, Haddad (2007) points
to Chinese, which has locally-bound subject anaphors.
2.2.5 Inherent reflexivity
Key to Reinhart and Reuland’s analysis of Dutch and English binding phenom-
ena is the notion of an inherently reflexive predicate. Inherently reflexive predi-
cates are marked as reflexive in the lexicon, and hence to do need to be reflexive-
marked by a reflexive pronoun such as himself. The idea is presumably that there
is some independent logical, semantic or conceptual notion of “inherent reflex-
ivity” such that the set of predicates which are inherently reflexive in this sense
is – more or less – the same as the set of reflexive predicates which do not need
to be marked by reflexive pronouns. There are, however, a number of serious
difficulties facing any attempt to define such a notion, as I will now argue.
Consider first how we might attempt to define inherent reflexivity in log-
ical/semantic terms. Presumably, a predicate which is “reflexive” in any sense
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must take more than one argument, so the inherently reflexive predicates can per-
haps be understood as a subclass of the n>1-ary predicates. Speaking relationally,
we might define a reflexive predicate as a predicate whose corresponding relation
is necessarily identical to one of its (i, j)-diagonals, where the (i, j)-diagonal of a
predicate P (x1, . . . ,xn) is {〈x1, . . . ,xn〉 | xi = xj and P (x1, . . . ,xn)}. This is not, how-
ever, a very well-motivated definition. Consider the following Dutch examples,














The first kind, exemplified in (108a), requires zich to the exclusion of zichzelf. In
cases of this sort, there is no independent reason at all (other than the superfi-
cially transitive form of the sentence) to think that behave denotes a two-place
relation. On intuitive semantic grounds, it it would be more natural to treat be-
have as an intransitive verb of some sort. Behaving is not obviously any more
a reflexive or self-directed action than, say, laughing or arriving, but laugh and
arrive surface as ordinary intransitives in Dutch, whereas behave takes zich. Mov-
ing onto (108b), we see that verbs such as wash [wassen] are compatible with both
zich and zichzelf. On the face of it, this immediately refutes the hypothesis that
the distribution of zich and zichzelf is determined by the presence or absence of
inherent reflexive marking on the predicate. However, Reinhart and Reuland
suggest that verbs of this sort really come in two distinct forms: zich is licensed
by an inherently reflexive form of wash, whereas zichzelf is only possible with the
ordinary transitive form. The trouble with this proposal is that it seems to predict
that an inherently reflexive form might be available for virtually any transitive
verb. The idea is perhaps that in the case of “grooming” verbs such as wash or
shave [scheeren], there is a distinct concept associated with the self-directed forms
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of these actions. But this takes us into very squishy territory. Self-hating, for
example, seems just as good a candidate for its own concept as self-washing, but
hate [haten] in Dutch is never compatible with zich.
Similar problems arise if we take a more conceptual tack. The idea here
would be to single certain concepts out as inherently reflexive, and hypothe-
size that predicates denoting relations derived from inherently reflexive concepts
should be inherently reflexive. We might try, for example, to single out the rele-
vant class of concepts terms of prototypicality – perhaps it is concepts of proto-
typically self-directed actions which are typically linked to inherently reflexive
predicates. This idea immediately runs into the same kinds of difficulty as the
first. Behaving can only be construed as a prototypically (indeed, obligatorily)
self-directed action if we take the unmotivated step of characterizing it as a two-
place relation in the first place. And it is not at all obvious that, say, washing is
prototypically self-directed. It is true, of course, that washing qua grooming is
prototypically self-directed, but to say this is virtually to make the tautological
point that self-directed instances of washing are typically self-directed.
In short, inherently reflexive predicates occupy a strange no-man’s land be-
tween the 1-place and the >1-place. On the one hand, we do not really wish to
say that behaving is a two-place relation. On the other hand, in order to maintain
that inherently-reflexive wash and shave denote inherently self-directed actions –
and what’s more, that they do so in a way that arrive and laugh don’t – we have
to say that wash and shave denote two-place relations in their inherently reflex-
ive forms. In the final analysis, it seems that inherent reflexivity functions as a
mere diacritic, having no real logical, semantic or conceptual significance. The
primary purpose of this diacritic is to predict two sets of distributional facts.
The first of these is the distribution of direct-object zich with respect to differ-
ent verbs; this will be discussed further in §2.10.2. The second is the reflexive
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interpretation of English intransitive sentences such as John washed.19 Even as
a diacritic, inherent reflexivity isn’t very successful. Consider for example the
following data:
(109) a. John washes.
b. John washes himself.
(110) a. John behaves.
b. John behaves himself.
The predicate-centric approach would have us believe that the interesting cut to
be made here is between (109a)/(110a) and (109b)/(110b) – the former are sen-
tences with inherently reflexive predicates, whereas the latter have non-inherently-
reflexive predicates which must be reflexive-marked by himself. On this view,
then, behaving oneself is of a piece with washing oneself in terms of predicational
structure, but the former is quite distinct from merely behaving. This might turn
out to be the right way of looking at things, but it is a rather counterintuitive
way of dividing up the data on the face of it. One would naturally suppose that
washing and washing oneself were pretty much the same thing – and ditto for
behaving and behaving oneself. Similarly, one might suppose that washing – a re-
lation between a washer and washee who might happen to be identical – must be
quite a different sort of relation from behaving – a one-place relation holding of
all well-behaved people.
19 I do not mean to suggest here that Reinhart and Reuland’s notion of inherent reflexivity
is relevant only to the English and Dutch data. Clearly, many other languages could be used
to illustrate the same points. Reinhart and Reuland also give an interesting analysis of certain
subtle Condition B facts within their predicate-based approach. It may be that these facts really
do require some Condition-B-like condition stated over the coargument domain. However, such
a condition can easily be added to the present framework if it should prove necessary. See Lidz
(2001), Reuland (2001), Safir (2004) for pertinent discussion.
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Indeed, there is a good evidence that grooming verbs are transitive in many
languages. For example, Lødrup (1999) notes an interesting contrast between
grooming verbs in Norwegian and other “inherently reflexive” verbs. All take seg
as an object (which is broadly similar to Dutch zich). However, only the grooming
verbs permit seg to be modified by hele [all]. Those inherent reflexives which more























‘She appeared all herself at the office.’



















On the assumption that Perlmutter and Postal’s (1984) 1-Advancement Exclusive
Law20 is an accurate descriptive generalization, Oya points out that this suggests
that the external argument cannot have been suppressed in (112). This in turn
argues against an unaccusative analysis of these verbs.
20 This law requires that there is only a single advancement to subject position per clause.
Both unaccusatives and passives involve the advancement of an internal argument to subject
position, so the 1-Advancement Exclusive Law prohibits a single clause being both passive and
unaccusative.
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The distribution of zich and zichzelf in Dutch will be discussed further in
§2.10.
2.2.6 Competition and Comparison
I will follow Reinhart (1983b) in assuming that the syntax does not have any
notion of coreference. There are no syntactic conditions which make reference
to coreference relations, and there are no syntactic conditions which require
any pair of DPs to have disjoint, overlapping or identical reference. Though I
share Reinhart’s goal of removing conditions on coreference from the grammar,
there are well-known problems with Reinhart’s original proposal. Subsections
§2.2.6.1-§2.2.6.2 present a summary of existing proposals which build on Rein-
hart’s ideas, outlining some of the problems these proposals face. §2.3 presents
my own analysis, introducing the “Keeping Up Appearances” principle as an al-
ternative to Reinhart’s (2006) formulation of Rule I.
2.2.6.1 Reinhart (1983b)
Reinhart (1983b) proposes the following binding principles:
(113) Coindex a pronoun P with a c-commanding NP α (α not immediately
dominated by COMP or S).
Conditions:
(a) If P is a reflexive/reciprocal pronoun α must be in its minimal gov-
erning category.
(b) If P is a non-reflexive/reciprocal pronoun, α must be outside its
minimal governing category.
(114) Translation procedure for bound anaphora:
[S φ]⇒ [S β(λx(φ
β/x))]
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where for any string φ and any NP β in non-COMP or S position in φ,
φβ/x is the result of replacing β and all pronouns coindexed with and
c-commanded with β by x.
Conditions (113a) and (113b) are simply the analogs of Condition A/B as pre-
sented in Chomsky (1981). The requirement that α not be immediately domi-
nated by COMP or S amounts, in modern terms, to a requirement that α be in an
A-position. The translation procedure in (114) ensures that coindexation is al-
ways interpreted as variable binding (i.e. that a pronoun or reflexive co-indexed
with a c-commanding NP is interpreted as a variable bound by that NP). As an
example of the operation of the translation procedure, the output of (114) for
(115a) is given in (115b):
(115) a. Mary1 thinks that she1 is intelligent.
b. Mary (λx . x thinks that x is intelligent)
Since (114) applies obligatorily, coreference cannot be encoded using coindex-
ation. As a consequence, coreference relations can be established only at the
interpretative interfaces. Reinhart, echoing a point made in Lasnik (1976), notes
that:
The problems for [previous] theories of anaphora (including those which dis-
tinguish bound anaphora from coreference) result from attempting to define
within the grammar the conditions for coreference, rather than for bound
anaphora only. Whatever way we may specify conditions on the referen-
tial interpretation of unbound pronouns within the sentence, there is always
the problem that such pronouns can corefer freely (i.e. subject to pragmatic
conditions only) across sentences. So, unless we introduce the problematic
non-coreference rules, there is no way to prevent a pronoun from selecting
the ‘wrong reference’ from outside the sentence. We shall see now that once
the procedures determining bound-anaphora are specified, there is in fact
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no need to establish sentence-level coreference rules.
(p. 69)
This raises the question of how (116b) is to be ruled out under an interpretation
where him corefers with John. For the remainder of this subsection, I will adopt
the convention of indicating coreference (and other extrasyntactic construal re-
lations) using italics:21
(116) a. * John1 likes him1
b. * John likes him.
With the given indexing, (116a) is straightforwardly ruled out by condition (113b),
but there is no grammatical condition ruling out (116b). Reinhart’s key proposal
is, in short, that the coreferential interpretation is not licensed in (116b) because
(117) provides the speaker with a means of encoding the same interpretation us-
ing binding:
(117) John1 likes himself1.
Reinhart (1983b) argues that when a given interpretation can be expressed using
either binding or coreference, the use of binding is preferred. In the 1983 paper,
Reinhart gives a Gricean rationale for this preference, but there would be little to
be gained from summarizing the details here.22 A more straightforward version
21 If Reinhart’s analysis is correct, the asterisks of (116a) and (116b) signal different kinds of
deviance. (116a) is an illicit syntactic representation ruled out by (113b). In contrast, (116b) is
syntactically licit, but cannot under ordinary circumstances receive an interpretation in which
him is taken to refer to John.
22 The basic idea is that using binding is in some sense more “explicit” than using coreference,
since the use of the former hard-codes the desired interpretation into the syntactic representation
itself. However, as Lasnik (1989) points out, this rather technical notion of explicitness is quite
different from whatever notion of explicitness we might expect to play a role in Gricean pragmatic
reasoning.
80
of the same general principle is stated as “Rule I” of Grodzinsky and Reinhart
(1993, 79):
(118) Rule I: Intrasentential Coreference
NP A cannot corefer with NP B if replacing A with C, C a variable A-
bound by B, yields an indistinguishable interpretation.
In the case of (116b), it is clear that replacing him with a variable bound by John
would yield the same interpretation. Thus, Rule I kicks in, and requires this
interpretation to be expressed using binding. Owing to (113b), (116a) cannot be
used to express the bound interpretation, but (117) can.23
As Reinhart herself noted in later work (Reinhart, 2000, 2006), there are
a number of problems with the Rule-I-based account of (116). In particular, it
appears to clash with Reinhart’s own analysis of strict/sloppy ambiguities in VP
ellipsis contexts. Like Keenan (1971), Reinhart assumes that the ambiguity in
(119a) derives from a hidden ambiguity in (119b):
(119) a. John loves his mother and Bill does too.
Either:
i. John loves John’s mother and Bill loves John’s mother.
(Strict reading)
ii. John loves John’s mother and Bill loves Bill’s mother.
(Sloppy reading)
23 Norbert Hornstein (p.c.) points out that Rule I does not obviously yield the correct results
in the case of ECM verbs such as expect, because locally-bound reflexives, unlike pronouns, yield
obligatory de se readings. So for example, “John expects himself to win” has only a de se reading,
whereas “John expects that he will win” has both a de se and de re reading. If it is some property
of the reflexive itself which is responsible for the absence of the de re reading in the ECM case,
then replacing a locally bound ECM pronoun with a reflexive does not obviously yield the “same
interpretation.”
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b. John loves his mother.
There are in principle two possible LFs for (119b): one in which his is co-indexed
with John and interpreted as a bound variable, and another in which there is
no syntactic relation between John and his. The latter leaves open the option of
interpreting the two as coreferential:
(120) a. John1 loves his1 mother.
b. John loves his mother.
As we have seen, Rule I will rule out (120b) when the sentence “John loves his
mother” is uttered on its own. However, Rule I as stated in (118) would ap-
pear to license the use of (120b) in (119a), since with the addition of the second
conjunct, the use of coreference in the first conjunct makes available a distinct in-
terpretation. Unfortunately, this understanding of Rule I leads to clear instances
of overgeneration:
(121) * John loves him and Bill does [love him] too.
(Where all instances of ‘him’ are interpreted as referring to John.)
As shown by the unacceptability of (121) under the indicated reading, the avail-
ability of the additional interpretation in the second conjunct does not in general
license the use of coreference in the first conjunct. (Recall that if John and him
are not co-indexed in the first conjunct, (113b) will not be violated.)
A further difficulty with Reinhart’s approach relates to its account of Con-
dition C effects such as (122):
(122) He believes that John is intelligent.
Reinhart assumes that construal of he with John in (124) can only be effected via
coreference, on the grounds that a full DP is incompatible with a bound reading.
Thus, the LF (123a) is outcompeted by (123b), and there is no possible LF along
the lines of (123c):
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(123) a. He believes that John is intelligent.
b. John1 believes that he1 is intelligent.
c. He1 believes that John1 is intelligent.
(LF where ‘he’ binds ‘John’ as a variable.)
However, epithetical DPs such as the guy do in fact allow bound readings when
they are not c-commanded by the DP which binds them:24
(124) Every man who knows [a lawyer]1 thinks [the guy]1 is super rich.
Thus, there cannot be any deep semantic reason why binding is not available in
an example such as (125):
(125) * John1 believes that [the guy]1 is intelligent.
Rather, there must be some syntactic condition which makes it impossible to
parse (125) as a structure in which the guy is bound by he.
2.2.6.2 Fox (2000)
Fox (2000) presents a modified version of Reinhart’s analysis which fixes the
problems outlined in the preceding subsection. There are two principle changes:
(i) Fox argues that Rule I is computed locally. Thus, in a sentence with multi-
ple conjuncts, such as (119a) above, each conjunct must satisfy Rule I sep-
arately. This implies, inter alia, that the use of coreference in the first con-
junct cannot be licensed by any interpretative effect in the second conjunct.
(ii) Fox relaxes the parallelism condition on VP ellipsis considerably. As we
have seen, Reinhart assumed (following earlier work) that strict/sloppy am-
24 By referring to these as “bound” readings, I do not mean to prejudice the question of whether
or not donkey anaphora involves true binding. The point is just that many full DPs are capable
of receiving non-referential interpretations under which they co-vary with a quantifier.
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biguities must reflect an ambiguity in the first conjunct. Fox rejects this
view, arguing that the pronoun in the first conjunct in an example such as
(119a) is always interpreted as a bound variable. Fox’s version of the paral-
lelism condition is sufficiently lax that the pronoun in the second conjunct
may be interpreted either as a bound variable or referentially. (Though as
we will see, this looser parallelism requirement does impose constraints on
which bound/referential interpretations are available.)
To illustrate, let us consider the possible readings of (126):
(126) John loves his mother and Bill does too.
Under Reinhart’s original analysis, the sloppy reading obtains in the pronoun in
the first conjunct is bound by John, and the strict reading obtains if it is corefer-
ential with John. However, if Rule I is computed locally, coreference in the first
conjunct will be ruled out for the same reason as coreference in (127):
(127) John loves his mother.
That is, it will be ruled out because binding is also possible and yields the same
interpretation. Thus, Fox requires a way of deriving both the strict and sloppy
readings without positing an ambiguity in the first conjunct of (126). His pro-
posal is to relax the parallelism requirement on VP ellipsis in accord with the
following principle (p. 117):
(128) NP Parallelism (Fox, 2000)
NPs in the antecedent and elided VPs must either:
i. have the same referential value (Referential Parallelism) or
ii. be linked by identical dependencies (Structural Parallelism).
It should be borne in mind that Fox does not propose (128) as the only constraint
on VP-ellipsis. Fox does not attempt to subsume (128) within an overall theory of
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Parallelism, but he presumably has in mind that any such theory should both (i)
impose weaker requirements than strict syntactic/semantic identity and (ii) im-
ply (128).25 Note that in the sense Fox uses the phrase “same referential value,”
it is possible for a pronoun to have the same referential value as another pronoun
which is interpreted as a bound variable.26 This obtains in the case where the
second pronoun is bound by a referential DP, and the first pronoun has the same
referent as this DP.
With this background, we can now see that the two readings of (126) corre-
spond to the two kinds of parallelism in (128). If the pronoun in the elided VP
satisfies (128) via Referential parallelism (i.e. by taking John as its referent), we
derive the strict reading:
(129) John1 loves his1 mother and Bill does [love his mother] too.
(Strict reading)
And if the pronoun in the elided VP satisfies (128) via Structural parallelism, the
sloppy reading is derived:
(130) John1 loves his1 mother and Bill2 does [love his2 mother] too.
(Sloppy reading)
Since Rule I always forces the use of binding in the first conjunct, (121), repeated
here as (131), is still ruled out:
(131) * John loves him and Bill does [love him] too.
A key component of Fox’s theory is his account of the pattern of interpreta-
tions available in instances of VP ellipsis such as the following:
25 It seems from footnote 8, p. 117 that Fox does not intend (128) to be an addendum to the
theory of parallelism presented in Chapter 3 of the monograph.
26 It might be helpful to make use of the notion of “covaluation” developed in Reinhart (2006)
to make sense of this.
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(132) John said that he loves his mother and Bill did too.
(As usual, we will be considering only readings where he and his in the first con-
junct are construed with John.) In principle, there are four possible interpreta-
tions of the second conjunct of (132), but as noted by Dahl (1974), only three of
these are in fact attested:
(133) a. Bill said that John likes John’s mother.
b. Bill said that Bill likes Bill’s mother.
c. Bill said that Bill likes John’s mother.
d. * Bill said that John likes Bill’s mother.
To account for unavailability of (133d), Fox proposes the following principle
(Fox, 2000, 115):
(134) Rule H: A pronoun, α, can be bound by an antecedent, β, only if there
is no closer antecedent, γ , such that it is possible to bind α by γ and get
the same semantic interpretation. [Italics in original]
Rule H blocks the LF for (132) whose first conjunct corresponds to (133d). This
is the LF in which John binds both pronouns directly (co-binding): with the first:
(135) John λx (x said that x loves x’s mother).
Clearly, when evaluated locally within the first conjunct, (135) has the same in-
terpretation as (136):
(136) John λx (x said that x λy (y loves y’s mother)).
Thus, Rule H requires (136) as the LF for the first conjunct (given that Rule I rules
out the use of coreference). Fox states the parallelism condition on VP ellipsis in
such a way that (136) in the first conjunct is parallel to (133a)-(133c) but not to
(133d). The statement of the parallelism condition is somewhat stipulative. Fox
defines two distinct notions of parallelism, Referential Parallelism and Structural
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Parallelism, and imposes the requirement that every pronoun in the ellipsis site
must receive an interpretation which is either referentially or structurally par-
allel to the corresponding pronoun in the antecedent. In the LF corresponding
to (133a), both pronouns are referentially parallel to the pronouns in the an-
tecedent. In (133b), both are structurally parallel. In (133c), the first pronoun
is structurally parallel (it is bound by an antecedent in a parallel structural con-
figuration) and the second is referentially parallel. In (133d), the first pronoun
is referentially parallel. Crucially, however, the second pronoun in (133d) is nei-
ther referentially parallel to the corresponding pronoun in the antecedent (it is
construed with Bill, not John), nor structurally parallel, since due to Rule H, the
second pronoun in the antecedent must be bound by the first pronoun, not by
John.
Fox’s approach to the Dahl phenomena is empirically extremely success-
ful. It does, however, have some undesirable properties. Heim (2007) points
out that Fox’s account of strict/sloppy ambiguities under VP ellipsis requires as-
sumptions regarding the form of the parallelism condition on VP ellipsis which
have no independent motivation. There is also a sense in which Fox’s analysis
lacks the intuitive appeal of Sag (1976), Williams (1977) and Reinhart (1983b).
A general maxim which could be extracted from this work is “ambiguities in
the interpretation of elided material can always be traced to ambiguities in the
antecedent.” Fox’s approach embodies the arguably less interesting hypothesis
that strict/sloppy ambiguities simply reflect a rather weak parallelism condition
holding between the elided material and its antecedent. Though it is certainly
possible that this will turn out to be empirically correct, it would be desirable to




Precisely such an account is proposed in Reinhart (2006). This subsection has
two aims. The first is to present a brief summary of Reinhart’s theory and some
problems with it raised by Heim (2007) and Roelofsen (2010). Roelofsen and
Heim take the position that these problems argue in favor of maintaining a Fox-
type analysis of the data. the second aim of this subsection is to show that several
of the problems with Reinhart’s theory can be resolved when the theory is stated
within a chain-based analysis of binding. This is a particularly welcome conse-
quence given that Reinhart (2006) is one of few attempts to develop a principled
account of strong crossover effects which does not depend on a traditionally for-
mulated (and hence rather stipulative) Condition C. Thus, resolving the prob-
lems with Reinhart’s theory will make available an account of strong crossover
within the present framework.
Reinhart proposes what I will term a “No Sneaking” condition to replace
the version of Rule I stated in (118):27
(137) No Sneaking: α and β cannot be covalued in a derivation D, if
(i) α is in a configuration to A-bind β.
(ii) α cannot A-bind β in D, and
(iii) The coreferential28 interpretation is indistinguishable from what
would be obtained if α binds β.
(“A-bound” here just means “bound from an A-position.”) This is somewhat cryp-
tic at first glance, and significantly more difficult to interpret than the original
27 Reinhart calls (137) Rule I, but I think it will be less confusing to assign it a different name,
since it is an entirely different principle from the one stated in (118).
28 As we will see momentarily, Reinhart actually states No Sneaking in terms of “covaluation,”
not coreference.
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Rule I. Let us consider how it applies in a simple example:
(138) a. * John1 likes him1.
b. * John likes him.
Binding in (138a) is ruled out directly by Condition B. As usual, the problem is to
rule out the use of coreference in (138b). Reinhart argues that what is wrong with
(138b) is that it uses interface processes (accidental coreference) to “sneak in”
an interpretation which a grammatical principle (Condition B) rules out. Thus,
just as with the original Rule I, it will be possible to use coreference in (138b) if
this results in an interpretation different from that which would be obtained by
binding. A similar logic applies in the case of Condition C effects. Coreference
in (139) is impossible because, although he is in a configuration to bind John, and
binding of John by he would derive the same interpretation as coreference, he
cannot in fact bind John because John is a referential DP, not a pronoun.
(139) * He thinks that John is intelligent.
A key advantage of No Sneaking over Rule I is that it does not incorrectly
predict the absence of a Condition B effect in (140):
(140) * John likes him and Bill does [like him] too.
Recall that (140) posed something of a dilemma for the Rule-I-based account of
(138). If Rule I were evaluated with respect to the entire sentence, then (140)
would be incorrectly predicted grammatical. On the other hand, if Rule I were
evaluated locally in each conjunct, binding would be forced in the first conjunct
in (141), and thus the strict reading would be unavailable given a strict paral-
lelism requirement on VP ellipsis:
(141) John loves his mother and Bill does too.
This problem is what led Fox to weaken the parallelism requirement. On the
assumption that No Sneaking is evaluated locally, this principle derives the facts
89
as desired. No Sneaking rules out the use of coreference in the first conjunct
of (140) for the same reason that it does in (138b). But, in crucial contrast to
Rule I, No Sneaking permits both binding and coreference in the first conjunct of
(141). The use of coreference instead of binding is entirely permissible so long as
the LF encoding the corresponding bound interpretation violates no grammatical
principle. Thus, No Sneaking is compatible with an analysis of the strict/sloppy
ambiguity in (141) which traces this ambiguity to an ambiguity in the first con-
junct.
So far, I have explicated the operation of No Sneaking in terms of the dis-
tinction between binding and coreference. However, Reinhart proposes to re-
place this distinction with a distinction between binding and covaluation. Coval-
uation is defined as follows (Reinhart, 2006, 172):
(142) Covaluation: α and β are covalued iff neither A-binds the other and
they are assigned the same value.
This is a relation which can hold between variables, and thus is not tied to ref-
erence. The use of covaluation instead of coreference is crucial to Reinhart’s ac-
count of strong crossover effects. Consider a standard example such as (143):
(143) * Who1 did he1 say we should invite t1?
If who binds the pronoun (Reinhart assumes that this is possible), then covalua-
tion is obtained between the pronoun and the trace of the wh-phrase:
(144) Who λx (x said that we should invite x).
We must therefore check whether this covaluation is licensed by No Sneaking. To
facilitate comparison with the representation in which he binds the trace, Rein-
hart recasts (144) as the equivalent (145a). This can then be compared to the LF
expressing binding of the trace by the pronoun, (145b):
(145) a. Who λx (x λz (z said that we should invite x))
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b. Who λx (x λz (z said that we should invite z))
These differ minimally with respect to the bolded variables. According to Rein-
hart, covaluation is not licensed in (143)/(144) because the second x is already
bound in (145a), and hence cannot be bound again. That is, it would be illicit for
the second x in (145a) to be bound in the same manner as z is bound in (145b).
Thus, the covaluation relation in (144) has the effect of “sneaking in” an interpre-
tation which is ruled out by a logical/grammatical principle (the principle that a
variable cannot have two distinct binders).
This brings us to Reinhart’s account of the Dahl facts. Unfortunately, this
now presents something of an exigetical nightmare due to a recent critique of
Reinhart’s account presented in Roelofsen (2010). In his careful analysis, Roelof-
sen shows that Reinhart appears to assume that No Sneaking applies iteratively
(i.e., that it applies to its own output). Unfortunately, this assumption turns out
to derive the wrong results in many instances, casting doubt on whether Rein-
hart’s account is empirically viable. I will first attempt a faithful rendering of
Reinhart’s original exposition, and then discuss the problems raised by Roelof-
sen.
Consider (132), repeated here as (146):
(146) John said that he loves his mother and Bill did too.
As we have seen in (133) above, there is an interesting patterning of available
interpretations of the elided VP. Under Reinhart’s theory, the first conjunct in
(146) has, on the face of it, three possible LFs:
(147) a. John λx (x said that x loves x’s mother).
b. John λx (x said that x loves y’s mother) & x = John.
c. John λx (x said that y loves x’x mother) & y = John.
We could also have written & x = y in (147b) and (147c) – since covaluation is
91
specified in semantic terms in (142), the distinction is not important. Of the LFs
in (147), it is (147c) which gives rise to the unattested reading:
(148) John said that John loves John’s mother and Bill said that John loves
Bill’s mother.
Thus, we need a way to rule out (147c) as a possible LF for the first conjunct.
Given the apparent symmetry between (147b) and (147c), we will have to find
some way of introducing a distinction. Reinhart argues as follows.
Reinhart implicitly assumes that statements of covaluation are added after
binding relations have been encoded via lambda abstraction, so there is an order-
ing component to the argument. Consider the LFs of (147b) and (147c) before
the covalued pronouns were replaced with variables:
(149) a. John λx (x said that x loves his mother). (Compare (147b))
b. John λx (x said that he loves x’s mother). (Compare (147c))
Given that we wish to express an interpretation under which his and he are con-
strued with John, we must now evaluate whether it is permissible to translate
these pronouns as covalued variables. Under No Sneaking, this means figuring
out whether it would be licit to translate the pronouns as bound variables. Rein-
hart states that the following procedure should be followed to make this check:
(150) To check clause (iii) of (137), construct a comparison-representation by
replacing β with a variable A-bound by β. (To be computed locally in
each conjunct.)
In (149a), we can do this simply by introducing a new lambda abstraction inside
the existing lambda abstraction:
(151) John λx (x said that x λy (y loves y’s mother)).
In (149b), by contrast, more drastic alterations to the LF would be required. The
variable x is already bound, so it “cannot be bound again” (Reinhart, 2006, 193).
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Thus, there is no licit way of deriving from (149b) an LF which encodes a binding
relation between he and x. At this point, No Sneaking comes into effect. If there
is no licit LF for the bound reading, then we cannot use covaluation to encode an
equivalent reading. Reinhart is not particularly clear on what exactly is wrong
with “binding a variable again.” I will follow Roelofsen (2010) in assuming that
the key principle is that all existing binding relations must be left in tact in order
for binding to be licit for the purposes of No Sneaking. Thus, (149a) is alright
because it leaves in tact the existing binding relation between John and x, whereas
there is no way of constructing a comparison-representation for (149b) which
does not destroy the existing binding relation between John and x.
Though the intuition between Reinhart’s account is reasonably clear, Roelof-
sen (2010) shows that there is a rather deep problem with it. To see this, consider
a more detailed step-by-step account of why (149b) is illicit. To evaluate (149b)
with respect to No Sneaking, we must begin by constructing its binding alterna-
tive. This is simply (149b) with he replaced by x:
(152) John λx (x said that x loves x’s mother).
In (152), the last two instances of x are covalued. For this covaluation to be licit
according to No Sneaking, it must be possible for each covaluation relation to be
replaced by a licit binding relation. The question is now whether the comparison-
representation for (149b) – (153) – is a No Sneaking violation:
(153) John λx (x said that x λy (y loves y’s mother)).
This does in fact constitute a No Sneaking violation since the existing binding re-
lation between John and x in (149b) has been destroyed. Thus, it is correctly pre-
dicted that (149b) is not a possible LF. The problem, as Roelofsen points out, is
that (149a) has the same comparison-representation as (149b)! (I.e. (153).) Thus,
by exactly the same logic, (149a) should violate No Sneaking too. It seems, then,
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that Reinhart cannot really have had in mind that comparison-representations be
constructed according to the method stated in (150). Some passages in Reinhart’s
exposition suggest that No Sneaking is evaluated over representations where one
can still tell the difference between those pronouns which have “already” been
translated as bound variables, and those pronouns which are candidates for re-
ceiving a covalued interpretation. The idea seems to be that pronouns which
have already been translated cannot be “bound again,” whereas the untranslated
pronouns can. I think that it might be possible to work out a coherent statement
of Reinhart’s account along these lines. However, I will not attempt to do so here,
since I would like to suggest a chain-based alternative to No Sneaking, “Keeping
Up Appearances,” which will be stated in the following section. This condition
is inspired by No Sneaking, but relies crucially on a comparison set defined in
phonological rather than interpretative terms.
2.3 Keeping Up Appearances
The basic idea is behind Keeping Up Appearances is that even dependencies
which aren’t syntactically encoded have to sound as if they’re syntactically en-
coded, if the elements related by the dependency are in a configuration which
could potentially license a syntactic dependency.
(154) Keeping Up Appearances: If α and β are A-local29, then for any inter-
pretative dependency between α and β which is not established via
a chain, it must be possible to replace β with the tail of a licit A-
position-spanning chain terminating in α (or vice versa) to yield the
29 A-locality in the intended sense is implied by A-locality. I.e., it is not possible for α and β to
be too close to be A-local. Roughly speaking, there must be a c-command relation between α and
β for them to be A-local, but in the present framework, the Merge over Move condition takes on
the role of a c-command constraint; see §2.8.5.4.
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same phonological output.
We will see in §2.12 that the relevant notion of A-locality is quite loose, in the
sense that it permits violations of Minimality and certain island constraints. Be-
fore going through the account of the Dahl paradigm in terms of (154), I would
like to point to some advantages of this condition with regard to Condition C
effects. First, consider an example such as (139), repeated here as (155):
(155) * He thinks that John is intelligent.
Reinhart’s account of (155) relied on the assumption that a DP such as John is in-
herently incapable of receiving a bound interpretation. As argued in §2.2.1, this
assumption is somewhat dubious. Under the present analysis, (155) is ruled out
simply because English lacks a rule of backwards pronominalization.30 Suppose
a construal dependency is established between he and John at the CI interface.
To check whether Keeping Up Appearances is satisfied, we now form a chain be-
tween John and the pronoun (so that the pronoun is replaced by a copy of John):
(156) [John] thinks [CP [John] that [John] is intelligent].
Although this is a licit chain, it cannot be spelled out as (139). Keeping Up Ap-
pearances is therefore violated.
Keeping Up Appearances correctly predicts the existence of Condition C
violations involving epithets:
(157) a. The bastard thinks that he is intelligent.
b. * He thinks that the bastard is intelligent.
c. * John thinks that the bastard is intelligent.
d. ?? The bastard thinks that the bastard is intelligent.
30 That is, there is no chain spellout rule which pronounces the head of any English chain as a
pronoun. This is not to deny that sentences such as “His1 mother loves John1” are grammatical
in English, just to deny that they are derived via a pronominalization rule.
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e. * The bastard thinks that John is intelligent.
In every case except (157a), it is impossible for the relevant A-chains to yield
an appropriate pronunciation. In (157b), a higher copy of the bastard cannot be
pronounced as he, since English lacks a rule of backward pronominalization. In
(157c), the problem is that a lower copy of John cannot be pronounced as the
bastard and vice versa. The other examples play out in a similar fashion. These
data highlight an advantage of stating Keeping Up Appearances with reference to
phonological output. The Condition C violations in (157b)-(157e) are problem-
atic for Reinhart’s interpretation-based statement of No Sneaking,31 but they are
easily accommodated under the present approach. If the c-command relation be-
tween the epithet and its antecedent is broken (so that the two are not “A-local”),
then binding is correctly predicted to be possible:
(158) a. His mother thinks that the bastard is intelligent.
b. The bastard’s mother thinks that the bastard is intelligent.
c. John’s mother thinks that the bastard is intelligent.
d. The bastard’s mother thinks that John is intelligent.
Strong crossover effects are derived as follows. We must determine what
happens if the non-syntactically-derived binding relation in (159) is replaced by
the chain relation in (160) (intermediate landing sites not shown):
(159) Who1 did he1 say that we should invite [who]?
(160) Who1 did [who] say that we should invite [who]?
Once again, we see that although the chain in (160) is licit, and is an A-chain as
required, (160) cannot be pronounced identically to (159). Keeping Up Appear-
ances is therefore violated. Condition B effects follow in a similar manner:
31 The problem posed by epithets was first noted in Lasnik (1989), with reference to Reinhart
(1983b).
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(161) * John loves him.
Here, condition (i) of Keeping Up Appearances is satisfied, but it is impossible
to satisfy (ii) because no A-position-spanning chain can be formed to link John to
the position of him.32
The set of facts in (162) has received an elegant explanation in terms of No
Sneaking and Rule I:
(162) a. He is John.
b. Obviously, given that everyone is self-identical, John is John.
c. No, you’re mistaken, John is him [points].
d. No, you’re mistaken, John is that man [points].
These data cannot be accounted for in terms of Keeping Up Appearances. How-
ever, this does not pose a serious problem since they are in any case subsumed
under Postal’s (1970) generalization that it is only relations of presupposed coref-
erence which are of any grammatical significance. A potentially more serious
problem for Keeping Up Appearances is posed by the following data, which also
have an account in terms of No Sneaking and Rule I:
32 It seems that the phonological identity requirement imposed by Keeping Up Appearances
must be reasonably loose with respect to the distinction between stressed and unstressed pro-
nouns in English. Or alternatively, it may be that the tail of a pronominalization chain can be
spelled out as a stressed pronoun in English. Consider the following contrast:
(i) John thinks that HE is intelligent.
(ii) * John thinks that THE BASTARD is intelligent.
This contrast follows from Keeping Up Appearances only if HE (or something sufficiently phono-
logically similar to it) can be the spellout of the tail of an A-position-spanning chain linking the
positions of John and HE. Thus, either the tail of such a chain simply can be spelled out as HE,
or if it can only be spelled out as an unstressed pronoun, the phonological identity requirement
must be correspondingly loose.
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(163) a. Only John loves John.
b. Everyone loves John. Bill loves John, Mary loves John, even HE loves
John.
c. As for John, Bill loves him, Mary loves him – even JOHN loves him.
Are these facts are also subsumed under Postal’s generalization? To answer this
question would require a detailed investigation of presupposition and focus,
which I will not attempt here. Examples such as (163a)-(163c) have recently been
discussed by Heim (2007). Heim concludes that the availability of coreference in
such cases derives from a lack of c-command. In (163a), John is embedded in a
larger phrase containing only. In cases where only is not present, such as (163b)-
(163c), Heim assumes that there is nonetheless a covert focus head which serves
to block c-command.33 A problem for this account is that it does not obviously
accommodate the possibility of reflexive binding in the same configuration:
(164) Only John1 loves himself1.
One would be forced to conclude that two structures are available: one in which
only (or the covert Focus head) does not block c-command, and one in which it
does.
A alternative approach to the data in (163b)-(163c) is presented in Grodzin-
sky and Sharvit (2007). Grodzinsky and Sharvit argue that the de se/de re distinc-
tion is critical to an understanding of these cases. The locally construed pronoun
receives a non-de se interpretation which is distinct from the interpretation ob-
tained if a reflexive is substituted. From the present point of view, the key ques-
tion is what exactly counts as an “interpretative dependency” in the statement
of Keeping Up Appearances in (2.3). Presumably, interpretative dependencies in
33 Most of Heim’s discussion centers on more complex examples such as “[Every devil]1 knows
that only he1 loves him1,” as famously discussed in Heim (1993, 1998), but the arguments carry
across to (163a)-(163c).
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this sense must include relations of binding and presupposed coreference which
are established via interpretative processes at the CI interface. However, it is not
clear that the relation between a non-de se pronoun and its antecedent falls into
either of these two categories. Grodzinsky and Sharvit’s account might there-
fore be adapted to the chain-based framework. More generally, the point is that
the construal relations in (163a)-(163c) may not be simple relations of binding
or presupposed coreference. If they are not, then it is not surprising that they
are ignored for the purposes of Keeping Up Appearances. However, aside from
these speculative remarks, I will have to leave the issues raised by (163a)-(163c)
unresolved in this dissertation.
Given this preliminary discussion of the consequences of Keeping Up Ap-
pearances, we can now return to the Dahl paradigm. Consider the possible LFs
for (165) under a chain-based approach to binding:
(165) John said that he loves his mother.
One option is for John to be base-generated in the position of his, subsequently
moving through the position of he and then on to the matrix subject position:
(166) [TP John said [CP [John] that [John] loves [John]’s mother]].
It is also possible for one or both of the pronouns not to enter into a chain depen-
dency with John. In this case, the pronouns relate to John via interface binding:
(167) a. [TP John said [CP [John] that [John] loves his mother]]
b. [TP John said [CP [John] that he loves [John]’s mother]]
c. [TP John said [CP that he loves his mother]]
What is not possible, crucially, is for “co-binding” to be encoded via chain rela-
tions. The derivation in (166) is interpreted as transitive binding: that is, binding
of he by John and binding of his by he. Thus, the only way to relate both he and him
to John independently of each other is to use interface binding (or coreference).
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Once again, to capture Dahl’s paradigm, the LF to be ruled out is (167b)
(in the case where he is construed with the higher copy of John by interpretative
processes at the CI interface). This is quite straightforward given the statement of
Keeping Up Appearances in (154). The basic point is that any sequence of copies
of the form in (168) is interpreted according to the pattern on the left, not either








If the pronoun in (167b) were to be replaced by the tail of a chain between it and
the higher copy of John, the configuration obtained would be the rightmost of
those shown in (168). Thus, Keeping Up Appearances is not met. Although the
pronoun and the higher copy of John are A-local, it is not possible to form an A-
chain linking John with the position of the pronoun, since this would lead to an
illicit dependency configuration. In general, chains can only be used to encode
transitive binding, not co-binding.34
Keeping Up Appearances accommodates the data in (79b)/(80b) above, re-
peated here as (169)-(170):
(169) * The boys{1,2,... } like him1.
(170) * We{1,2,... } like me1.
34 This is essentially the conclusion reached by Montalbetti (1984, 110) in his revised formula-
tion of Higgenbotham’s (1983) linking theory (“(56) [which corresponds to the leftmost pattern
in (168)] is the only configuration that can relate the three positions shown, when c-command
relations are enforced.”).
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In (170), for example, it is not permissible to establish an interpretative relation
between we and me because there is no way of forming an A-spanning chain
linking we to the position of me which would yield an identical phonological
output. (The condition on the phonological output is irrelevant here, since it is
not possible to form such a chain at all.) Keeping Up Appearances also accounts













‘I touched myself and John did too.’
b. I touched myself and John touched himself too.
c. * I touched myself and John touched me too.
This data point highlights the necessity of requiring that there be a licit A-position-
spanning chain in the definition of Keeping Up Appearances. If any licit chain
were sufficient to satisfy the condition, we would incorrectly predict the avail-
ability of a strict reading for (171a), since – owing to the lack of a distinct first-
person reflexive clitic in Spanish – an A-chain can be formed between Juan and
me to yield the required phonological output.
On standard assumptions, when two pronouns which do not stand in a c-
command relation are bound by the same antecedent, only co-binding is possible.
As we have seen, co-binding in the chain-based framework cannot be expressed
using only chain-based dependencies, since leaving aside instances of across-the-
board movement, two phrases cannot move to the same place. Thus, co-binding
must be encoded in one of the ways illustrated in (172). There turn out to be a
surprising number of possibilities, if it is admitted that interpretative processes
at the LF interface may both (i) relate a pronoun directly to a quantifier or (ii) re-
late a pronoun to another pronoun interpreted as a bound variable (“covaluation”
in Reinhart’s sense). In (172), coindexation is used to indicate a chain relation,
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and coitalicization to indicate a relation established by interpretative processes
at the CI interface.
(172) a. Every boy said that pictures of him resemble him.
b. Every boy1 said that pictures of him1 resemble him.
c. Every boy1 said that pictures of him resemble him1.
d. Every boy1 said that pictures of him1 resemble him
e. Every boy1 said that pictures of him resemble him1
f. * Every boy1 said that pictures of him1 resemble him1
In (172a), both pronouns are related to every boy via interpretative processes at
the CI interface.35 In (172b), the first pronoun is related to every boy via a chain
and the second at the CI interface. In (172c), the second pronoun is related via a
chain and the first at the CI interface. In (172d), the first pronoun is bound via
a chain and the second pronoun is covalued with the first at the CI interface. In
(172e), the second pronoun is bound via a chain and the first pronoun is covalued
with the second at the CI interface. Finally, the impossible configuration is shown
in (172f), where both pronouns are linked to every boy via a chain.
In English, it is difficult to find any overt correlates of the different depen-
dency patterns in (172). There are however some suggestive Spanish data first
noted in Montalbetti (1984). Spanish, to a first approximation, permits only null
35 (172a) may actually represent more than one dependency configuration, since at least in
principle, there are various different ways in which the quantifier and the pronouns could be
related to each other at the CI interface (e.g. transitive binding, co-binding, or binding of one of
the pronouns together with covaluation of the one pronoun with the other). The potential avail-
ability of these different configurations is however of no significance in the present connection.
Note that co-binding at the CI interface, though possible in principle when the quantifier and the
two pronouns are linked by c-command, will in fact be ruled out by Keeping Up Appearances, as
explained above.
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subject pronouns to express bound readings. However, there are some circum-
stances under which a an overt subject pronoun can be construed with a quan-
tifier when a null subject pronoun bound by this quantifier is also present. In
particular, when the quantifier and the covert/overt subject pronouns are linked
by c-command, only one of the pronouns must be covert:36



























b. Nadie pensó que las fotos que pro tomó probarían que él estuvo ahí.
c. Nadie pensó que las fotos que él tomó probarían que pro estuvo ahí.
d. Nadie pensó que las fotos que pro tomó probarían que pro estuvo
ahí.
This pattern is the expected one on the chain-based theory, given the assumption
that the pronominalization spell out rule of Spanish can only spell out the tail of
a chain terminating in a subject position as a null pronoun. (173a) is ruled out
by Keeping Up Appearances, since, inter alia, nadie and the first él are A-local
and yet the relevant chain could not have its tail spelled out as él. In (173b),
the relation between nadie and pro can either be encoded via a chain, or encoded
at the CI interface in accord with Keeping Up Appearances. Él in (173b) can in
principle either be related directly to nadie at the CI interface or indirectly via
pro (covaluation). The former option is ruled out by Keeping Up Appearances,
but the latter is not, since in this case the dependency is between pro and él, and
these are not A-local. The same logic applies in (173c), since the difference in the
order of pro and él makes no difference. Finally, (173d) can be encoded using any
36 These examples are Montalbetti’s. I could not find a judgment for (173b) in Montalbetti, but
it has been checked. All of the examples in (173b) are being considered under the reading where
both pronouns are construed with the quantifier.
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one of the patterns of dependencies in (172a)-(172e).
2.4 Copy reflexives and backward pronominalization
As pointed out by Boeckx, Hornstein, and Nunes (2008), the chain-based ap-
proach has no difficulty in accommodating copy-reflexive languages such as Hmong
































ii. 3 Pao always praises Pao and May always praises May.









These languages simply spell out both the head and the tail of the A-chain in the
same manner, rather than using a special reflexive form for the tail. As expected
under this account, each instance of the DP must be precisely identical – it is not
sufficient to use two different referential expressions which pick out the same










‘Mike1 knows the priest∗1/2 is smart.’
37 Mortensen reports that some of his informants do permit this interpretation (the “strict”
interpretation). However, Hmong in this respect is perhaps no different from English: some
English speakers allow strict readings in examples such as “John defended himself because his
lawyer couldn’t.”
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We find similar morphological arbitrariness in the case of bound pronouns.
In English, it is the tail of a variable binding dependency which gets spelled out
as the pronoun, but in Nuu-chah-nulth either the head or the tail may be spelled


























‘Christine1 said that she1’s gonna knead bread tomorrow.’
(Lit: ‘She1 said that Christine1’s gonna knead bread tomorrow.’)
Again, this is not unexpected under the chain-based approach.
2.5 Pronominalization from non-thematic positions
If pronouns and reflexives spell out lower Case positions in chains which span
multiple Case positions, the null hypothesis is that the thematic properties of
the chain should be irrelevant. Thus, we should find examples of pronouns and/
or reflexives used to spell out positions in chains which do not span multiple
thematic positions. In this section, I would like to draw attention to some possible
examples of pronouns of this type.
The English “copy raising” construction exemplified in (178) was first in-
vestigated in Rogers (1971, 1972, 1974a,b). It is exemplified in (178):
(178) John1 seems as if he1’s intelligent.
There are a number of reasons to treat this as an example of raising parallel to
“John seems to be intelligent.” First, it has a near-synonymous counterpart with
an expletive subject:
(179) It seems as if John’s intelligent.
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Second, many speakers allow non-thematic subjects:38
(180) There seem as if there are too many people here.
Finally, as noted by Kaplan-Myrth (2000), the “if” clause must contain a copy or
pronominalization of the subject:
(181) a. * John seems as if it’s the end of the world.
b. * There seem as if too many people have arrived.
This strongly suggests that the subjects of (178) and (180) are derived subjects.
I will follow Potsdam and Runner (2001) in assuming that apparent examples
of copy raising from non-subject positions, such as (182), really show thematic
versions of the same predicates, so that matrix subject is base generated in these
examples:
(182) Mary seems as if her paper received a bad grade.
It is natural within the present framework to analyze copy raising in terms
of A-movement.39 The only question is why in this Case the tail of the A-chain
is spelled out as a pronoun rather than as a reflexive. This may perhaps be an
indirect consequence of the Anaphor Agreement Effect. Since the AAE typically
makes it impossible for an A-chain to cross a finite clause boundary into a finite
subject position, English lacks a nominative form of the reflexive. In those rare
cases where such chains can be formed, it may be that the pronoun is the closest
thing to a nominative reflexive form that is available. The alternative would be
to assume that copy raising is derived via A-movement, and that the pronoun
in copy raising is an ordinary A resumptive. Such an analysis would, however,
be problematic in a number of respects. First, there is no independent evidence
that expletives can undergo A-movement, so (180) would be difficult to account
38 A google search for “ ‘there seem as if there’ ” will confirm this.
39An A-movement analysis was proposed for a similar construction in Igbo by Ura 1998).
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for. Second, even allowing for examples such as (182), it seems likely that an A-
movement analysis would predict non-local copy raising to be much easier than
it really is.
The existence of copy raising provides independent evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that syntax is value blind. If a DP is already in a Case position this
does not necessarily prevent it from raising, so long as there is a local higher Case
position for it to move to.
The question remains of why the form of the complementizer of the embed-
ded clause is able to determine the availability of copy raising. I.e., why is (183a)
good but (183b) bad?
(183) a. John seems as if he’s intelligent.
b. * John seems that he’s intelligent.
With reference to the discussion of expletives in §1.2.6, I suggest that this may
relate to the fact that finite clauses with if in C are frozen for A-movement:
(184) a. Everyone believes that John is intelligent.
b. It is believed by everyone that John is intelligent.
c. That John is intelligent is believed by everyone.
(185) a. Everyone wonders if John is intelligent.
b. * It is wondered by everyone if John is intelligent.40
c. * If John is intelligent is wondered by everyone.
Suppose we have reached the following stage in the derivation of (183b):
(186) seems that John is intelligent.
If, as suggested in §1.2.6, the embedded clause requires Case, it must raise to
40 Recall that on the analysis of §1.2.6, (185c) does involve A-movement of the clause, with the
higher copy pronounced as a pronoun and the lower copy pronounced fully.
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the matrix subject position at this point in the derivation. This will block raising
of John. In contrast, the inability to passivize of verbs which take if clauses as
internal arguments suggests that these clauses do not require Case. Thus, there
is nothing to stop John raising to subject position in (183a).
2.6 The Anaphor Agreement Effect
The preceding section suggests a partial analysis of the Anaphor Agreement Ef-
fect. The Anaphor Agreement Effect is the well-known generalization of Rizzi
(1990a) that anaphors cannot appear in positions “construed with agreement.”41
From the present perspective, it seems that an analysis of the Anaphor Agree-
ment Effect should provide an answer to the following question:
(187) Why can an A-chain not span multiple agreeing positions even though
an A-chain can?
We have seen in §1.2.6 that one difference between A-chains and A-chains is that
only the former are permitted to violate Minimality. In the preceding section, it
was suggested that ordinary finite clauses in English require Case. It may be that
a clause which requires Case and which contains a φ-complete T is sufficiently
similar in feature specification to a DP to induce an A-over-A violation if a DP
inside of it moves out. This is a particularly plausible hypothesis if we assume
that T is split between a lexical T head and a higher Agr projection. On Chomsky
and Lasnik’s (1993, 197) analysis, Agr bears D features of some sort.42 If so, the
Agr head is specified both for φ-features and for D. It is possible in any case
that category features are invisible for Minimality, so that a merely categorical
distinction between two heads/phrases is not enough to distinguish them w.r.t.
41 See also Woolford (1999).
42Chomsky calls them “NP features.”
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Minimality.
If the pronoun in examples such as (183a) is the spellout of the tail of an
A-chain, we might expect it to exhibit anaphor-like properties in cases where the
head of the chain is in a thematic position. There is one respect in which this
appears to be the case. Pronouns in the subject position of an if clause tend to
resist strict interpretations when bound by the matrix subject – (188) – whereas
pronouns in the subject position of ordinary finite clauses do not – (189):
(188) Only John acts as if he’s intelligent.
a. ?? Only John acts as if John is intelligent.
b. 3 John is the only x such that x acts as if x is intelligent.
(189) Only John thinks that he’s intelligent.
a. 3 Only John thinks that John is intelligent.
b. 3 John is the only x such that x thinks that x is intelligent.
This very brief discussion of the AAE does not address AAE effects in lan-
guages with object agreement. In principle, the same story may apply. If AgrO
is phi-complete, it may be sufficiently similar in feature-specification to a DP
to induce an A-over-A effect. But of course, since AgrOP does not, on standard
assumptions, undergo Case-driven A-movement, an account along these lines is
less plausible for the object case. I leave a fuller treatment of the AAE within the
present framework for future research.
2.7 Reflexives and Case absorption
Given the basic mechanics of feature valuation, there is no reason in principle





Such chains are usually assumed to be impossible. It is difficult to construct
putative instances of (192), since clausal structure appears to be such that there
is always a theta position between any two Case positions. However, there is no
obvious Minimalist rationale for blocking (190) or (191). I will argue that these
chains are in fact attested, and that they are responsible for uses of reflexives as
“Case absorbers.”
To begin with, consider the problem posed by (193). Here, behave appears
to be a one-place predicate (* John behaves Mary), but on traditional accounts this
is difficult to reconcile with the presence of the reflexive in object position:
(193) John behaves himself.
On the assumption that chains of the form in (190) are permitted, (193) has a
straightforward derivation that is compatible with the assumption that behave is
a one-place predicate. Suppose that behave assigns only one θ-role, but that it
also (in association with AgrO) assigns an accusative Case.If Case features can-
not be left unassigned, it follows that some means must be found of checking the
Case features of both the verb and finite T. This is precisely what a chain of the
form in (190) or (190) achieves. Whether the tail of the chain is a Case or a θ
position will be determined by whether the vP/VP is unaccusative or unergative.
Or rather, whether it is just like an unaccusative/unergative vP/VP but for the
addition of an accusative Case assigner. Let us refer to the relevant structures as
pseudo-unaccusatives and pseudo-unergatives. If we follow Hale and Keyser (1993,
315), Chomsky (1995), then in the pseudo-unaccusative case, the Agr head which
assigns accusative Case will be above the θ-position. In the pseudo-unergative
case, the θ position will be [Spec,vP] above Agr. It seems more reasonable to
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treat behave as a pseudo-unergative than as an pseudo-unaccusative. There are
few definitive syntactic tests for unergativity in English, but this decision is rea-
sonable on intuitive semantic grounds, and is consistent with the resistance of
behave himself to extraposition from subject:
(194) a. [A boy t] arrived [with red hair]. (Pseudo-unaccusative)
b. * [A boy t] laughed [with red hair]. (Pseudo-unergative)
c. * [A boy t] behaved himself [with red hair].
The pseudo-unergative derivation is roughly as shown in (195). The argument
(John) is first merged in the lower Case position, raises to receive a θ-role from v,

















In general, it seems that both pseudo-unaccusative and pseudo-unergative struc-
tures are possible. For example, Oya (2010) argues that German sich can appear
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in the object position of verbs which have either external or internal arguments
(see also §2.2.5 above):






















‘Dieter got on a ladder.’


















‘There happened an accident.’
Derivations of the preceding type provide an alternative to the Case-absorption
mechanisms of Hornstein (2001), Reinhart and Siloni (2004) and Reuland (2011).
Each of these authors assume that certain kinds of simplex reflexive function as
Case absorbers. This explains why these simplex reflexives often turn up in unac-
cusatives, impersonal passives and other non-reflexive constructions. The anal-
ysis also extends to reflexive sentences themselves. For example, in the case of
a verb such as Spanish lavar [wash], Reinhart and Siloni assume that the verb is
“reflexivized” by a syntactic operation of θ-role bundling, but that this mecha-
nism fails to remove the accusative Case assigned by the verb. This necessitates











Under this analysis, se functions essentially as a verbal affix. (And indeed, it is
not uncommon cross-linguistically to find verbal affixes which function in a sim-
ilar manner.) A slightly different implementation of this analysis is proposed in
Hornstein (2001). Here, the “bundling” of the θ-roles is taken care of by move-
ment through the two θ positions, and se attaches to the verb to absorb the spare














Both analyses face a problem raised in Labelle (2008, 850). Labelle points to
certain facts regarding the French causative construction. Reflexive clauses in
French (and also Italian) are well-known to pattern with intransitives when em-



































‘I will make Paul eat.’
Labelle notes that in (200a), the subject of transitive wash is realized as an oblique,
whereas in (200b), the full DP argument of reflexive wash is in the accusative.In
this respect, (200b) appears to pattern with the intransitive (200c), not the transi-
tive (200a). So far, this is all grist for the Reinhart-Siloni-Hornstein mill, since it
appears to suggest that the subject of a reflexive clause is the external argument –
se functions to absorb Case, but it leaves both the internal and external θ-roles in
tact. However, Labelle (2008) points out a rather serious problem with the Case
absorption analysis. Sometimes, se surfaces too far away from the Case-assigner













‘He1 will make Paul wash him1.’
Here, it is clear from the meaning that se is absorbing a Case in the embedded
clause, but it attaches to the matrix verb/auxiliary. Of course, one might suppose
that some sort of clitic climbing takes place here, but given that French does not
show clitic climbing in any other construction, this is hardly an attractive line
of analysis. This suggests that se and other such reflexives are never really Case-
absorbing verbal affixes. In cases where these morphemes appear to function as
such, it is really the lexical DP which absorbs the additional Case, as in (195).
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2.8 Merge over Move and subject-orientation
This section has two main aims. The first is to argue for a treatment of subject-
orientation effects in binding based on Merge over Move. The basic logic here will
be identical to that of Hornstein (2001)’s explanation of the subject-orientation
of adjunct control. The second aim is to motivate my adoption of Reinhart’s No
Sneaking principle by showing that it allows the account of subject-orientation
effects to be extended to cover certain anti-subject-orientation effects. Since these
effects pose a significant challenge for most approaches to binding theory, I take
this to be a significant argument in favor of the theory presented here.
To my knowledge, the first application of Merge over Move to subject-orientation
effects in binding phenomena is Motomura’s (2001) study of Japanese zibun. Zi-









‘Takashi1 recommended himself1/∗2 to his boss2.
On the assumption that zibun is the residue of A-movement, Motomorua observes
that Merge over Move provides a principled account of certain otherwise-curious
properties of the distribution of zibun. The logic is similar, but not identical,
to that of the adjunct control case. The key difference is that in (202), the licit
antecedent, takashi, must move over the illicit antecedent, jooshi. Since zibun
often functions as a long-distance reflexive, we can assume that it is in some
instances a residue of A-movement. Thus, Minimality does not block movement
of takashi over jooshi, and Merge over Move can exert its influence, forcing takashi
to move instead of jooshi. (We will see in §2.8.2 that things are a little more
complex in comparable English examples, owing to the prima facie expectation
43 Motomura notes some examples where zibun is, e.g., inside a PP and is not restricted to
subject antecedents.
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that movement of one internal argument over the other should be blocked by
Minimality.) Motomura’s second key data point is the possibility of “backward”















‘The fact that self1 may have cancer worried Kenji1.’
At first glance, this configuration appears to have nothing in common with (202).
However, Motomura notes that a Merge-over-Move-respecting derivation of (203)
is straightforwardly available using sideward movement. This derivation essen-
tially parallels that proposed by Hornstein (2001) for English examples such as
(204):
(204) a. [PRO1 having cancer] would worry John1.
b.
[John having cancer] (Workspace 1)
worry (Workspace 2)
Sideward movement of ‘John’ to become the object of ‘worry’
[John having cancer] (Workspace 2)
[worry John] (Workspace 2)
Derivation continues and [John having cancer] merges as matrix subject:
[[John having cancer] ...would... [worry John]] (Workspace 1)
Thus, Merge over Move permits a unified grammatical characterization of the re-
strictions imposed on the antecedent of zibun.44 Other accounts have to compli-
44 (204) is not the best example to illustrate this phenomenon, since the use of a psych verb
raises the question of whether zibun is a logophor in this context. However, the use of a psych
verb is not necessary to get this effect. For example, Oshima (2004, 186) gives examples such as
“Zibun’s invention brought George a big fortune.”
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cate the subjecthood condition somewhat. For example, to account for examples
such as (204), Oshima (2004, 187) proposes the following condition:
(205) (Non-logophoric) zibun must be bound to a subject syntactically c-comm-
anding it if there is any; when there is no such potential binder, it can
be bound to a (subject or non-subject) argument of the same clause or
a clause containing it.
This illustrates one of the advantages of capturing subject-orientation effects us-
ing Merge over Move, rather than imposing a subject-orientation requirement
directly. In §2.8 I will argue that there are no anaphors or pronouns which are
strictly subject-oriented. Apparent subject-orientation requirements derive from
Merge over Move.45
Although “subject-orientation” is often inaccurate as a descriptive term, I
will continue to use it to use as a theory-neutral label for phenomena of the pre-
ceding sort.
2.8.1 “Highest-DP-orientation”
An advantage of Merge over Move as compared to previous approaches to subject-
orientation is that it predicts not subject-orientation as such, but rather “highest-
DP-orientation.” In other words, when the most structurally prominent DP in a
clause is a non-subject, it will be preferred to the subject as an antecedent.
45 Another source of apparent subject-orientation effects is the set of requirements that certain
logophoric pronouns place on their antecedents, which naturally tend to favor subjects. Extra-
grammatical requirements of this sort will not really be investigated in this dissertation, however.
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2.8.2 Absence of subject-orientation in English
We have seen that local anaphoric binding in English is not constrained by a
subject-orientation requirement:
(206) a. John1 talked to Bill1 about himself1/2.
b. John1 showed Bill1 himself1/2.
This fact is potentially problematic for a theory in which local anaphoric binding
is constrained by Minimality and Merge over Move. As pointed out by Hornstein
(2001), (206a) is not particularly problematic, since we can simply assume that
the about is able to adjoin either above or below the to PP. (Or, following the
analysis in chapter 3, that “reanalysis” of to is optional.) In this way, derivations
for both interpretations are made available that are in accord with Minimality
and Merge over Move. The more difficult case is (206b). Here, Minimality and
Merge over Move pull in opposite directions. Minimality requires himself to be
bound by the closest possible antecedent – Bill – whereas Merge over Move would
prefer for the highest possible antecedent – John to be the binder. In the present
framework, Minimality always trumps Merge over Move. This seems to imply
that objects (or more generally, DPs within vP) should be preferred to subjects
as antecedents. However, this seems the wrong result in the case at hand. Cross-
linguistically, subject-orientation constraints on anaphoric binding are extremely
common, whereas object-orientation, if it exists at all, tends to be explicable in
terms of competition with an alternative subject-oriented form.46
For this reason, I suggest that binding of himself by John does not violate
Minimality. If this is the case, Merge over Move will come into effect, forcing
46 E.g., Dalrymple (1993, 29) discusses Norwegian ham selv, which appears to be object-oriented
(or at least, anti-subject-oriented). It seems, however, reasonable to assume that ham selv is in
principle compatible with both subject and object antecedents, and that its object-orientation
arises from its being dispreferred to the subject-oriented form seg selv.
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himself to be bound by John. Hornstein (2009) gives a path-based definition of
Minimality which derives a notion of equidistance: α and β are equidistant if
they are within the same minimal maximal projection.
2.8.3 Anti-subject-orientation
The subject-orientation of (much) anaphoric binding is not a particularly inter-
esting fact in itself. It is not at all surprising that certain dependencies should
require antecedents that are in some sense structurally prominent. A far more
interesting fact is the existence of anti-subject-orientation effects This section will
consider examples from Romance of anti-subject-orientation in Condition B ef-
fects. In many Romance languages the subject of a finite embedded clause cannot
be bound by the matrix subject when the embedded clause is in the subjunctive:
(207) [TP ... Subject1 ... [TP pro1 T-ind ...]]
(208) * [TP ... Subject1 ... [TP pro1 T-sub ...]]
This “obviation effect” has sometimes been analyzed as a Condition B effect (the
idea being that the subjunctive clause is “transparent” for binding in the same
way as an infinitive). I think that this analysis is correct, though not uncon-
troversial; this will be discussed further in §2.8.5. Despite the presence of the
(presumed) Condition B effect in (208), the matrix (indirect) object can bind the
embedded subject:
(209) [TP ... Subject ... Object1 ... [TP pro1 T-sub]]
We therefore have in (209) what appears to be an anti-subject-oriented Condition
B effect. The existence of such effects raises two rather difficult puzzles within
most approaches to binding theory.
First, anti-subject-orientation is a negative licensing requirement. It is usu-
ally quite easy to derive what Dalrymple (1993) describes as positive licensing
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requirements such as subject-orientation. (So for example, it has frequently been
proposed that Dutch zich is subject-oriented because it must somehow associate
covertly with T; see e.g. Reuland and Koster, 1991; Safir, 2004.) It is more dif-
ficult to derive in a principled manner a negative licensing requirement such
as anti-subject-orientation, since non-subjects have nothing in common as such.
Dalrymple simply proposes to allow the bald statement of negative licensing re-
quirements in the binding conditions of any given language, but this approach
seems reasonable only as a last resort.
The second puzzle arises even if we are willing to allow anti-subject-orientation
as a primitive licensing requirement. In the Romance languages exemplifying the
patterns in (207)-(208), the embedded pronoun is an ordinary subject pronoun
of a type which typically can be bound either by subject or object antecedents.
Thus, it cannot be a peculiarity of the licensing requirements on the embedded
pronoun which gives rise to the pattern of binding possibilities in (209) in these
instances.
2.8.4 Obviation in Spanish































47 Spanish has a present subjunctive, glossed here as sub, and an imperfect subjunctive, glossed
as imperf-sub. The imperfect subjunctive has essentially the same behavior with regard to obvia-
tion as the present subjunctive, but is used when the matrix clause is in a past tense.
48 Some Spanish examples are taken from Costantini (2005) and Caballero (2004).
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As we saw in (209), the matrix object, in contrast to the matrix subject, is


















Obviation appears to have nothing specifically to do with null subject pro-
nouns. The same effect is found in Spanish with an overt subject pronoun – (212)





































2.8.5 Previous attempts to explain subject-oriented obviation
2.8.5.1 Picallo (1985)
Picallo (1985) argues that the matrix object is able to bind the embedded subject
in (211) because subjunctive clauses extrapose to a right-adjoined position above
the object. However, in ordinary cases of clausal extraposition over an adverb in




















Moreover, as noted by Kempchinsky (2009, 1791), a bound variable reading is
permitted in cases such as (215), where the matrix object binds the subject of the
embedded clause:49
49 However, the implications of this fact are somewhat unclear, given that it is not obvious that





















‘I didn’t encourage anyone to study abroad.’
Similarly, there is no amelioration of Condition C in cases such as (216):

















‘* He1 always likes it that s/he visits John1.’
It is unclear why extraposition should not be able to take the clause out of the
c-command domain of the indirect object a él.50 It has occasionally been claimed
that a él in (216) is a subject with quirky dative case. However, Gutiérrez-Bravo
(2006) points out that these PPs have virtually none of the properties typically
associated with quirky subjects. If it were the case that a él resided in [Spec,TP],
Picallo’s account would have no difficulty explaining the deviance of (216) when
a él is present, since by assumption the clause cannot extrapose higher than
[Spec,TP]. However, a él is optional, and when only the indirect object clitic is
present, it is unclear why the clause should not be able to extrapose above it.
§2.11.1 for discussion.























‘Last month, John’s mother sent him several letters.’
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2.8.5.2 Avrutin and Babyonyshev (1997)
Avrutin and Babyonyshev (1997) propose a different explanation for subject-
orientation. (Their examples are from Russian, but the theory could carry over
to Romance without significant modification.) Avrutin and Babyonyshev pro-
pose that the matrix and embedded clause are closely related, in that a single
event operator binds the event in each clause (thus encoding a temporal depen-
dency). Syntactically, this is expressed by raising of the embedded C to the matrix
C. Since Avrutin and Babyonyshev assume universal V-to-T-to-C movement, the
end result is that the entire spine of the embedded clause ends up as a complex













































































On the assumption that AgrS is pronominal and subject to Condition B, a Con-
dition B violation obtains between the complex in matrix C (bearing the index
of embedded AgrS, and hence of the embedded subject) and the matrix subject/
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AgrS.
The problem with this proposal, as we will see shortly, is that obviation in
Romance is not always with respect to the agreeing matrix subject.
As we saw in §2.8.1, Merge over Move does not predict subject-orientation
as such. Rather, it predicts “highest DP orientation.” So for example, in (218), ob-
ject control is blocked not because the controller must be the subject, but because
the controller must be the highest DP in the clause containing the adjunct:
(218) John1 criticized Bill2 [without PRO1/∗2 being rude].
In principle, therefore, Merge over Move may choose a non-subject DP as
the preferred antecedent if this DP is higher in the clause than the subject. In
fact, as noted by Costantini (2005), we seem to find examples of this effect with





























‘I’d like to take a look at the painting.’
Thus, Merge over Move correctly predicts which DP triggers obviation. Note that
even on the assumption that a mi is a quirky dative subject in (219), Avrutin and
Babyonyshev’s account still fails to make the correct prediction, since a mi clearly
does not agree with the verb This is in contrast to previous analyses, which have
tended to stipulate an empirically not-quite-correct subject/object asymmetry.
We must, however, determine precisely how Merge over Move exerts an influ-
ence on the binding possibilities in (211) and (219). This is where Keeping Up
Appearances will be crucial. Before explaining the role of this condition, it may
be useful to consider how one might attempt to bring Merge over Move to bear on
obviation effects within the theory of Hornstein (2001). In this system, Condition
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B effects result from an economy condition which prefers the use of reflexives to
pronouns. The difficulties faced by this approach in dealing with the obviation
phenomena will highlight the advantages of Keeping Up Appearances.
2.8.5.3 Analysis 1 (doesn’t work)
Consider the following set of hypotheses designed to link Merge over Move to
the obviation data above:
• Local anaphoric binding is derived via A-movement.
• Condition B effects derive from a preference for local anaphoric binding
over pronominal binding. (And then in turn, a preference for all forms of
binding over coreference.51)
• Since local anaphoric binding is derived via A-movement, it is restricted by
Merge over Move.
• Hence, Condition B effects will be highest-DP-oriented, since only when the
binder is the highest DP in the clause will there be a licit derivation of local
anaphoric binding to block the possibility of pronominal binding.
Under this approach, the Condition B effect in in (210b) (repeated in 220)
















(221) María1 ha decidido que [María]1 vaya a la playa.
However, there is no spellout of (221) which is an acceptable sentence in Spanish:
The addition of a reflexive se clitic in either the matrix or embedded clause is
51 See e.g. Reinhart (1983a), Hornstein (2001), Safir (2004).
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scarcely conceivable as a means of expressing the intended meaning. The use of
















(223) * John decided that himself will go to the beach.
An additional problem is that Merge over Move and Minimality pull in opposite
directions in (221). Movement of the embedded subject to the matrix subject
position crosses over the matrix object and thus violates Minimality:
(224) María1 verb a Ines2 [CP comp [María]1 V-sub].
(‘María’ moves over ‘Ines’ – Minimality violation?)
In contrast to the English cases discussed in §2.8.2, it is clear that Ines and María
cannot be equidistant. Thus, such a derivation could only be permitted if (con-
trary to the assumptions of this dissertation) Merge over Move took priority over
Minimality. However, there is strong evidence that the prioritization is the other
way round. For example, cases of control such as (225) provide independent sup-
port for the hypothesis that Minimality takes precedence over Merge over Move:
(225) John1 persuaded Bill2 [TP PRO∗1/2 to leave].
If Minimality takes precedence, obviation is predicted to occur with respect to
the object rather than the subject – precisely the wrong result. Thus, the approach
to obviation effects considered in this subsection does not seem very promising.
52 In some contexts, si mismo/a must be doubled by the reflexive clitic se in Spanish. For com-
pleteness, I note here that the addition of se in either the matrix or embedded clause does nothing
to improve the acceptability of (222).
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2.8.5.4 Analysis 2 (more promising)
This approach is based on the assumption defended in this dissertation that cer-
tain instances of pronominal binding are derived via A-movement (§2.1.3):
(226) John1 thinks that [CP [John]1 [TP [John]1 is intelligent]].
⇓
John thinks that he is intelligent.
(227) Juan1 cree que [Juan]1 es inteligente.
⇓
Juan cree que pro es inteligente.
As we saw in §2.1.3 and §2.3, Condition B effects derive from (i) the distribu-
tion of intervening A-positions and (ii) the Keeping Up Appearances principle,
defined in (154), which bars the use of a pronoun which could not have been
derived via spellout of an A-chain.
Given these background assumptions, it is possible to implement a ver-
sion of the domain-extension analysis by adopting the hypothesis that subjunc-
tives, in contrast to indicatives, do not provide an intermediate A landing site
in [Spec,CP]. Kempchinsky (1990, 2009) hypothesizes that Romance subjunctive
clauses require T-to-C movement. Let us suppose that movement of T to C ren-
ders [Spec,CP] (or [Spec,T-CP]) an A-position. Returning to (210), repeated here
as (228), we now see that the contrast between (228a/b) corresponds to that be-






























(229) a. María1 ha decidido [CP [María]1 que [TP [María]1 va a la playa]].
(Indicative)
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b. María1 ha decidido [CP ([María]1) que [TP *[María]1 vaya a la playa]].
(Subjunctive – asterisk indicates impossibility of pronominalizing copy)
Since embedded [Spec,CP] is an A-position in (229b), pronominalization of the
lower copy of Mary is impossible, whether or not Mary is able to move via [Spec,CP].
It must now be established that Keeping Up Appearances makes it impossible to
use LF binding or coreference to to encode the dependency in (228a). Clearly it
does so, since the matrix and embedded subject positions are A-local, but it is not
possible to from a chain between these positions which spans an A-position.


















In (229b), it was possible to move from the embedded subject position to the
matrix subject position, but the resulting A-chain could not feed pronominaliza-
tion.53 For the same reason, María can’t be construed with the embedded subject
position in (230). With regard to the matrix object position, by contrast, it is not
possible to even get as far as forming a chain. The crucial point in the derivation
of (230) is the following:
(231)
53 It presumably cannot feed reflexivization either due to the Anaphor Agreement Effect.
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[CP de que Ines baile mucho] (Workspace 1)
aP (Workspace 2)
{..., María, ...} (Items remaining in numeration)
⇒ Ines can’t move to become the complement of the
preposition a because María remains in the numera-
tion and could be merged as its complement instead.
To get the correct result here, we must understand the notion of “A-local”
used in the definition of Keeping Up Appearances to be sensitive to the stric-
tures of Merge over Move. This is not as odd as it might at first appear. It
would be intuitively reasonable to define a notion of A-locality which was sen-
sitive to c-command, such that α and β are not A-local in if they do not stand
in a c-command relation. Merge over Move is really just the replacement for
a c-command constraint on movement within the syntactic framework of this
dissertation. It is therefore natural that Merge over Move should enter into the
relevant notion of “A-local” used in the statement of Keeping Up Appearances.
Thus, Keeping Up Appearances does not apply to the relation between the matrix
indirect object and the embedded subject in (230), since these are not A-local in
the relevant sense.
2.9 Condition C, Epithets and Subject-orientation
Attempts to derive Condition C in a non-stipulative manner have, broadly speak-
ing, adopted one of the following two hypotheses:
(i) The structure underlying a Condition C violation is one to which pronomi-
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nalization obligatorily applies. A Condition C violation results if pronomi-
nalization fails to apply.
(ii) Condition C violations result from the illicit use of coreference when bind-
ing is available as an alternative.
Hypothesis (i) is to be found in one form or another in most work on pronouns
prior to Lasnik (1976). Hypothesis (ii) was first worked out in detail in Reinhart
(1983b), and as we have seen, substantially revised in Reinhart (2006). Both
(i) and (ii) have difficulty accounting for the fact that epithets behave like r-
expressions for the purposes of Condition C:
(232) a. * John1 thinks [the guy]1 is intelligent.
b. * [The guy]1 thinks John1 is intelligent.
With regard to (i), there is on the face of it no reason to think that pronominal-
ization should apply in either of the examples in (232). Similarly, it is not clear
that (ii) rules out these examples, since replacing the epithet with a bound pro-
noun would not yield an equivalent interpretation (on the intuitively reasonable
assumption that the epithet makes an interpretative contribution). Even if we
simply stipulate a version of Condition C which blocks (232a/b), we face the fur-
ther problem that epithets do not in all respects behave like r-expressions. In
many contexts they freely allow bound readings:54
(233) [Every student1]’s mother thinks that [the idiot]1 is a genius.
Lasnik (1989) argues that epithets had mixed pronominal and r-expression prop-
erties. The theory presented in this dissertation has a slightly different take on
epithets. They key observation is the following:
54 This is noted for example in Lasnik and Stowell (1991), Safir (1996).
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(234) Epithets are interpreted like pronouns but they don’t sound like pro-
nouns.
In this section, I will argue very briefly that the mixed pronominal/r-expression
behavior of epithets with regard to binding and Condition C follows from this ob-
servation together with Keeping Up Appearances. This is a rather pleasing result,
since it invokes no distinction between pronouns and epithets other than the un-
deniable phonological distinction. An epithet is simply a pronoun which sounds
like an r-expression. Feeding this back-of-an-envelope description into the theo-
retical machinery developed in the preceding sections seems to give roughly the
right results. In particular, I would like to draw attention to the following pair of
data points.
First, epithets freely receive bound readings at LF except when the epithet is
A-local to its antecedent (Hornstein and Weinberg, 1990; Higgenbotham, 1992):
(235) * [Every politician]1 said that [the politician]1 would have to resign.
(236) [Every politician]1’s mother said that [the politician]1 would have to
resign.
(237) Every farmer who owns [a politician]1 beats the politician1.
When A-locality holds, as in (235), Keeping Up Appearances kicks in, and since
the epithet doesn’t sound at all like any possible spellout of the tail of an A-chain,
the result is sharp deviance. Condition C effects with epithets are stronger than
the Condition C effects obtained by duplicating a name:
(238) ?? John1 thinks that John1 is intelligent.
(239) * John1 thinks that [the man]1 is intelligent.
As suggested in §2.3, full pronunciation of a lower copy may exist as a highly
marked alternative to pronominalization in English. However, there is clearly no
way of pronouncing the tail of a chain as an epithet, so (239) is sharply deviant.
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The second data point is closely related to the the Spanish data discussed in
§2.8.4. If two positions α and β are non-A-local owing to Merge over Move, then
an epithet in β may be bound at LF by α even if α c-commands β:
(240) [The president]1 told [the Vice President]2 that [the bastard / the bril-
liant politician]∗1/2 would be forced to resign.
There are a number of respects in which “strong” pronouns behave like ep-
ithets. These pronouns tend to resist bound interpretations when c-commanded
by the binder, and yet they freely permit bound or high-tech interpretations in
other configurations. A particularly clear case, mentioned in §2.1.3, is Japanese,
which has a contrast between null and overt pronouns along these lines. We find
a similar contrast in Spanish between null subject pronouns and overt subject

































Within the present framework, we need not postulate any deep similarity be-
tween strong pronouns and epithets to capture their similar behavior. What
strong pronouns and epithets have in common is, plausibly, that they are phono-
logically distinct from the pronouns which spell the tails of chains.
2.10 Uniformity of domain and uniformity of interpretation
There are two principle challenges which might be leveled at a uniform theory
of obligatory control and local anaphoric binding. The first could be summed up
by the following quotation from Dalrymple (1993):
55 I use here Montalbetti’s examples, which are indeed as bizarre as the glosses indicate.
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If a language has...only one reflexive, it might seem adequate to char-
acterize the “domain of reflexivization” as a property of universal
grammar, or of a particular language. However, if a language has two
or more reflexives, each with a different domain, the domain of re-
flexivization must clearly be a property of the particular lexical item
for which it is applicable. Similarly, if a language has two or more
reflexives, each with different requirements on the syntactic role of its
antecedent, one must take these antecedent requirements as lexically
specified for each anaphoric element.
Although the inference signaled with “must” is distinctly non-demonstrative,
this is a persuasive argument if we accept the hypothesis that all language-specific
idiosyncrasies are stored in the lexicon. The following subsections examine the
evidence for different locally bound forms having different interpretations and/
or binding domains.
2.10.1 Interpretative distinctions
If anaphors are lexical items which make their own contribution to the interpre-
tation of a sentence, we might expect different kinds of anaphor to have different
interpretative properties. The following subsections discuss some possible exam-
ples, concluding that they can be explained as a consequence of pragmatic and
phonological factors.
2.10.1.1 Statue readings
Lidz (2001) claims that there are systematic interpretative differences between
morphologically simplex and complex reflexives with respect to their compati-
bility with “statue” readings (Jackendoff, 1992). An example of a English reflex-
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ive supporting a statue reading is given in (242); this example can be contrasted
with (243). In general, Lidz claims that only complex reflexives support statue
readings. This is particularly clear in languages which have both simplex and
complex anaphors, as shown in the table in (244):
(242) Ringo Starr1 shaved himself1 at the wax museum.
(Has a reading: “Ringo Starr shaved the statue of himself at the wax mu-
seum.”)
(243) Ringo Starr1 wants PRO1 to be shaved at the wax museum.
(Does not have a reading: “Ringo Starr wants the statue of himself to be
shaved at the wax museum.”)
(244)
Reflexive Language Simplex/complex Statue readings
John saw himself. English Complex Yes
Jan zag zich. Dutch Simplex No
Jan zag zichzelf. Dutch Complex Yes
Juan se vio. Spanish Simplex No
Juan se vio a si mismo. Spanish Complex Yes
Hari tann-annu
nood. -i-kon. d. -a Kannada Simplex No
Hari tann-annu-taane
nood. -i-kon. d. -a Kannada Complex Yes
If it is true that simplex and complex anaphors differ in this way, this is
problematic for the hypothesis that all local anaphoric dependencies are estab-
lished via A-chains. In the best case, we would like A-chains to be interpretatively
uniform.
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However, it seems likely that pragmatic factors are ultimately responsible
for the contrast between simplex and complex reflexives in (244). Geurts (2004)
points out that morphologically complex reflexives tend to be “strong,” in the
sense that they can bear stress. He argues that there is generally a preference for
using strong forms over weak forms when the desired interpretation has a high
“eyebrow index” (Beaver 1993).
(245) “Eyebrow Index”: A measure of a proposition’s intuitive plausibility or
prototypicality – the extent to which an ordinary person would “raise
their eyebrows” in response to it.
(246) Eyebrow Principle: Use strong reflexives/pronouns to express propo-
sitions with a high eyebrow index; use weak reflexives/pronouns to
express propositions with a low eyebrow index.
Statue readings are almost invariably more eyebrow-raising than non-statue read-
ings. Thus, the preference for using complex reflexives to encode statue readings
may result simply from a preference for using the strongest possible reflexive
form. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the generalization illustrated
in (244) does not hold of all languages. German and Japanese, for example, both
have morphologically simplex reflexives which permit statue readings:
(247)
Reflexive Language Simplex/complex Statue readings
John-wa ziko-hihan-si-ta. Japanese Simplex No.
John criticized himself
John-wa zibun-o hihan-si-ta. Japanese Simplex Yes.
John criticized himself
Peter sah sich. German Simplex Yes.
Peter saw himself
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In both cases, this seems to be because the simplex reflexives are not “outweighed”
by a stronger complex form. In Japanese, it is the phonologically weaker of the
two reflexive forms which is incapable of expressing statue readings (ziko is a
verbal affix).
2.10.1.2 Metonymy
Reflexives differ from PRO and ordinary pronouns in failing to license certain
kinds of metonymous reading (Lasnik, 1988; Landau, 1999):
(248) a. John1 wants very badly PRO1 to be parked near the entrance.
(Can be understood as “John wants his car to be parked near the en-
trance.”)
b. # John1 thinks that he1 should be parked near the entrance.
(No such reading is available.)
c. # John1 wants very badly for himself1 to be parked near the entrance.
(No such reading is available.)
This apparent interpretative distinction between PRO and himself is unexpected
under the chain-based approach, since this approach holds that A-chains are in-
terpretatively uniform. Indeed, Landau uses the facts in (248) to argue against
the movement theory of control (Hornstein, 2001; Boeckx, Hornstein, and Nunes,
2010).
On closer inspection, however, we once again find that pragmatic/phonological
factors are at work here. Just as statue readings require the use of the strongest
possible form, it seems that metonymous readings require the use of the weak-
est possible form. Thus in (248a/c), where the reflexive competes with PRO, PRO
wins the competition as the weaker of the two forms. In contrast, no weaker form
than the pronoun is available in (248b), so its use is licit.
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This analysis predicts that the use of a reflexive to express a metonymous
reading should be possible if there is no competing structure with PRO. This
prediction turns out to be correct:
(249) a. * John1 believes PRO1 to be parked near the entrance.
b. John1 believes himself1 to be parked near the entrance.
It seems reasonable to maintain, then, that A-chains are interpretatively
uniform. There is little evidence that the phonological differences between PRO
and the various forms of reflexive have any deep semantic or syntactic correlates.
2.10.2 Variation in binding domains
If anaphors are lexical items, it would not be surprising if they impose different
requirements on the choice of antecedent.
A particularly influential argument for lexically determined binding do-
mains is that Reinhart and Reuland (1993) regarding the distribution of zich and
zichzelf in Dutch. Both are locally bound anaphors, but they distribute differ-
ently. For example, zich is typically impossible as a direct object, except with
so-called “inherently reflexive verbs”:
(250) a. John saw *zich/zichzelf.
(Ordinary transitive verb.)
b. John washed zich/zichzelf.
(Inherently reflexive verb.)
c. John shames zich/*zichzelf.
(Inherently reflexive verb.)



















‘She didn’t want to let him work for her/himself.’
Reinhart and Reuland argue that these differences (amongst others) stem from
a fundamental grammatical distinction between zich and zichzelf. The former is
a kind of defective pronoun which must receive φ-features from a local T (and
hence from the subject). The latter is a “reflexive marker” – a formative which is
inserted to indicate that a predicate has two co-indexed arguments. In the case
of “inherently reflexive” verbs, no such marking is required, hence the grammat-
icality of (250b/c) with zich.
There is one respect in which zich surely is grammatically distinct from
zichzelf. It seems that Dutch always uses zich in preference to zichzelf when the
predicate is a pseudo-unergative or pseudo-unaccusative bearing a “spare” Case
which needs to be absorbed (see §2.7). We have already seen, however, that in
other contexts there are phonological and pragmatic factors which influence the
choice between zich and zichzelf. Indeed, Geurts (2004) and Koster (1994) ar-
gue that it is factors of this sort which largely determine the facts in (250).56
It seems, then, that several additional properties of the distribution of zich and
zichzelf that are treated grammatically by Reinhart and Reuland (1993) can be
accommodated in a Geurts/Koster style phonological/pragmatic analysis. For
example, one of the key pieces of evidence R&R present in favor of their theory
is the Dutch paradigm in (252) (p. 714):
56 The one exception is (250b). That zich must be used with verbs such as shame is almost
certainly a grammatical fact, but not one which obviously has many implications for binding




(Grammatical sentences translate as “John heard himself criticize himself.”)
Jan hoorde
a. * zich zich critiseren.
b. zich zichzelf critiseren.
c. zichzelf zich critiseren.
d. ?? zichzelf zichzelf critiseren.
According to Reinhart and Reuland’s theory, the embedded predicate (critiseren)
must be marked as reflexive. This can be achieved by inserting zichzelf (which is a
“reflexive marker”) in either the subject or object position. Thus, both (252b) and
(252c) are grammatical. (252a) is ungrammatical because the embedded predi-
cate is not reflexive marked, and (252d) is marginal because the embedded pred-
icate is redundantly reflexive marked by both instances of zichzelf.
For the most part, this paradigm also has a straightforward phonological/
pragmatic explanation. Since self-criticism has a high “eyebrow index” (espe-
cially given Reinhart and Reuland’s choice of matrix predicate; see §2.10.1.1),
this must be marked by the use of a strong reflexive form. Thus, (252a) is out,
while either of (252b)/(252c) is ok. The only remaining question is the status of
(252d). As Reinhart and Reuland’s double question mark indicates, the judgment
is not entirely clear. They suggest that (252d) is somewhat degraded because it
is redundant to mark the embedded predicate reflexive twice. Something very
similar could be said under the phonological/pragmatic account: if the use of
the strong form “marks” a high eyebrow index, then it is redundant to mark
this twice. However, some caution is probably advisable in constructing intricate
explanations for the Dutch paradigm in (252), since the paradigm is not partic-
ularly robust cross-linguistically. For example, a Norwegian speaker asked to
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judge the equivalent paradigm in Norwegian gave the following judgments:








































Though there are subtle differences in the behavior of seg and seg selv as compared
to zich and zichzelf, it seems unlikely that these could reflect any deep distinction
in terms of reflexivity or reflexive marking. Moreover, the more recent theory
of Reuland (2011), in which pronoun-self reflexives effect reflexive marking via
head movement (see §2.2.4), it is predicted to be impossible for the embedded
subject to reflexive-mark the downstairs predicate. Thus Dutch (252c) and Nor-
wegian (253c) seem to be incorrectly predicted to be ungrammatical on this new
theory.
2.11 Sideward movement into DP
Is sideward movement permitted in the abstract configuration shown in (254)?
(254) [DP [DP α] ...] ... [DP α] ...
There is evidence both for and against the availability of this kind of movement.
At present, I do not think that the evidence is decisive in either direction, but on
balance it seems better to prohibit it.
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2.11.1 Local anaphoric binding and control
In English, the binding and control data argue strongly against the availability of
(254):
(255) a. * John1’s mother loves himself1.
b. * John1’s mother wants PRO1 to win.
However, there is some evidence from Chinese that dependencies in this config-
uration are not universally prohibited. As is well known, the Chinese reflexives
ziji and ta ziji may be bound under “sub-command” as well as under c-command.
However, there are rather complex restrictions on licensing via sub-command.






























‘[Zhangsan1’s father]2 has no confidence in himself∗1/2.’
For this reason, though an analysis of the sub-command cases in terms of side-
ward movement is tempting, the Chinese data can hardly be said to unambigu-
ously support the existence of derivations of the form shown in (254).
2.11.2 “Almost c-command”
Pronominal binding in English is (when “high-tech” interpretations are excluded)
restricted by an “almost c-command” requirement (Hornstein, 1995):
(257) a. Everyone1 loves his1 mother.
b. Everyone1’s mother loves him1.
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c. * A man who met everyone1 loves him1.
As with the Chinese examples in the preceding subsection, it would be tempting
to analyze these cases in terms of sideward movement. However, the Condition C
facts are not very cooperative. As is well known, (257a) and (257b) are crucially
distinct configurations with regard to Condition C:
(258) * He1 thinks that John1 is intelligent.
(259) His1 mother thinks that John is intelligent.
Within the present framework, Condition C effects derive in from the spellout
rules of English together with Keeping Up Appearances. If his and John are
A-local (as indeed they are), then any dependency between his and John must
“sound as if” it was formed by spelling out a chain dependency between the two
positions. Thus, if we allow an A-chain to be formed in (257b) to effect binding
of him by everyone, we incorrectly predict that there should be no Condition C
violation in (259).
2.12 Chain spellout rules
2.12.1 Covert movement
As mentioned briefly in chapter 1, it is assumed in this dissertation that covert
movement is pronunciation of a lower copy. Clearly, pronunciation of a lower
copy may result from the application of a language-specific spellout rule. How-
ever, it seems unlikely that all instances of covert movement derive from the ap-
plication of such rules, and chapter 3 will propose that there is a certain kind of
systematic relationship between the covert/overt status of head movements and
related phrasal movements. For these reasons, I conclude that pronunciation of a
lower copy sometimes occurs in accord with the Universal Chain Spellout Rule.
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This dissertation has nothing of interest to say regarding the factors which de-
termine whether a movement is overt or covert. It seems that copies in positions
associated with “weak” heads are simply not considered for pronunciation. That
is, these copies are in effect removed from chains prior to spellout, so that neither
the Universal Chain Spellout Rule, nor language-specific chain spellout rules,
have any inkling of their presence. In common with much Minimalist work,
the covert/overt distinction is therefore tied to a stipulative distinction between
“strong” and “weak” heads (or heads which do or do not have an EPP feature).
2.12.2 Universal and language-specific spellout rules
Chapter 1 introduced the universal rule (50), repeated here in (260):
(260) Universal Chain Spellout Rule: If a chain contains exactly one copy,
c, such that all c’s features are valued, then spell out the chain by pro-
nouncing c fully and leaving all other copies silent.
This is the basic strategy available to all languages for spelling out chains, but
languages may, as we have seen, have additional chain spellout rules. It is nat-
ural to begin with the hypothesis that these rules kick in if (260) cannot apply
(Bošković, 2002; Bošković and Nunes, 2007). With regard to binding phenom-
ena, the usual reason for the failure of (260) to apply is the presence of multiple
Case positions in a chain. In a chain spanning multiple Case positions, there will
be no unique copy with a valued Case feature. Thus, in the absence of some other
distinguishing feature, there will be no unique copy which can be distinguished
by (260). This reasoning may also apply to certain instances of pronunciation
of lower copies in control structures, given variation in the tense properties of
embedded infinitives. For example, Boeckx, Hornstein, and Nunes (2008) sug-
gest that pronunciation of the lower copy in San Lucas Quiaviní Zapotec may be
determined by the obligatory presence of Case marking on that copy. This sug-
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gests that (260) as currently formulated is missing a generalization. It is not the
case that the spellout of chains with multiple featurally indistinguishable copies
is entirely idiosyncratic. Rather, Case seems to play a special role in determin-
ing which, and how many, copies are pronounced. This suggests the following
principle, harking back to the Case filter of early GB theory:
(261) Only copies with valued Case features are candidates for pronuncia-
tion.
Given (260) and (261), the overall situation is as follows. A chain is delivered to
the PF component. Only the +Case copies of this chain are visible for pronunci-
ation. If one of these copies has more valued features than all of the others, then
(260) applies automatically. Otherwise, the chain is handed over to language-
specific chain spellout rules.
The rule in (260) is, by hypothesis, sensitive to Minimality and to some sub-
set of the island constraints. In contrast, language-specific chain spellout rules
are not sensitive to these constraints. This idea closely resembles the proposal of
Ross (1967) that island constraints apply only to “chopping” (i.e. deletion) rules.
However, the claim is slightly weaker than Ross’s, since as mentioned above, a
language specific rule may be a deletion rule. Thus, the implication goes only
in one direction. When one of the lower copies in a chain is pronounced, this
indicates that a language-specific rule has applied, and we do not expect the pro-
cess to be sensitive to Minimality or the relevant island constraints. On the other
hand, when all of the lower copies are deleted, we cannot tell without further in-
vestigation whether this deletion was effected by (260) or by a language-specific
rule. For example, deletion of the lower copy of wh-phrases in English is ef-
fected via (261), and is therefore sensitive to Minimality and island constraints.
In contrast, it was hypothesized in §2.1.3 that Japanese has a language-specific
pronominalization rule which deletes lower copies and which is not sensitive to
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Minimality or island constraints.
A crucial point here is that because (260) is sensitive to Minimality and cer-
tain island constraints, the notion of A-locality used in the statement of Keeping
Up Appearances need not be sensitive to these same constraints. It is an interest-
ing question precisely which of the island constraints restrict A-locality. If Ross’s
hypothesis that there are special restrictions on “chopping” rules is correct, we
might expect that the constraints which do not reign in the relevant notion of
A-locality should be the same as those which can be obviated via ellipsis. Judg-
ments are rather variable in both domains, but it does seem to be the case that
positions in which an indefinite is inaccessible to sluicing are also positions in
which epithets with c-commanding antecedents are relatively acceptable:
(262) a. * John1 said that [the bastard]1 arrived late.
b. * John1 wonders whether [the bastard]1 will arrive late.
c. ?? John1 said that pictures of [the bastard]1 arrived late.
d. ? John1 said that anyone who wanted pictures of [the bastard]1 should
arrive early.
(263) a. John said that someone arrived, but I don’t know who.
b. John wonders whether someone will arrive late, but I don’t know
who.
c. ? John said that a picture of someone arrived, but I don’t know who.
d. * John said that anyone who wants to see pictures of someone should
arrive early, but I don’t know who.
Aoun and Choueiri (2000) presents some intriguing facts regarding resumptive
epithets which also seem to point in a similar direction. He proposes the follow-
ing generalization restricting the use of epithets and strong pronouns in Lebanese
145
Arabic (p. 21):57
(264) Strong pronouns and epithets cannot be linked to the most local op-
erator (where A is the most local element with respect to B iff (i) A
c-commands B and (ii) for every C, such that C c-commands B, then C
also c-commands A).
Aoun illustrates (264) for strong pronouns and epithets in (265) and (266) re-
spectively:


























‘Who did you wonder whether/when he won a prize?’

























‘Who did you wonder whether/when this devil won a prize?’
Aoun, Choueiri, and Hornstein (2001) note that resumptive pronouns in Lebanese
Arabic do not always appear inside islands. However, within islands, only weak
pronouns can be used as resumptives. This suggests that in Lebanese Arabic, the
tail of a wh-chain may sometimes be spelled out as a weak pronoun. Following
Aoun and Choueiri’s earlier observation, Aoun, Choueiri, and Hornstein argue
57 This is not the principle as originally stated in Aoun’s (35), since it is extended to resumptive
epithets further down in the text of the paper. I should also note that on Aoun’s analysis epithets
in Lebanese Arabic are complexes formed of a DP and a strong pronominal element.
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that the availability of strong pronouns and epithets as resumptives indicates the
inaccessibility of a position to A-movement. It seems that in Lebanese Arabic,
even a weak island violation is sufficient to destroy A-locality for the purposes
of Keeping Up Appearances. This is not the case in English, where as we see in
(262b), a weak island is not sufficient to permit the use of a bound epithet. This
may follow from more general differences in the distribution of A and A positions
in the two languages.
2.12.3 Information available to chain spellout rules
What information is available to the spellout rules? Clearly, the rules have access
to the formal features of the copies in the chain, since bound pronouns and re-
flexives agree with their antecedents. It seems that spellout rules should not be
permitted to reference any other features, since there presumably could not be an
idiosyncratic rule such as “John reflexivization,” which outputs a special form of
the reflexive only in case the chain is headed by John. Spellout rules must, how-
ever, have access to the phonological properties of the copies in the chain, given
the existence of copy reflexive languages. The rules must also be sensitive to the
A/A status of a chain, since in e.g. English, A and A-chains spanning multiple
θ-positions receive distinct spellouts.
The issue of the A/A-status of a chain is a slightly subtle one. In informal
syntactic discourse, we talk about the A/A-status of both chains and positions.
It is not immediately obvious which of these should taken to be primitive – are
A-positions defined in terms of A-chains or vice versa? The very brief note on the
A/A distinction in §1.2.12 defines a notion of A/A-position, and I will assume
that this is the primitive. An A-chain is a chain headed by phrase in an A-position,
and an A-chain is a chain headed by a phrase in an A-position.
We saw in §2.1.3 that there must be an ordering of spellout rules, in the
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sense that reflexivization must apply before pronominalization gets a chance to
apply.58 The simplest assumption is that a chain is spelled out as soon as possible,
i.e., as soon as one of the available rules can apply. Thus, the rules are not ordered
directly, but by their domains of application.
How exactly should the phonological form of the DP in the chain be made
available to the spellout rules? Clearly, there is a certain sense in which the rules
are not able to manipulate these phonological forms. For example, there is no
copy reflexive language in which the lower copy is pronounced modulo some
phonological transformation (e.g. deletion of final stops). Although any typolog-
ical conclusions at this point must be tentative, it seems that the only option other
than deletion or pronominalization/reflexivization is full pronunciation of one or
more of the lower copies. For this reason, it would be slightly odd to conceive the
input to a spellout rule as a sequence of copies with phonological specifications
included. The output of a spellout rule can, it seems, be a function of the formal
features of the copies – as we have seen in cases of pronominalization and reflex-
ivization – but it can only be a trivial function of the phonological forms. It is
therefore more natural to suppose that full pronunciation is a default, and that
the rules have only the formal features of the copies as input. If no rule applies,
copies are pronounced fully, and if a rule applies, the output is a function of the
formal features of the relevant copies.
Given the above, I propose that the input to a spellout rule is an ordered
sequence of +Case copies, where each copy is a bundle of (i) formal features and
(ii) a label indicating whether it is in an A or A-position. The output is a sequence
of “pronunciation instructions.” At least for the phenomena considered in this
58 This is not absolutely necessary. It might be that the pronominalization rule and the reflex-
ivization rule are formulated so as to have non-overlapping domains of application. However,
this does not seem a very attractive hypothesis.
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dissertation, we do not need to consider the possibility of pronunciation of inter-
mediate positions in the subpart of the chain to which a spellout rules applies.
Thus, the output is a pair of pronunciation instructions, specifying how the top
and bottom copies in the relevant subpart of the chain should be pronounced.
A pronunciation instruction is either (i) Delete (D), (ii) Pronounce Fully (F), or
or (iii) Reduce (R). The first two are self-explanatory; the third applies to derive
pronouns and reflexives. A reduce instruction must of course include a mapping
from formal features to output forms (e.g. [+masc,+sing,+acc] → him). Since
there does not appear to be anything interesting to say about these mappings, I
will not specify them explicitly here.59
Rules for English reflexivization and pronominalization are given below.
The input to each of the rules is the full sequence of copies in a given chain.
The rules use ellipsis to represent a (possibly empty) sequence of copies. The
reflexivization rule applies to any chain containing a pair of adjacent copies in
A-positions. Since only +Case copies are considered by the spellout rules, it is
necessary only to specify that each of the copies has a +D feature (i.e. that it
is a DP copy).60 The pronominalization rule applies to any chain containing a
sequence of +Case copies such that the first and last are in an A-position and the
intermediate copies are in A-positions. A ‘+’ postfix is used to indicate “one or
more.”
(267) Reflexivization (English):
... [+D]A [+D]A ... → ... K R ...
(268) Pronominalization (English):
59 Of course, there may be something interesting to say about them in languages with rich
morphology. I assume that most of this complexity should be factored out into a separate mor-
phological component,
60 In fact, specifying this on all of the copies is redundant.
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... [+D]A [+D]A′+ [+D]A ... → K R ...
These rules apply “as soon as possible” in the following sense. In order to pro-
nounce a chain, one cycles in order of size through the chains formed of each
rightmost contiguous subsequence of the copies in the original chain. So for ex-
ample, if a chain goes through three positions α . . .β . . .γ , one begins by attempt-
ing to spellout the trivial chain (γ), then (β,γ), and finally (α,β,γ). When a spell-
out rules applies, the relevant subpart of the chain is ignored for the application
of subsequent rules. So for example, if a spellout rule applies to (β,γ), then the
next step is to check if a spellout rule can apply to the trivial chain (α), As a more
complex example, (269b)-(269e) shows the sequence of operations involved in
spelling out (269a). Each step is annotated with the relevant chain spellout rule,
where (U) refers to the Universal Chain Spellout Rule of chapter 1. Striking out
of a copy indicates that is is not being considered for the application of further
spellout rules. When a rule assigns a pronunciation to a copy, this is placed in
parentheses following the copy.
(269) a. Who1 said [CP t1 that Mary thinks [CP t1 that he1 likes himself1]]?
b. [...]A′ [...]A′ [...]A′ [...]A [...]A
c. [...]A′ [...]A′ [...]A′ [...]A [...]A(himself) [by (267)]
d. [...]A′ [...]A′ [...]A′ (he) [...]A [...]A(himself) [by (268)]
e. [...]A′ (who) [...]A′ [...]A′ (he) [...]A [...]A(himself) [by (U)]
2.12.4 Locality and chain splitting
If spellout rules apply “as soon as possible” in the sense of the preceding sub-
section, this naturally suggests that spellout rules may apply in the course of the
derivation, rather than to a completed syntactic structure. We will see shortly
some evidence in support of this hypothesis. First, it should be noted that if
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spellout rules do apply in the course of the derivation, they cannot apply within
any particular local domain. For example, the boxed CPs in (270a) and (270b) are
identical, but the copies of who in the subject position are pronounced differently
(the copy in (270a) is unpronounced and the copy in (270b) is pronounced as a
pronoun).
(270) a. Who did you say [ CP [who] [TP [who] had to leave]]
⇓
“Who did you say had to leave?”
b. Who did you say [CP [who] [TP [who] told Mary [ CP [who] [TP [who]
had to leave]]]]
⇓
“Who did you say told Mary he had to leave?”
This shows that spellout rules must, in some instances, be able to look at large
chunks of structure in order to apply correctly. For this reason, it would not be
possible to integrate the theory of language-specific spellout rules presented here
with phase theory.
Examples such as (271a) suggest that spellout rules can feed subsequent
movement operations:
(271) a. Himself1, I think John1 likes t1.
b. John1, I think t1 likes himself1.
If it were the case that spellout rules applied only at the end of a derivation, we
would be forced to treat both (271a) and (271b) as spellouts of the structure in
(272):
(272) John, I think [John] likes [John]
It seems much more natural to assume that the reflexivization spellout rule is
able to feed movement in (271a).
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Examples such as (271) may provide a clue to the relationship between
language-specific spellout rules and linearization. According to Nunes (1995,
2001), the function of copy deletion is to prevent linearization conflicts at PF.
On Nunes’ theory, if multiple copies of the same phrase remain at PF, the result
is a set of conflicting ordering statements. Within the present framework, the
Universal Chain Spellout Rule ensures that such conflicts do not arise in most
instances.61 Data such as (271) suggest that language-specific spellout rules may
avoid linearization conflicts by splitting chains rather than by deleting copies
within chains. In (271a), for example, the copy spelled out as himself is initially
part of the same chain as the copy spelled out as John, but the subsequent move-
ment of himself suggests that the application of the reflexive spellout rule splits
the chain in two, so that John and himself head separate chains prior to move-
ment of himself. If language-specific spellout rules split chains in this manner,
this would go some way to explaining two key facts. First, that pronouns and
reflexives behave in many respects as if they head their own chains. Second, that
the application of a language-specific spellout rule serves to obviate certain lo-
cality conditions on chains, such as Minimality.
61 This raises the question of whether the Universal Chain Spellout Rule is really a rule at




Reanalysis, binding, pseudopassivization and preposition
stranding
3.1 Introduction
The availability of binding in (273) is a well-known problem for c-command-
based theories of anaphoric binding:
(273) John talked to Mary1 about herself1.
On the face of it, it seems that in a framework incorporating sideward movement,
it should be possible to give a derivation for (273) along the following lines:
(274)
[about Mary] (Workspace 1)
to (Workspace 2)
Sideward movement of ‘Mary’ to become the complement of ‘to’:
[about [Mary]] (Workspace 1)
[to Mary] (Workspace 2)
Derivation continues and ‘John’ merges as subject:
[John ... [talked [to Mary] [about [Mary]]]]
However, this derivation violates Merge over Move. At the point where Mary
moves to become the complement of to, John remains in the numeration and
could be merged instead. Mary could then go on to move to the subject posi-
tion, deriving (275):
(275) [Mary ... [talked [to John] [about [Mary]]]]
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For this reason, it will take a bit more work to accommodate (273) within the
present framework.
Within GB theory, a popular response to the problem posed by (273) was the
proposal that to “reanalyzes” with the verb, in such a way that the PP no longer
breaks the c-command relation between the reflexive and its antecedent. Con-
sider now the status of (274) if the complement of to does somehow c-command
into the about PP. Then the movement of Mary in (275) is illicit, since it violates
Minimality. Since Merge over Move is a defeasible condition, this implies that
the Merge over Move violation in (274) is permitted, since there is no convergent
alternative derivation in which movement of Mary is delayed until after merger
of John. Thus the reanalysis theory offers an account of (273) within the present
framework. Note that condition (iv) of Merge over Move is crucial here:
(276) Merge over Move: A head or phrase X may not move at a stage S of a
derivation D if there is a convergent derivation D ′ such that
(i)D and D ′ begin from the same numeration,
(ii)D ′ is identical to D up to S,
(iii) at S of D ′, a head or phrase merges in the position that X moves to
at S of D, and
(iv) X later moves in D ′ to value the same features that it did at S of D.
If derivations in which Mary did not move were considered as competitors, then
there would be a competing derivation in which it is John which moves to subject
position:
(277) [John ... [talked [to [John]] [about Mary]]]
Thus, (274), even though not blocked by (275), would nonetheless be blocked by
(277) (since in (277), merger of John as the complement of to replaces movement
of Mary to this position).
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Reanalysis was also implicated in the derivation of pseudopassives such
as (278). In order to maintain the Case-theoretic account of passivization, it
was necessary to assume that the Case-assigning powers of the preposition were
somehow transferred to the verb for subsequent removal by the passive mor-
pheme:
(278) John1 was talked to t1.
This chapter has two primary aims. The first is to develop an account of reanal-
ysis adequate to the phenomena in (273)-(278). Previous attempts to do so have
run into serious empirical and conceptual problems, as pointed out by Baltin
and Postal (1996). My account is designed to address these problems, and can
be summarized as follows. Reanalysis occurs when a preposition raises covertly
to a v/V-medial Agr projection to form a complex [P-Agr] head. This head plays
essentially the same role as the [V-Agr] head in Lasnik’s (1999) theory of objec-
tive Case assignment. After the preposition has raised, its erstwhile complement
raises covertly to check Case in the specifier of [P-Agr]. The derivation for (273)
is given in (279):1
(279) [John] ... [V−vP [John] [v−V talked] [P−AgrP [Mary] [P−Agr to] [VP [talked]
1 Pseudopassivization is possible with complex PPs:
(i) John1 was stood on top of t1.
It is difficult to say whether or not these PPs block binding, since the only examples that can be
constructed are such as (ii):
(ii) John stood on top of the boys1 on each other1’s birthdays.
Though binding in these cases is clearly acceptable, there is strong evidence that possessive re-
ciprocals are logophors which do not require a strictly c-commanding antecedent (see §3.4.2). I
will therefore limit my discussion in this footnote to pseudopassivization.
I suggest that complex PPs have the following abstract structure:
(iii) [AgrP ... [P1P ... [P2P ... [P3P ... ]]]]
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[PP to [Mary]]]]]
Raising of the the complement of the preposition is “raising to object” of the kind
undergone by ECM subjects under Lasnik’s analysis.2
The second aim of this chapter is to explain why pseudopassivization is
typologically linked to preposition stranding under wh-movement:
(280) Who1 did you talk to t1?
As is well known, most languages do not allow preposition stranding, and pseu-
dopassivization is rarer still (both constructions being limited for the most part
to the Germanic languages).Thus German and Spanish – (281)-(282) – permit
neither preposition stranding nor pseudopassivization; Icelandic – (283) – per-
mits preposition stranding but not pseudopassivization; and Norwegian – (284)
– is one of few languages apart from English with both pseudopassivization and
preposition stranding:
























That is, a sequence of lexical P projections topped by a single Agr projection. The highest lexical
P head raises to the Agr head, and the resulting P-Agr complex assigns Case in the usual way.
As usual, reanalysis occurs if the Agr head merges within vP, rather than immediately above the
highest P head.
2 The association of P with Agr is also reminiscent of Kayne’s (1994, 195) proposal that the
Case of an English verb is sometimes able to “percolate” to a lower P head. At a more abstract
level, my analysis is further inspired by analyses of pseudopassivization within Relational Gram-




































































Building on a proposal of Abels (2003), I propose that there is one prereq-
uisite that reanalysis and preposition stranding have in common: the presence
of independent Agr projections. In most languages, φ-features (if present) are
bundled onto lexical heads such as V, T and P. Other languages (such as English)
project separate Agr heads above PP; these associate with the P head via head
movement. I argue that the presence of this separate Agr projection within PP
suffices to permit wh-extraction. Reanalysis occurs when P’s Agr projection is
merged above VP, giving the structure in (279).
This chapter is structured as follows. §3.2 explains the derivation in (279)
in greater detail and provides evidence to support it. §3.3 outlines the impli-
cations for existential constructions, pseudopassives and Case. §3.4 deals with
the binding facts (as exemplified in (273)). §3.5 responds to Baltin and Postal’s
(1996) criticisms of reanalysis hypotheses. §3.6 defends my assumption that
covert movement can license new binding relations (and hence license binding in
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(273)). Finally, §3.7 contains some further remarks on the typology of preposition
stranding and pseudopassivization.
3.2 The analysis
3.2.1 Starting assumptions: Agr and the structure of vP
In common with most accounts of reanalysis, I propose that the complements
of reanalyzed prepositions receive Case in the same manner as ordinary direct
objects. Adopting the proposals of Koizumi (1993) and Lasnik (1999), I take
this to be raising to the specifier of an Agr projection located between v and V.
Thus, an ordinary direct object receives Case from a V-Agr complex derived by
movement of V to Agr:
(285) [V−Agr−vP Subj V-Agr-v [V−AgrP Obj V-Agr [VP V Obj]]]
(Configuration for assignment of objective Case to a direct object. Overt
movement shown; covert movement also possible in English.)
I assume that Case is typically assigned by the combination of a lexical head
(e.g. V, T) and an Agr head. Though I remain neutral on the question of whether
this configuration is responsible for all Case assignment (in particular, all inherent
Case assignment), I necessarily assume that it extends at least to those preposi-
tions which may be reanalyzed. For example, the complement of to in (286b) –
a structure in which reanalysis has not occurred – will be assigned Case in the
configuration shown in (286b):
(286) a. John talked to Bill.
b. [V−vP John [V−v talked] [VP V [P−AgrP [Bill] [P−Agr to] [PP to Bill]]]].
It seems that the “strong” or “weak” nature of the complex Case-assigning head is
determined by its lexical component. Thus in English, V-Agr is optionally strong
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or weak, with the consequence that overt movement of the object to [Spec,V-
AgrP] is optional (Lasnik, 1999). In contrast, English P-Agr must be obligatorily
weak, or the preposition and its complement would be pronounced in the wrong
order:
(287) * [V−vP John [V−v talked] [VP V [P−AgrP Bill [P−Agr to] [PP to [Bill]]]]].
I will assume that the strength of the requirement for a lexical head to ad-
join to an Agr head is always correlated with the strength of the requirement for
the specifier of the resulting complex to be filled. Thus in English, movement of
T to Agr is always overt, movement of P to Agr is always covert, and movement
of V to Agr is optionally either overt or covert. These assumptions regarding the






It will be necessary to specify the precise featural motivation for raising of a
lexical head to an Agr projection. Following Chomsky (1995, 197), I take the
relevant feature to be a category feature on the Agr head itself (“...Agr must in
fact have two kinds of features: V-features that check V adjoined to Agr, and NP
features that check NP in [Spec,AgrP].”). Movement of the lexical head to Agr
therefore falls under Enlightened Self-interest (Lasnik, 1999, 78).
As indicated in (288), movement of V to Agr should in principle be covert
when raising of the object to [Spec,V-AgrP] is covert. In practice, however, the
need for v and V to associate forces overt movement of V through Agr and then
to v; this movement will occur whether or not Agr is strong. The assumption
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here is that “opportunistic” movement to check a weak feature is permitted if
it is a step in a successive-cyclic movement which will eventually lead to the
checking of a strong feature. This assumption is independently required in order
to account for, e.g., the instance of wh-movement in (289):
(289) Who did you see t?
If, owing to a strong interpretation of Procrastinate, the wh-phrase in (289) were
required to skip the weak Agr position, then it would never be able to check
Case (assuming subsequent lowering to be impossible), and there would be no
convergent derivation of (289) available.
3.2.2 Reanalysis
Given the preceding assumptions regarding the structure of “normal” PPs, we
can now consider the “reanalysis” structure in more detail. Reanalysis occurs
when a P head raises covertly to a v/V-medial Agr head (the latter bearing unchecked
‘P’ features):
(290) a. John talked to Bill.
b. [V−vP John [V−v talked] [P−AgrP [Bill] [P−Agr to] [VP V [PP to Bill]]]]
Since P-Agr complexes are obligatorily weak, raising of both to and Bill is nec-
essarily covert. There are two “exceptional” features of the structure shown in
(290b). First, the presence in an intransitive vP of a v/V-medial Agr head bear-
ing ‘P’ features. Second, the absence of an Agr projection attached to the PP itself
(compare (286b)). I take these exceptional features to be the preconditions for re-
analysis (see §3.7 for further discussion). I will continue to refer to prepositions
such as to in (290b) as “reanalyzed” prepositions, but it should now be clear that
I postulate no reanalysis operation as such. (That is, the analysis does not make
use of any operations other than ordinary head/phrase movement.)
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The structure in (290b) makes apparent the motivation for taking a feature
of Agr to drive movement of V/P to Agr. If movement were driven by a require-
ment of P/V, then Minimality would presumably preclude movement of P over
V in (290b). On the other hand, if the Agr merged in (290b) has a ‘P’ category
feature (i.e. an instruction to “attract” the closest P) then Minimality is satisfied.
The term DCRP (“DP Complement of a Reanalyzed Preposition”) will be a
useful shorthand. For example, Bill in (290b) is a DCRP. If the derivation shown
in (290b) is correct, direct objects and DCRPs are similar in that they both re-
ceive Case in essentially the same position. However, there are nonetheless some
important differences between DCRPs and direct objects:
(i) DCRPs cannot raise to their Case position overtly, whereas direct objects
may optionally raise overtly.
(ii) A DCRP is initially merged as the complement of a preposition, whereas a
direct object is initially merged as a complement of V.
(iii) The vP containing a DCRP is still in some sense marked as intransitive (the
V head does not have a DP complement).
The ability to distinguish between direct objects and DCRPs in these respects will
make it possible to account for those cases where the two do not behave alike.
3.3 Passives, unnacusatives, existentials and partitive Case
My account of pseudopassivization can be summed up as follows. The comple-
ment of a reanalyzed preposition raises to the same position as an ordinary direct
object: the specifier of a v/V-medial Agr projection. The addition of the passive
morpheme renders this a Case′ position (for whatever reason it does so in or-
dinary passives). Subsequently, the complement of the reanalyzed preposition
moves to [Spec,TP] to receive Case.
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The remainder of this section is organized as follows. We first show how my
analysis accounts for the adjacency requirement on pseudopassivization (§3.3.1);
this first subsection is largely independent of any specific technical implemen-
tation of passivization. To place the subsequent discussion in a more concrete
theoretical context, I go on to outline a specific analysis of passivization in §3.3.2.
This subsection is not intended as an original contribution to the study of pas-
sivization, but rather as an indication of the type of analysis which jibes best
with my account of pseudopassives. I conclude by addressing the implications of
idiomatic passives such as take advantage of (§3.3.3), arguing that certain restric-
tions on these follow from the theory of “partitive” Case.
3.3.1 Existentials, locality and adjacency
Movement of P to Agr is, as would be expected, subject to locality conditions.
Thus, the presence of a closer PP in (291c) blocks pseudopassivization:
(291) a. John1 was spoken to t1 about Mary.
b. John1 was spoken about t1.
c. * John1 was spoken to Mary about t1.
Under analyses such as that of Bresnan (1982), (291c) is ruled out by a linear
adjacency constraint. (That is, a requirement that V and P must be adjacent in
order for V+P to reanalyze as a complex verb.) However, if it is reanalysis that
permits binding in (292), there can be no adjacency constraint on reanalysis as
such:
(292) John spoke (frequently) to Bill1 (frequently) about himself1.
Something must therefore be said to explain the deviance of (293):
(293) * John was spoken frequently to.
162
In contrast to (291c), which is plausibly ruled out as a violation of Minimality
or some similar condition on movement, (293) appears to exemplify a genuine
linear adjacency constraint on pseudopassivization. If this constraint does not
follow from a condition on reanalysis itself, it must derive from some property of
English passives. I suggest that the relevant property is the position of V. Capon-
igro and Schütze (2003) propose that V does not raise overtly to v in English
passives. They point out that this accounts for the DP-V order in sentences such
as (294):
(294) There were (three fish) caught (* three fish).
(Idealized judgments; see subsequent discussion.)
Interpreting C&S’s analysis within the present framework, we have two possible
structures for active sentences – (295a/b) – and one for passives – (296):
(295) a. [V−Agr−vP Subj V-Agr-v [V−AgrP Obj V-Agr [VP V Obj]]]
(Active with overt raising to [Spec,Agr])
b. [V−Agr−vP Subj V-Agr-v [V−AgrP Obj V-Agr [VP V Obj]]]
(Active with covert raising to [Spec,Agr])
(296) [v◦P v◦ [Agr◦P Obj V-Agr◦ [VP V Obj]]]
(Passive; raising to Agr and [Spec,Agr] is always covert.)
C&S are not explicit regarding the nature of the Case assigned to the DP in
[Spec,V-AgrP] in passive clauses, but it would seem natural to follow Belletti
(1988) and Lasnik (1992, 1995) in assuming that it is partitive Case. (In the next
subsection, I will argue that this is the only Case which can be assigned by the
defective form of Agr present in passive vPs.) Given the structure in (296), the
adjacency requirement on pseudopassivization in (293) now follows. If the VP
has the structure in (297), then there is no “room” for an adverbial expression to
be infixed between V and its PP sister:
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(297) [VP talked [PP to Bill]]
In contrast, V raises to v in (292) (repeated here as (298a)). Thus, an adverb left-
adjoined to P-AgrP in (292b) can appear between V and P, as shown in (298b):
(298) a. John spoke (frequently) to Bill 1 (frequently) about himself1.
b. [V−vP spokev−V [P−AgrP Adverb [P−AgrP [Bill] [P−Agr to] [VP V [PP to
[Bill]]]]]]
This explains why pseudopassivization in (293) is subject to adjacency, and why
binding in (292) is not. Truswell (2009) notes that there are some exceptions to
the adjacency requirement. I find his examples marginal, but there is no doubt
that e.g. (iv) is much better than (v):
(iv) ? John was spoken sternly to.
(v) * John was spoken yesterday to.
This suggests that there may be “room” for a certain restricted class of adverbials
to adjoin between V and its PP complement. If adjuncts must adjoin to maximal
projections, this would imply that the structure of the lower VP is somewhat
more articulated than I have been assuming.
Returning briefly to (294), it should be noted that the judgments indicated
in this example are an idealization. Many English speakers find a postverbal DP
in such cases at least marginally acceptable:
(299) % There were caught three fish.
However English speakers uniformly reject (300a), showing a clear preference
for (300b):
(300) a. * There were spoken to three men.
b. There were three men spoken to.
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In §3.5.6, I will argue that this is because Heavy DP Shift may apply to the asso-
ciate in (300a) but not in (300b).
3.3.2 A very sketchy analysis of the English passive
Following Jaeggli (1986), Baker, Johnson, and Roberts (1989), I will assume that
the passive morpheme is responsible for absorbing the external theta-role of v
and blocking assignment of accusative Case. BJ&R propose that the passive mor-
pheme is itself a theta and Case assignee. I prefer to assume that the passive
vP is headed by a special “defective” v head, written v◦, which does not assign
a theta-role to its specifier (Chomsky, 2000, 2001). This v◦ head is spelled out
as the passive morpheme, and selects an AgrP as its sister just like an ordinary
v.However, the Agr head selected is correspondingly defective (I’ll call it Agr◦).
Like any other Agr head, Agr◦ may attract a lexical head such as P, T or V, but the
resulting P/T/V-Agr complex is not capable of assigning structural accusative
Case. Rather, it assigns partitive Case – the Case which licenses the associate of
there in existentials (Belletti, 1988; Lasnik, 1992, 1995). As mentioned in the in-
troduction to §3.3, I will assume that the surface subject of a (pseudo-)passive
sentence transits through [Spec,X-Agr◦P] (for X ∈ {V,P}) on its way to [Spec,TP].
Compared to BJ&R’s analysis, mine differs principally in the extent to which
it admits the syntactic presence of a nominal expression bearing the external
argument theta role. For BJ&R, the passive morpheme is precisely such an ex-
pression, and this is taken to explain instances where the suppressed external
argument appears to enter into syntactic relations such as control:
(301) The ship was sunk (by John1) [PRO1 to collect the insurance].
(PRO can be controlled by the agent of the matrix event whether or not the
‘by’ phrase is present.)
On my account, the suppressed external argument has a more spectral presence.
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It may in some sense be expressed by v◦, but since v◦ is not a nominal (and has
no nominal specifier), it cannot enter into ordinary DP-DP relations. This may
well be an advantage over BJ&R’s analysis, since there is little hard evidence that
the suppressed external argument may do so. For example, we have seen in (302)
that it cannot bind:
(302) John was arrested *(by the police officers1) using each other1’s hand-
cuffs.
And there is evidence that the apparent cases of control – such as (301) above –
are really a separate phenomenon (see e.g. Lasnik 1988; Landau 1999).
To exemplify my analysis of the passive, (303) gives the structures for two
active sentences, and (304) the structures for their corresponding passives.3 The
active sentence (303b) is shown with reanalysis having applied, but reanalysis is
not obligatory here.
(303) a. John saw Bill.
[V−Agr−vP John [V−Agr−v saw] [V−AgrP [Bill] V-Agr [VP saw [Bill]]]]
b. John talked to Bill.
[V−vP John [V−v talked] [P−AgrP [Bill] [P−Agr to] [VP talked [PP to [Bill]]]]]
(304) a. Bill was seen.
[TP [Bill] ... [V−Agr◦−v◦P [V−Agr◦−v◦ seen] [V−Agr◦P [Bill] V-Agr◦ [VP seen
[Bill]]]]]
b. Bill was talked to.
[TP [Bill] ... [V−v◦P [V−v◦ talked] [P−Agr◦P [Bill] [P−Agr◦ to] [VP talked
[PP to [Bill]]]]]]
3 (303a) is shown with overt raising to [Spec,V-AgrP], though as we have seen, covert raising
is also an option in English.
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3.3.3 Paying attention to taking advantage
A classic puzzle in the study of passivization is illustrated in (305)-(307):
(305) a. John took advantage of Bill.
b. John made fun of Bill.
(306) a. John was taken advantage of.
b. Advantage was taken of John.
(307) a. John was made fun of.
b. (Much) fun was made of John.
If we take passivization to be driven by the Case requirements of the surface
subject, the possibility of the (a) structures in (306) and (307) is surprising.The
addition of the passive morpheme ought to absorb the Case of whichever DP it is
that receives Case from the verb in (305) (presumably advantage); it ought there-
fore to be advantage that raises to subject position, not the complement of of. An
informal notion of reanalysis offers the sketch of a solution to this problem. I.e.,
the (a) passives result if reanalysis applies, and the (b) passives result if it does
not (Bach and Partee, 1980, 323-324). The problem of refining this analysis fur-
ther has essentially been a technical one: just how is it that of can reanalyze with
the verb (or any neighboring projection) when a DP intervenes? And how is the
postverbal DP Case-licensed? An advantage of the analysis presented here is that
the first question receives a straightforward answer in terms of head movement,
since movement of the preposition is not subject to an adjacency requirement.4
4 It has been proposed that reanalysis is possible in (306a) because take advantage (of) forms
an idiomatic complex predicate of some sort (Hornstein and Weinberg 1981; Chomsky 1973,
Riemsdijk and Williams 1986, 148). Although intuitively appealing, this sort of analysis faces a
few problems. The formation of such complex predicates must presumably be optional, given the
possibility of (306b) and (307b). Thus, the claim would be that there are two optional operations
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The second question has previously been addressed by the hypothesis that
take advantage of forms a single complex predicate, thus exempting advantage
from the Case filter (Chomsky, 1973; Hornstein and Weinberg, 1981). Rather
than taking this approach, I follow Mills (2008) in assuming that advantage is
licensed by partitive Case.5 Partitive Case is compatible only with certain classes
of DP. These can be roughly characterized as the weakly quantificational DPs,
though it is unclear whether bare DPs such as fun or attention qualify as such.
(A reviewer points out that bare and weakly quantificational DPs may have in
common the property of being “small” DPs in a theory such as that of Zamparelli
(2000).) As expected, the restrictions imposed by partitive Case apply to the
postverbal DPs in the pseudopassive constructions under consideration:
(308) a. John was paid attention to.
b. John was paid a great deal of attention to.
c. * John was paid every possible attention to.
Though judgments are difficult in this area owing to the idiosyncrasies of the
various idioms involved, the restriction to weak quantifiers tends to be relaxed in
passives where the idiomatic DP is the subject. So for example, (309) is detectably
better than (308c):6
at work here: optional complex predicate formation, and optional reanalysis of the preposition,
the latter conditioned (in the cases at hand) on complex predicate formation. On the face of it,
having these two optional operations is overkill, since in principle a single binary optionality
should be sufficient to explain the existence of the two different passive versions of (305).
5 See also Lødrup (1991): “...The generalization [is that] the indefiniteness requirement holds
of an unaccusative object whose verb has a non-thematic subject.”
6 Judgments are quite variable for (308), (309) and other such cases. I do not think this vari-
ation should be taken too seriously as a grammatical phenomenon. For example, while some
English speakers find (309) distinctly odd, the construction appears to have been unexception-
able in 19th century English, as shown by a Google search for “every attention was paid to”
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(309) ? Every possible attention was paid to John.
This contrast crucially shows that the restriction to bare nouns is not imposed by
the requirements of the pay attention idiom. The idiomatic DP can often appear
preverbally in a passive existential:
(310) a. There was much fun made of John at the conference.
b. There was much attention paid to John at the conference.
c. (The court ruled that) there was no unfair advantage taken of John.
In (310a), made fun of is not even a string (and likewise for paid attention to and
taken [no unfair] advantage of in (310b/c)). Thus, passivization in cases such as
(308a/b) cannot be conditioned on formation of a complex predicate in the syn-
tax. It follows that the postverbal DP in (308a/b) cannot be exempted from Case
licensing by means of incorporation within such a complex. This provides fur-
ther support for the hypothesis that the postverbal DP is licensed by partitive
Case. On this hypothesis, the derivation for (308a) is along the lines shown in
(311):
(311) [TP [John] ... [V−v◦P [John] [V−v◦ made] [P−Agr◦P [DP fun] [P−Agr◦ of] P-Agr◦
[VP [V made] ... [DP fun] ... [PP of [John]]]]]]
Here Agr◦ has ‘P’ features. Thus, P raises covertly to Agr◦ to create a complex
P-Agr◦ head. This head assigns partitive Case to fun following covert raising to
[Spec,P-Agr◦P].7
(quotes included), which returns many matches from books published in this period (together
with a few contemporary examples). In contrast, a search for “was paid every attention to” re-
turns only two relevant matches as of 03/01/2011. It seems unlikely that any deep grammatical
distinction could be responsible for the differing judgments of modern English speakers. The
important point here is that virtually everyone finds (309) noticeably better than (308c).
7 Raising of the DCRP to the surface subject position “crosses over” [Spec,P-Agr◦P]. Not all
formulations of Minimality/Shortest Move would permit this, but in general this kind of “nested”
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In sum, the postverbal DP in a passive such as (308a/b) is subject to two sets
of constraints: (i) those imposed by partitive Case; and (ii) those imposed by the
idiom itself (e.g., that the DP must contain an NP headed by fun).8 This amounts
to the following claim:
(312) If a DP α ...
(i) Meets the requirements imposed by partitive Case; and
(ii) can be the subject of a passivized ...V α PP... type idiom (as in (309))
...then α will also be permissible in a passive such as “...V α P t...”
To illustrate the need for stating the claim in this somewhat complex form, note
that the contrast in (313) does not constitute a counterexample to it:
(313) a. There was a significant advantage (in arriving early).
b. * John was taken a significant advantage of.
The argument here would be that since a significant advantage is compatible with
the requirements imposed by partitive Case – as shown by (313a) – we ought
therefore to expect the postverbal DP in (313b) to be licensed. However, this
argument fails to impugn the claim in (312) because a significant advantage is
never able to participate in the take advantage idiom:
(314) * A significant advantage was taken of John.
dependency is what is predicted by the conjunction of Shortest Move and Cyclicity (Richards,
1999; Kitahara, 1995, 1997). With regard to Cyclicity, a complication here is that the “nested”
movement is covert, implying that it occurs after the overt outer movement. Since virtually all
covert movement is prima facie countercyclic, it is unclear what the conjunction of Shortest Move
and Cyclicity predicts in the case at hand. This issue will not, however, arise within “single-
cycle” theories, which take covert movement to be pronunciation of a lower copy, movement of
formal features, or Agree without subsequent remerge. This would provide some motivation for
interpreting my analysis within a single-cycle framework.
8 A similar observation is made in Taraldsen (1979).
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Thus, (312ii) is not met.
3.3.3.1 Two non-existent pseudopassives
The hypothesis that advantage receives partitive Case in (315) may offer an expla-
nation for the impossibility of the pseudopassives in (316):
(315) John1 was taken advantage of t1.
(316) a. * Mary1 was said to t1 that Bill is intelligent.
b. * Mary1 was said that Bill is intelligent to t1.
Given the semantic reflexes of partitive Case, it is reasonable to assume that it is
incompatible with clauses. If so, the derivation given above for (315) will not be
available in (316).9
9 I have not yet addressed the question of why non-idiomatic pseudopassives such as (vii) are
barred:
(vi) John was taken advantage of.
(vii) * John was given a book to.
On the face of it, it should be possible for a book to be licensed by partitive Case in the same way
that advantage is licensed in (vii). The only principled explanation for the impossibility of (vi)
that I am are aware of is the aforementioned hypothesis that passives of this sort are conditioned
on complex predicate formation (which in turn is conditioned on the idiomaticity of the com-
plex predicate). However, we have seen that examples such as (310) constitute decisive evidence
against complex predicate formation as a process applying in the narrow syntax. All I can offer
here is the weaker hypothesis that there is nonetheless some semantic process of complex predi-
cate formation that is subject to Hornstein and Weinberg’s (1981) “natural predicate” condition.
This condition seems to extend to subject-predicate constructions more broadly. For example, the
contrast between (vi) and (vii) is mirrored in the (albeit weaker) contrast in the acceptability of
tough-movement between (viii) and (ix):
(viii) It is tough to take advantage of John⇒ John is tough to take advantage of.
(ix) It is tough to throw books at John ; ? John is tough to throw books at.
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Unaccusative pseudopassives such as (317) are also correctly predicted to
be impossible, since no Agr projection can be present within an unaccusative vP:
(317) * [This bed]1 was died in t1.
3.4 Reanalysis and binding
Baltin and Postal (1996) object to reanalysis accounts of these binding phenom-
ena on the grounds that the set of PPs which permit pseudopassivization is not
identical to the set of PPs which are transparent for binding. Rather, the latter
are a proper superset of the former. For example, whereas talk to permits both
pseudopassivization and binding – (318) – pseudopassivization is degraded for
talk with despite binding being perfect – (319):10
Since tough-movement and passivization appear to have little in common syntactically, this sup-
ports the hypothesis that the natural predicate condition is syntax-external. In §3.5.5, I will
develop further the idea that subject-predicate constructions are a natural class with respect to
a certain family of extrasyntactic conditions. Within generative syntax, the idea that the subject-
predicate relation has a special interpretative significance is often associated with Chomsky’s
(1975) discussion of the difference in meaning between Beavers build dams and Dams are built by
beavers. Only the latter can be paraphrased as “It is a general property of dams that they are built
by beavers.” (See Standop 1981 for a contrasting view.)
It should also be noted that, according to Taraldsen (1979) and Lødrup (1991), Norwegian is
slightly more permissive than English with respect to postverbal DPs in pseudopassives, some-












I have no idea why Norwegian should differ from English in this respect, but the Norwegian facts
do hint that (vii) may not be ruled out in the narrow syntax.
10 Baltin & Postal’s other examples are somewhat difficult to assess. In their (5c-f), they present
a number of examples based on (xi):
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(318) a. John was talked to.
b. John talked to Mary1 about herself1.
(319) a. ? John was talked with.
b. John talked with Mary1 about herself1.
I agree with B&P that (319a) is degraded as compared to (318a). However, I
suggest that the relevant comparison cases for judging the acceptability of pseu-
dopassives are examples such as (320b), where the complement of a preposition
which is not the closest to the verb is passivized:
(320) a. John was talked about.
b. * John was talked to Bill about.
For all the speakers I have consulted, (320b) is considerably worse than (319a).
This is perhaps the level of unacceptability to be expected if reanalysis is truly
impossible. With regard to (319a), I note that while reanalysis is a precondition
for pseudopassivization, it is surely not the only precondition. It may well be that
reanalysis does successfully apply in (319a), and that passivization is degraded
for some other reason.
One possible source of the degradation of (319a) is a constraint blocking the
passivization of symmetric predicates (Bach and Partee 1980, 332-333; Dowty
1991; Hallman 2000, 58). As an illustration of this constraint, note that the verb
marry has two possible meanings in the active sentence (321a), but in the pas-
sive sentence (321b) has only the reading where the surface subject stands in an
(xi) ? The detective worked from Mary1 back to herself1.
(B&P’s judgment.)
However, all English speakers I have consulted find binding to be highly degraded in this exam-
ple. The failure of pseudopassives such as B&P’s (5e) (* Mary was worked back from to Sally) has,
on my account, the same explanation as in (333a).
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asymmetric relation to the logical subject:
(321) a. John married Mary.
(Ambiguous: either “John and Mary (got) married,” or “John presided
over Mary’s marriage ceremony.”)
b. Mary was married by John.
(Has only the reading “John presided over Mary’s marriage ceremony.”)
Regarding the contrast between (318a) and (319a), note that talk with is arguably
“more symmetric” than talk to, since the former strongly suggests (without per-
haps implying) a two-way conversation. For example, (322a) can be roughly
glossed as (322b):
(322) a. I talked to John but not with him.
b. I said things to John, but John didn’t reciprocate.
The mild degradation of (318a) may therefore follow from the fact that talk with is
a “mildly” symmetric predicate. More generally, it appears that with pseudopas-
sives are fully acceptable only with robustly asymmetric predicates. Thus, pred-
icates such as bargain with and dance with (which describe events in which the
participants play more-or-less identical roles) pseudopassivize poorly, whereas
clearly asymmetric predicates such as dispense with and do away with pseudopas-
sivize perfectly:
(323) Symmetric (or near-symmetric)
a. ? John was bargained with.
b. ? John was argued with.
(324) Asymmetric
a. John was dispensed with.
b. John was done away with.
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3.4.1 Non-c-command-based theories of binding
As B&P note, an appealing feature of the reanalysis account of binding from
within PPs is the explanation it offers for the contrast in (325) (Riemsdijk and
Williams, 1986, 203):
(325) a. Who1 did Mary talk to t1 about himself1?
b. * [To whom1]2 did Mary talk t2 about himself1?
c. * [To Mary1]2, John talked t2 about herself1.
The traditional explanation is that reanalysis destroys the constituency of the
PP, barring it from undergoing subsequent wh-movement in (325b/c). On my
account, P-AgrP is a constituent following reanalysis, but the intervention of VP
between P-Agr and the wh-phrase nonetheless blocks pied-piping of P-AgrP:11
(326) a. [P−AgrP:+wh P-Agr [PP:+wh P Wh]]
(Percolation of +wh up to P-AgrP is possible; pied-piping of P-AgrP is
possible.)
b. [P−AgrP:+wh P-Agr [VP:+wh V [PP:+wh P Wh]]]
(Percolation of +wh is blocked by VP; pied-piping of P-AgrP is impossi-
ble.)
To my knowledge, no means of accounting for the data in (325) has yet been pro-
posed which does not appeal to reanalysis in one form or another. Thus, (325a/b)
11 No special assumptions regarding pied-piping are required here, since typically pied-piping
can never extend up to a maximal projection which is not a PP or DP. This generalization can also
be stated in approaches to pied-piping which do not assume feature percolation (e.g. in terms of
the subcategorization/selection properties of Cable’s (2007) Q head). Though +wh features may
percolate as far as PP, pied-piping of PP would cause the derivation to crash, since it would block
subsequent covert movement of P’s complement to [Spec,P-AgrP], and of P to Agr. Apart from
this, there may be a more general ban on φ-incomplete phrases undergoing A-movement.
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poses a significant empirical challenge to theories of binding which attempt to
accommodate (325a)/(273) by abandoning the c-command condition on binding
altogether.
A representative example of such a theory is that presented by Pollard and
Sag (1992). P&S argue that Conditions A and B are stated over arg-st lists, which
are essentially ordered lists containing the arguments of a given predicate. Ar-
gumenthood here is to be understood in a syntactic rather than semantic sense,
such that John in (327) is taken to be an argument of believe:12
(327) John believes Bill to like Mary.
The arg-st list for believe in (327) is approximately as follows:
(328) < John, Bill, [VP to like Mary] >
Since arg-st lists are ordered, it is straightforward to define an asymmetric prece-
dence relation over them; in P&S’s terminology, John in (327) “o-commands” Bill.
Condition A is stated as the requirement that an anaphor have an o-commanding
antecedent in the same arg-st list (and conversely for Condition B). P&S’s cru-
cial further assumption is that the complement of a preposition can appear on
the arg-st list of the verb which takes the relevant PP as a complement. So for
example, the arg-st list for talk in (329a) is approximately as shown in (329b):
(329) a. John1 talked to Bill1 about himself1/2.
b. < John, Bill, himself >
The anaphor herself therefore has two potential o-commanding antecedents on
the same arg-st list, and the attested binding possibilities are correctly predicted.
12 One might dispute the standard assumption that John in (327) is not the semantic object
of believe (see e.g. Klein and Sag 1985), in which case one might consequentially maintain that
arg-st lists have more semantic significance than would be thought given standard assumptions.
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We have already seen that the data in (325) are problematic for argument
structure theories of binding.13 A further difficulty for P&S’s analysis is posed by
the contrast in (330):
(330) a. John talked to Mary1 about herself1.
b. * John talked t2 about herself1 [to Mary1]2.
For P&S, the arg-st list is identical for (330a) and (330b) (< John, Mary, herself
>), so their Condition A is not able to make any cut between the two. P&S recog-
nize this difficulty, and postulate a linear precedence requirement on anaphoric
binding to rule out (330b) (p. 266). However, English does not impose any such
requirement on anaphoric binding in the general case, as shown by the accept-
ability of (331b) and (331d):14
(331) a. John1 talks to himself1 frequently.
b. To himself1, John1 talks frequently.
c. John1 would like himself1.
d. Himself1, John1 would like.
The reanalysis account of the contrast in (330) is relatively unproblematic. Fol-
lowing P&S, I assume that to...about is the base order, and that the order in (330b)
is derived via extraposition of the to PP. Movement of P to Agr is obligatorily
covert, and thus must follow overt extraposition of the PP. On the assumption
that extraposition targets an adjoined position in (330b),15 head movement of P
to Agr (and phrasal movement of P’s complement to [Spec,P-Agr]) would there-
fore violate the adjunct island condition.
13 See also Baltin (2006) for further arguments against o-command theories.
14 For important early discussions of binding facts of this type, see Lakoff (1968) and Reinhart
(1976, 1983a).
15 On“freezing” effects of this type, see Rochemont and Culicover (1990).
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With regard to examples such as (332), which are correctly ruled out by
P&S’s o-command condition, I note that binding is also predicted to be impossi-
ble under my account. This is because about is not structurally the closest prepo-
sition to the verb and hence cannot reanalyze with it:
(332) * Mary talked [to himself1] about John1 to himself1.
As expected, pseudopassivization from within an about PP is also degraded when-
ever a to PP is present, whatever the surface word order:
(333) a. ?? Mary was talked about t to John.
b. * Mary was talked to John about t.
3.4.1.1 More arguments against argument structure theories of
binding
In addition to the empirical problems just mentioned, there are some conceptual
problems with the use of argument structure to obviate the problem posed by
binding from within PPs. Often when argument structure theories of binding
are presented, the details of the mapping from constituent structure to argument
structure are left tacit. This is of course understandable, given the range of highly
complex and controversial issues that arise in this connection. Nonetheless, once
one begins to spell out in detail a mapping procedure (or set of mapping con-
straints), it becomes necessary to make an exception for PPs very much like the
exceptions typically made in c-command-based theories of binding. Clearly, it is
not the case that for any verb V, any DP that is contained within a sister of V can
be one of its arguments. For example, the subject of an embedded finite clause
which is the sister of V cannot under any circumstances be one of its arguments.
In English at least, it seems that the only thing that can be an argument of V
(apart from one of its sisters) is the complement of a prepositional phrase that is
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one of its sisters. Unless this fact can be given some principled explanation, one
must resort to making an exception for PPs in the theory of the syntax/argument-
structure mapping. Precisely such an exception is made, for example, in the the-
ory of subcategorization and binding presented in Sag, Wasow, and Bender (2003,
211-12) (which is a revised version of that presented by P&S).16 Thus, the appar-
ent absence of stipulation in P&S’s account may be illusory: the stipulation has
merely been shifted to another component of the grammar.
3.4.1.2 About PP reflexives as logophors
Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and Büring (2005) offer a different explanation for
the possibility of binding in examples such as (334):
(334) John talked to Mary1 about herself1.
They suggest that reflexives in about PP’s are “exempt” or “logophoric” reflex-
ives which are not subject to Condition A. Since logophors do not require c-
commanding antecedents (see the next subsection), it is no surprise that about
PP reflexives may be bound by antecedents embedded within another PP.The hy-
potheses that about PP reflexives are logophors correctly predicts predicts the
absence of a strong Condition B effect when the reflexive in (334) is replaced by
a pronoun:
(335) ? John talked to Mary1 about her1.
16 Sag, Wasow, and Bender (2003, 211-12): “For prepositions that function as argument mark-
ers, we need to find some way by which they can transmit information about their object DP up
to the PP that they project...If the object’s mode and index values can be transmitted up to the PP,
then the higher verb that takes the PP as its complement will have the mode and index informa-
tion from the object DP in its arg-st, within the PP’s sem value.” (In SW&B’s theory it is the mode
and index values of DPs which are crucially involved in binding dependencies.)
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However, it seems unlikely that the logophoric status of the reflexive can be the
true explanation for the relative acceptability of (335). This hypothesis overgen-
erates, incorrectly predicting the absence of a Condition B effect with subject
antecedents:
(336) * John1 talked (to Mary) about him1.
A more plausible explanation for the ungrammaticality of (335) is simply that
reanalysis of to is optional. If reanalysis does not occur, then the complement of
to (John) will not c-command him.
3.4.2 A reciprocal red herring
Examples with possessive reciprocals such as (337) have often been cited in sup-
port of the claim that English PPs do not block binding (see e.g. Pesetsky 1995):
(337) John talked to the boys1 on each other1’s birthdays.
In a certain sense (337) clearly does support this claim: the antecedent is con-
tained in a PP and the indicated interpretation is not blocked. However, there is
reason to think that the reciprocal in (337) is a logophor rather than an anaphor
bound under Condition A. Pollard and Sag (1992) present a number of persuasive
arguments to this effect; there follow three additional arguments.
(i) Though each other generally permits both animate and inanimate an-
tecedents, possessive each other is compatible only with animate antecedents:
(338) a. I placed the boys1 next to each other1.
b. I placed the pens1 next to each other1.
(339) a. I placed the boys1 next to each other1’s mothers.
b. # I placed the pens1 next to each other1’s cases.
This is expected if possessive each other is a logophor, since logophors typically
seek prominent animate antecedents.
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(ii) Fronting of the PP in sentences such as (337) does not block binding, in
contrast with (325c) above:17
(340) To the boys1, John talked on each other1’s birthdays.
This suggests that reanalysis is not required to license binding in this configura-
tion. Again, this is expected if the possessive reciprocal is a logophor, since as
shown in (341), logophors do not require strict c-command for binding:18
(341) John1’s nervous disposition suggests that pictures of himself1 are on
display again.
(iii) There are additional examples suggesting that possessive each other
does not require a strictly c-commanding antecedent:
(342) Pictures of the boys1 were taken at each other1’s birthday parties.
If possessive reciprocals are indeed logophors, this has the important con-
sequence that examples such as (343) are not as problematic as they may first
appear:
(343) John talked to Bill about the boys1 on each other1’s birthdays.
In this configuration, about cannot reanalyze (since to intervenes), and thus the
boys cannot A-move to a position c-commanding each other. However, since pos-
17 Here we do not give an example with wh-movement since wh-movement of a PP seems to
degrade even variable binding:
(xii) Who1 did you talk to on his1 birthday.
(xiii) ?? To whom1 did you talk on his1 birthday.
18 It is necessary for the antecedent to be contained in an inanimate DP such as John’s disposi-
tion, since an animate DP would be a more prominent logophoric antecedent than its possessor.
There appears to be some connection here to the notion of “sub-command” that has arisen in the
analysis of long-distance reflexives in Chinese (Tang, 1989).
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sessive each other does not require a strictly c-commanding antecedent, there is
no reason to suppose that this movement is necessary to license the relevant in-
terpretation.
3.5 The Baltin & Postal phenomena
I have already discussed some of objections to reanalysis presented in Baltin and
Postal (1996).19 However, B&P present an entire battery of arguments against
reanalysis, and it is the aim of this section to address them comprehensively. The
arguments in question are primarily based on a single kind of observation: that
in various respects, the DP complements of reanalyzed prepositions (DCRPs) do
not behave like ordinary direct objects. B&P are entirely correct in observing
that previous reanalysis theories cannot explain these differences in behavior,
since these theories essentially claim that DCRPs just are ordinary direct objects.
On my account, however, DCRPs are syntactically distinct from ordinary direct
objects insofar as they have a different base position. (They initially merge as the
complement of P rather than V.) In §3.5.1-§3.5.7 I argue that this distinction is
sufficient to explain the differences in behavior noted by B&P.
19 I unfortunately have not had time to give a proper reaction to Postal (2011). Postal (2011,
200) presents a new analysis of pseudopassivization which does not involve promotion to direct
object (or “2-object” in Postal’s terms). My “raising to object” analysis has more in common with
earlier relational grammar accounts of passivization (e.g. Perlmutter and Postal 1983), which
likewise assumed that only direct objects can passivize. I agree with Postal (p. 202) that the
absence of “pseudo-middles” is a crucial fact which any adequate theory of pseudopassivization
must account for; this is discussed further in §3.7.1.1. I also agree that make fun of passives argue
decisively against traditional reanalysis theories. (In fact, Postal’s analysis of the licensing of the
postverbal DP is abstractly reminiscent of the analysis in Mills (2008), which I have adopted.)
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3.5.1 Syntactic independence of stranded prepositions
B&P note that given examples such as (344), it is implausible to maintain that
reanalyzed prepositions are in any way attached to the associated verb:
(344) The bridge was flown both under and over.
Under my analysis, cases such as (344) can be derived simply by coordination of
the two P heads:
(345) ... [v◦P [V−v◦ flown] [P−Agr◦P [DP the bridge] [[P under and over]-Agr◦] [VP
[V flown] [PP [P under and over] [DP the bridge]]]]]]
3.5.2 Floating quantifiers
B&P note that whereas direct objects sometimes allow floating quantifiers, DCRPs
do not:
(346) The airforce struck (* at) those targets both in the morning.
This is expected under an extension of the analysis of floating quantifiers first
proposed in Sportiche (1988). According to Sportiche, subject-oriented floating
quantifiers originate together with the subject in a quantificational phrase (QP).
This QP receives a thematic role in [Spec,VP] (which I will anachronistically take
to be [Spec,vP]). The subject then raises out of the QP to the matrix subject posi-
tion:
(347) [The boys]1 [vP [QP all t1] saw the girls].
For floating quantifiers associated with objects, it is easy enough to extend Sportiche’s
analysis to make use of the v/V-medial Agr projection. The QP begins as the com-
plement of V, and the DP then extracts from the QP to raise to [Spec,V-AgrP]. In
the case of V-AgrP, this raising may be overt, whereas in the case of P-AgrP (the
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reanalysis case), raising is obligatorily covert. Thus, reanalysis will be incompat-
ible with quantifier float:20
(348) [The airforce]1 ... [V−Agr−vP t1 [V−Agr−v struck] [V−AgrP [DP those targets]
[V−AgrP′ tV−AgrP [VP tV [QP both [DP those targets]]]]]]].
(Raising to [Spec,V-AgrP] is (optionally) overt; quantifier is stranded.)
(349) [The airforce]1 ... [V−vP t1 [V−v struck] [P−AgrP [DP those targets] [P−Agr
at] [VP tV [PP [P at] [QP both [DP those targets]]]]]].
(Raising to [Spec,P-AgrP] must be covert; quantifier cannot be stranded.)
3.5.3 Heavy DP Shift
B&P note that DCRPs cannot undergo Heavy DP Shift (HDPS), giving examples
such as the following:
(350) a. I described t1 to himself1 [the victim whose sight had been im-
paired by the explosion]1.
b. *I talked to t1 about himself1 [the victim whose sight had been im-
paired by the explosion]1.
Since the source of the ban on extraposing DPs from within PPs is still poorly
understood, I will have little to say on this point. I suggest two possible explana-
tions:
(i) Extraposition is a PF process. At PF, the complement of a reanalyzed prepo-
sition is in exactly the same configuration as the complement of an ordinary
20 To highlight the relevant contrasts between the two derivations, (348)-(349) use a mix of
trace/copy notation. This is not intended to imply any difference in the type of movement. Traces
(t) in these examples are always traces of overt movement. A striken-through copy is, if it is the
higher copy, the landing site of a covert movement, and if it is the lower copy, the initial position
of an overtly moved phrase.
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preposition. Thus, there is no reason to expect a difference in behavior w.r.t.
extraposition.
(ii) Drummond, Hornstein, and Lasnik (2010) attempt to explain the ban on
Heavy DP Shift out of PP in a manner which should extend to the reanalysis
structure, if P-AgrP is taken to be a phase. An explanation along these lines
is not particularly attractive within the present framework, however, since
phases are not appealed to in the analysis of any other phenomena.
3.5.4 Ellipsis phenomena
B&P note a number of respects in which DCRPs do not behave like direct ob-
jects with respect to ellipsis/deletion. Most significantly, DCRPs do not permit
gapping – (351) – or pseudogapping – (352):21
(351) a. Frank called Sandra and Arthur Louise.
b. * Frank talked to Sandra and Arthur (to) Sally.
(352) a. Frank called Sandra and Arthur did Louise.
b. * Frank talked to Sandra and Arthur did Louise.
As I will now explain, these differences between DCRPs and direct objects are
not unexpected under my analysis. First, a point of notation. To avoid a clash
between two distinct uses of the strikeout notation, I will for the remainder of
this section use a strikeout to indicate ellipsis, and traces to indicate movement.
21 The judgment on (352b) is somewhat controversial. E.g., Lasnik (2003) has suggested that
such examples are relatively acceptable. Most speakers I have asked find (352b) distinctly worse
than (352a). B&P also discuss comparative subdeletion. I will have little to say about this phe-
nomenon, since the analysis of comparative subdeletion remains controversial, and it is difficult
to make any general comments.
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3.5.4.1 Gapping and pseudogapping
I assume pseudogapping of direct objects is predicated on extraction of the object
to [Spec,AgrP] prior to elision of VP (Lasnik, 2003). Thus, pseudogapping is
correctly predicted to be degraded in (352b). The structures for (352a/b) are
shown respectively in (353a/b):22
(353) a. Frank called Sandra and Arthur did Louise.
... [v′ v [AgrP Louise1 [VP [V called] t1]]]
(‘Louise’ raises overtly and escapes the ellipsis site.)
b. Frank talked to Sandra and Arthur did Louise.
... [v′ v [AgrP [VP [V talked] [PP to Louise]]]]
(‘Louise’ remains as the complement of V at PF and can’t escape the
ellipsis site.)
If gapping has a broadly similar derivation to pseudogapping (i.e. one in-
volving extraction of the object from VP; see e.g. Sag 1976, Coppock 2001), then
the same logic applies. If, on the other hand, gapping has the derivation pro-
posed in Johnson (2009), a different explanation for the ill-formedness of (351b)
will be required. According to Johnson, simple cases of gapping are derived by
across-the-board raising of the verb to a higher Pred head, as in (354) (tree from
p. 307). More complex cases are derived by across-the-board raising of a VP to
[Spec,PredP], as in (355) (tree from p. 318):
22 Note that – atypically – V does not raise overtly to v in (353a), even though Sandra does
raise overtly to [Spec,AgrP]. Lasnik’s analysis of pseudogapping relies on the hypothesis that V’s
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Gapping, then, arises when vPs have been coordinated, and the VP-movement indicated in (41)
and (42) occurs across the board. Movement of the VP can be fed by operations—such as heavy
NP shift—that are also found in pseudogapping. The gaps in (39a) and (40a) will have the
representations in (43) and (44). (43) illustrates a case in which the objects of the moved VPs




















13 The idea that gapping involves, or is related to, across-the-board movement has several precedents; see, for example,
Goodall 1987, Steedman 1990, 1996, and Zoerner 1995. Also, a number of interesting applications of the idea have been
used to derive some of its typological and/or interface properties; see Abe and Hoshi 1997, Paul 1999, and López and
Winkler 2003.
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(! (60) with across-the-board VP-movement)
Moving give me as indicated in (65) will have two consequences. It will remove from the lineariza-
tion statements gathered from the right conjunct before movement (i.e., the set in (61b)) all those
statements that involve give and me. It will also introduce a set of statements that position give
and me before everything else in the coordination. Because the statements that place give and me
after the subject of the right conjunct are removed, there will be no conflict in introducing state-
ments that place give and me to the left of this subject. A conflict will be introduced, however,
with respect to give and me and the position of the subject of the left conjunct. The linearization
statements gathered from the left conjunct prior to movement (i.e., (61a)) include ones that put
the subject of this conjunct (ice cream) to the left of give and me. This conflict is repaired,
however, by moving the subject of the left conjunct into the specifier of TP.
In illustrating this technique for solving the word order problems that (58) invokes, I have
assumed an across-the-board treatment of gapping, but the same technique would work under an
ellipsis-based treatment as well. There are quite a few cases where a word order problem looms,
and I do not know whether all of them can be addressed in this way. It is possible that some will
show that the across-the-board analysis I am advocating fails.
6.2 Left Branch Condition Violations
Let me close this article by considering one particularly difficult case and sketching how this
technique might be applied to it. The case is another on Coppock’s (2001) list of problems for non-
Let us consider these two possibilities i relation to (351b): If the verb moves
across-th -board t Pred, we str ightforw rdly derive the gramma ical case of
gapping in (356):
(356) Frank talked to Sandra and Arthur to Louise.
In contrast, to derive (351b), it would be necessary to create a VP consti u nt with
the string yield talked to (i.e. a VP excluding the complement of the preposition).
We have seen in §3.5.3 that the complement of a reanalyzed preposition cannot
extrapose, so no such VP constituent can be created.
3.5.4.2 A problem raised by the interaction of pseudogapping and
binding
It is possible to bind out of PPs which are remnants of pseudogapping:
(357) John talked to Mary1 about herself1 and Jane did to Bill2 about himself2.
On the assumption that pseudogapping is a form of VP ellipsis, the to and about
PPs in the second conjunct must somehow have extracted from VP (I will as-
sume via movement of some kind; Jayaseelan 1990). The problem to be discussed
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in this subsection is raised by the contrast between (357) and examples such as
(325b)/(330b), repeated here in (358):
(358) a. * [To whom1]2 did you talk t2 about himself1.
b. * I talked t2 about himself1 [to Bill1]2.
I have argued on the basis of such examples that movement of a PP blocks reanal-
ysis, and hence binding. On the face of it, the PPs in (358) would appear to have
extraposed out of the ellipsis site, so it is surprising that binding is not blocked.
A clue to the correct analysis of (357) is that the relative order of the to
and about PPs affects binding precisely as it does in the absence of ellipsis. For
example, the contrast in (330) is mirrored in (359):
(359) a. John talked to Mary1 about herself1 and Jane did to Bill2 about
himself2.
b. * John talked to Mary1 about herself1 and Jane did about himself1 to
Bill2.
This suggests that the to and about PPs in (359) have not extraposed indepen-
dently. I suggest that AgrP is in fact the extraposed constituent in these cases,
and V-vP the elided constituent:
(360) PF: [[...did [V−vP talkv−V tAgrP]] [AgrP Agr [VP [VP tV [PP toP Bill] [PP about him-
self]]]]]
LF: [[...did [V−vP talkv−V tAgrP]] [P−AgrP Bill toP−Agr [VP [VP tV [PP tP tBill] [PP
about himself]]]]]
In (360), AgrP extraposes overtly to a position above vP, and reanalysis applies
subsequently. If such a derivation is available, we also gain some insight into the
contrast between (361a) and (361b):
(361) a. John spoke yesterday to Mary1 about herself1.
b. * John was spoken yesterday to.
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So far, I have assumed that yesterday can be base-generated between talked and
to Mary in (361a), and that this is not possible in (361b) because the verb is in
a lower position (§3.3.1). (See e.g. Johnson 1991, Pesetsky 1989 for analyses in
which the order in (361a) is derived without movement of the to PP.) If AgrP is
able to extrapose, a different account of this contrast becomes available: the order
in (361a) is derived via extraposition of AgrP.23
3.5.5 Passivization and object raising
B&P point out a striking parallel between passivization and tough-movement.24
The extent to which pseudopassivization is acceptable correlates with the accept-
ability of the corresponding tough-movement construction:
(362) a. * The chair was stood next to.
b. * The chair is difficult to stand next to.
(363) a. ?? John was stood up to (by Bill).
b. ?? Bill is tough to stand up to.
(364) a. John was spoken to (by Bill).
b. John is tough to speak to.
B&P use these data as the basis for an argument against reanalysis. Though the
data are very interesting, I find B&P’s argument, summarized in the following
23 Absent a theory of extraposition, it is somewhat unclear whether it is more stipulative to
assume that AgrP can extrapose or to assume the converse. In the reanalysis structure, Agr even-
tually becomes P-Agr, so in a sense, extraposition of AgrP is just extraposition of PP (given that
ordinary English PPs are really P-AgrPs on my account).
24 I have found that many of B&P’s starred examples are in fact acceptable for most English
speakers, so I give different examples here. As far as I can tell, B&P are nonetheless correct
regarding the correlation between the acceptability of pseudopassivization and the acceptability
of tough movement.
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quotation, to be somewhat unclear:
In all these cases [examples similar to my (362)-(364) above] the PP object
is [able to undergo wh-movement]; thus, there is no general ban on extrac-
tion or P-stranding that can be used to block the [(b)] form. The constraints
on the [(b)] cases seem linked to the pseudopassive restrictions in the [(a)]
cases. If pseudopassives involved “reanalysis,” the unacceptable [(b)]
cases would presumably have to be attributed to failures of “reanalysis”.
But if it exists, “reanalysis” must be optional...Therefore, whatever “reanaly-
sis” restrictions exist would leave a full PP analysis available, and full PPs are
in general not incompatible with object raising. Thus, a “reanalysis” view of
pseudopassives provides no way to link the pseudopassive and object-raising
restrictions in a range of cases like [(362)-(364)].
(p. 132, my emphasis)
The bolded claim is questionable. Successful reanalysis is but one requirement
for an acceptable pseudopassive. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that
something other than failure of reanalysis is responsible for the deviance of (362a)
and (363a). This is particularly so given the well-known fact that pseudopassives
of this sort can be rescued by a pragmatic context in which the subject is “af-
fected.” For example:
(365) The chairs in this room are very fragile, and can be damaged if someone
so much as stands next to one. Thus, you will easily be able to identify
the chairs that have been stood next to (or otherwise disturbed) by the
small fatigue cracks in the legs.
(Compare (362a))
Unless the reanalysis operation itself is subject to pragmatic constraints (which
seems unlikely), something else must be at work. In fact, what the illicit pseu-
dopassive and tough-movement cases appear to have in common is that they
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are both violations of the “affectedness” constraint on certain kinds of subject-
predicate construction.25 This constraint applies to pseudopassives and passive
nominalizations, but not to ordinary passives (or at least, not as strongly26 ):
(366) Pseudopassives
a. John shot at Mary⇒Mary was shot at (by John).
b. John stood next to Mary ; * Mary was stood next to (by John).
(367) Passive nominalizations
a. Bill’s arrest of John⇒ John’s arrest (by Bill).
b. Bill’s avoidance of John ; * John’s avoidance (by Bill).
(368) Ordinary passives
a. John arrested Bill⇒ Bill was arrested (by John).
b. John avoided Bill⇒ Bill was avoided (by John).
Intriguingly, those forms of the passive constrained by affectedness are precisely
those restricted to agentive by phrases:
(369) Pseudopassives
a. John stood on the desk⇒ The desk was stood on by John.
25 The affectedness constraint was first formulated by Anderson (1979, 43) in relation to passive
nominalizations (though Anderson does not propose that passivization as such is restricted by
this constraint). See also Ramchand and Svenonius (2004) for recent discussion.
26 There are examples demonstrating an apparent affectedness constraint on verbal passiviza-
tion, such as the well-known contrast between the following active/passive pair:
(xiv) John left Sweden.
(xv) * Sweden was left by John.
However, the contrast between (367b) and (368b) appears to show that the affectedness constraint
is (for reasons I do not understand) weaker for the verbal passive. Alternatively, one might con-
clude that there are two entirely distinct constraints at work here.
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b. A lamp stood on the desk ; # The desk was stood on by a lamp.
(370) Passive nominalizations
a. The surrounding of the city by the barbarians.
b. # The surrounding of the city by trees.
(371) Ordinary passives:
a. John persuaded Bill⇒ Bill was persuaded by John.
b. John’s argument persuaded Bill⇒ Bill was persuaded by John’s ar-
gument.
Similarly, it has been noted that the subject of the non-finite clause in tough con-
structions must be agentive, whether it is null or overt (Jackendoff, 1975):
(372) a. This ledge is easy to fall off.
(Has only the reading “...is easy for people [not plants etc.] to fall off.”)
b. This ledge is easy for careless people to fall off.
c. # This ledge is easy for large potted plants to fall off.
This effect is seen only when the application of tough-movement derives a subject-
predicate structure. The effect disappears when the subject is an expletive, as
shown in (373); and the affectedness constraint likewise fails to hold, as shown
in (374):
(373) a. It is easy for a careless person to fall off this ledge.
b. It is easy for large potted plants to fall off this ledge.
(374) It is difficult to stand next to this chair.
These facts may be a clue to the source of the correlation between pseu-
dopassivization and tough-movement in (362)-(364). It seems that there is some
link between the affectedness constraint and the agentivity requirement (though
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I have no insight to offer regarding what this link might be). Descriptively, this
link can be stated as follows:
(375) In the configuration [γ αι [φ ... tι ... ]], where
(i) α a is a subject
(ii) φ is a predicate containing a trace co-indexed with α, and
(iii) φ has an external argument η which may or may not be syntac-
tically expressed and which if expressed is distinct from α and
its trace,
α must be affected and η must be agentive.
(Following Chomsky (1986), I assume that the subject of a tough predicate is
co-indexed with the trace of the null operator.27) As we have seen, the one excep-
tion to this generalization is the ordinary verbal passive. I do not know why (375)
holds insofar as it does. However, I see no reason to suspect that the ultimate ex-
planation for (375) will be incompatible with an account of pseudopassivization
in terms of reanalysis.
3.5.6 Pseudopassives, there existentials and locative inversion
Citing examples such as (376b), B&P note that pseudopassives are incompatible
with locative inversion. Postal (2004, 47) cites examples such as (376c) to show
that pseudopassives are incompatible with there existentials:28
27 I.e.:
(xvi) John1 is tough [CP Op1 to talk to t1].
28 Postal’s actual claim is slightly more subtle than this. He argues that pseudopassives are
incompatible with locative inversion just when they are incompatible with the corresponding
there existential. However, it is clear from his example (127b), p. 47, that he takes sentences
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(376) a. Many famous revolutionaries were shot (at) in this very building.
b. In this very building were shot (*at) many famous revolutionaries.
c. In this very building there were shot (*at) many famous revolution-
aries.
The unacceptability of pseudopassives in (376b/c) is arguably unexpected under
reanalysis accounts, which seem at first blush to imply that pseudopassives ought
to have all the properties of ordinary passives. In this subsection, I will argue that
on closer inspection, the data in (376) do not in fact pose a serious challenge to
reanalysis theories.
Consider first (376c). We have already seen (in connection with (300) above)
that pseudopassive existentials require the associate of there to appear prever-
bally. We therefore expect (376c) to become acceptable if the DP is placed in a
preverbal position. This is indeed the case, so long as a “light” DP is used:29
(377) In this building there were many revolutionaries shot at.
The only remaining problem pertaining to (376c) is that of explaining why (377)
is unacceptable with a heavy DP. This is so whether the associate is pre- or post-
verbal:
(378) a. ?? In this building there were a number of revolutionaries who’d fought
for years shot at.
b. * In this building there were shot at a number of revolutionaries
who’d fought for years.
such as (376c) to be unacceptable (as do all native English speakers I have consulted). These
observations go back to Bresnan (1994). See also Postal (2004, 46) for further discussion.
29 See Bruening (2011), Chomsky (2001) for arguments that shot at in (377) cannot be a reduced
relative attached to revolutionaries.
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The degradation in (378a) is likely due to prosodic awkwardness; and as for
(378b), we have already seen that the lack of V-to-v raising in English passives
implies that the order in (378b) cannot be straightforwardly generated (§3.3.1).
The question, then, is why the word order in (378b) cannot be derived via Heavy
DP Shift:
(379) * In this building there were t′1 shot at t1 [a number of revolutionaries
who’d fought for years]1.
There is no general ban on HDPS of the associate of there – as demonstrated
by examples such as (380) – so some explanation is required for why HDPS is
blocked in (379).
(380) There were (t1) arrested (t1) on Tuesday [a number of low-level drug
dealers]1.
(Bracketed traces indicate two possible base positions.)
I suspect that this restriction may fall under the descriptive generalization
in (381):
(381) Heavy DP Shift cannot apply to a DP which was ever – at any stage in
the derivation – the complement of a preposition.
In (378b), the DP is initially the complement of a (reanalyzed) preposition, and
is thus barred by (381) from undergoing HDPS. Independent evidence for (381)
comes from certain properties of ECM subjects of pseudopassive clauses. As
shown in (382a), subjects of ECM clauses are marginally able to extrapose. How-
ever, when an ECM subject originates as the complement of a (reanalyzed) prepo-
sition, as in (382b), extraposition is more severely degraded:
(382) a. ? I believe t′1 to have been shot t1 [every soldier in the unit]1.
b. * I believe t′1 to have been shot at t1 [every soldier in the unit]1.
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The same contrast can also be seen in certain kinds of small clause construction.
For example in (384b), every prisoner cannot extrapose from the subject position
of the small clause because it originates as the complement of at:
(383) a. I’ll have [every prisoner who tries to escape]1 shot t1 on sight.
b. I’ll have [every prisoner who tries to escape]1 shot at t1 on sight.
(384) a. ? I’ll have t′1 shot t1 on sight [every prisoner who tries to escape]1.
b. * I’ll have t′1 shot at t1 on sight [every prisoner who tries to escape]1.
Thus, given that there is no means of shifting the associate of there to the right
in pseudopassive existentials, the only word order possible is one in which the
associate is pre-verbal.30
Turning now to (376b), I will follow Bruening (2011) in assuming that loca-
tive inversion is banned in pseudopassives because the derivation of locative
inversion involves rightward extraposition of the postverbal subject DP. With-
out going into the details of Bruening’s analysis, the claim is essentially that the
postverbal subject in an instance of LI such as (385) obligatorily undergoes Heavy
30 Intriguingly, (381) cannot be strengthened to the following generalization:
(xvii) If a DP cannot undergo Heavy DP Shift from its initial Case/θ position, then it cannot
undergo Heavy DP Shift from any subsequent position.
For example, it is well known that the first object in the double object construction cannot un-
dergo Heavy DP Shift:
(xviii) * I’ll give t1 a free book [every student in my class]1.
But when the first object is promoted to an ECM subject position via passivization, Heavy DP
Shift is then possible:
(xix) I expect t′1 to be given t1 a free book [every student in my class]1.
This contrasts with (382b), where raising to ECM subject position fails to improve extraposition
of the erstwhile complement of a preposition.
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DP Shift:
(385) Into the room t1 walked [a man]1.
We have just seen that the complements of prepositions (whether reanalyzed or
not) cannot undergo Heavy DP Shift, so Bruening’s analysis correctly predicts
that locative inversion is incompatible with pseudopassivization. As would be
expected, other DPs which resist Heavy DP Shift, such as the first object in the
double object construction, likewise fail to appear postverbally in locative inver-
sion. For example, locative inversion is barred in (386a) because Heavy DP Shift
is barred in (386b).31
(386) a. * In this room were given books the best students in the class.
b. * I gave t1 books [the best students in the class]1.
3.5.7 Pronoun binding restrictions
B&P argue (i) that reanalysis must, if it exists, be optional, but that (ii) this op-
tionality leads to overgeneration. I agree with (i), but am not persuaded by (ii).
In support of their argument, B&P present the following paradox:
(387) a. To whom did you talk about that issue?
b. * I talked to Thelma1 about her1.
(B&P’s judgment.)
The possibility of pied-piping in (387a) appears to show that reanalysis is not
obligatory, but if reanalysis is optional, the Condition B violation in (387b) is
unexpected (since if reanalysis does not apply, Thelma will not c-command her).
Thus, neither optional nor obligatory reanalysis seem to be consistent with the
facts.
31 The deviance of examples such as (386a) is noted by Postal (2004, 47), Bresnan (1994,
79fn79).
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The logic of B&P’s argument is undoubtedly correct. However, as we have
seen in connection with (336) above, it is likely that the judgment shown in
(387b) is not correct. A number of authors (e.g. Reinhart and Reuland 1993,
Büring 2005) have reported these sentences to be acceptable, or at least marginally
so. Furthermore, there is a detectable contrast in the strength of the Condition B
effect between (388a) and (388b):
(388) a. ? John talked to Thelma1 about her1.
(My judgment; compare (387b).)
b. * Thelma1 talked to John about her1.
Thus, given that the acceptability judgments are rather fuzzy in these cases, I see
no clear indication that reanalysis theories make the wrong predictions regard-
ing grammaticality. Indeed, they appear to account for the otherwise puzzling
contrast in (388).
A more serious problem is raised by the following example given by B&P,
which they take to be a Condition B violation:
(389) * The person to whom1 I talked about him1.
There may also be a weak crossover effect in (389).32 However, it seems at least
plausible on the face of it that Condition B is also at work, given that (389) is
clearly far less acceptable than (390):
(390) ? The person to whom1 I talked about his1 mother.
The same pattern is found in simple questions:
(391) a. * To whom1 did you talk about him1.
b. ? To whom1 did you talk about his1 mother?
32 Whether or not (389) instantiates a WCO configuration will depend on the extent to which
WCO is linearly or structurally conditioned.
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These facts are puzzling and I have no explanation for them. However, I
believe that B&P’s argument against reanalysis based on these data ultimately
fails because the phenomenon in question turns out to be much broader. For
example, an apparent Condition B effect obtains in (392b), despite the complete
absence of any Condition B effect in the underlying configuration (392a):
(392) a. I talked about John1 near him1.
b. * About whom1 did you talk near him1?
Thus, it seems that obviation in cases such as (389), (391a) and (392b) is simply
not predicated on the existence of a Condition B configuration in the underlying
structure. For this reason, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from (389a)
and (391). To add to the puzzle, I conclude this section by noting that the absence
of pied-piping seems to improve these examples somewhat:33
(393) a. ?? Who1 did you talk about near him1?
b. ?? Who1 did you talk to about him1?
3.6 Binding and covert movement
I have argued that raising to [Spec,P-AgrP] places a DCRP in a position to c-
command into PPs to its right. This explains why binding is possible in (273),
repeated here as (394):34
(394) John talked to Mary1 about herself1.
33 Note that on my account, full reanalysis is not required to obtain preposition stranding, so I
do not predict that reanalysis must necessarily occur in (393) (though of course it may optionally
occur, yielding a structure where the trace of who c-commands the pronoun). Thus, while the
contrast between e.g. (392b) and (393a) is puzzling, the mere absence of Condition B effects in
(393a/b) does not pose a problem for my account, since a derivation is available without reanal-
ysis (and hence without c-command of the pronoun by the wh-phrase).
34 There appear to be cases parallel to (394) in the nominal domain:
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Lasnik (1999) presents evidence that covert raising of an anaphor to [Spec,V-
AgrP] (i.e. v/V-medial Agr) is not sufficient to establish new binding relations.
This implies that binding should not in fact be possible in (394). Lasnik is of
course working within a framework in which anaphors are separate lexical items
and are not linked via a chain to their antecedents. Within the present frame-
work, it is very difficult to see why a DP which undergoes covert movement to
a Case position should not then go on to merge in another pair of Case and θ
positions to derive a binding relation. (Recall that this dissertation treats covert
movement as pronunciation of lower copies – there is no separate covert cycle.)
Lasnik’s argument is based on evidence from English verb-particle constructions
and English existential constructions. These arguments were strong given the
prevailing theoretical assumptions at the time of publication, but as I will now
attempt to show, recent shifts have rendered them somewhat less compelling.
3.6.1 English verb-particle constructions
The most straightforward evidence for Lasnik’s position is the contrast in (395):
(395) a. The boys made themselves/each other out to be idiots.
b. * The boys made out themselves/each other to be idiots.
(xx) A letter to Mary1 about herself1.
Since reanalysis is clearly not involved in (xx), examples of this sort appear to argue that reanaly-
sis is not a precondition on binding out of PP. (I would like to thank Richard Larson for drawing
my attention to this issue.) The argument is, however, weakened by the observation that reflexives
in this configuration behave as logophors (Pollard and Sag, 1992; Reinhart and Reuland, 1993):
(xxi) Letters about herself1 frighten Mary1.
(xxii) Mary1 was worried. A private letter about herself1 was circulating.
Since logophors need not be structurally bound at all, the lack of c-command in (394) will not
prevent the reflexive receiving the indicated interpretation. (See also §3.4.1.)
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Lasnik takes (395) to show that an ECM subject cannot be bound by an an-
tecedent in the matrix clause unless it raises overtly to matrix [Spec,V-AgrP]. This
suggests that only overt A-movement is sufficient to license new binding config-
urations. This conclusion has been challenged by Craenenbroeck and Dikken
(2006), who point to Lasnik’s (2001b) observation that covert raising in (395b)
can be analyzed not as the presence of a weak Agr, but rather as the complete
absence of a separate Agr projection. Thus, the data in (395) do not rule out the
possibility that covert A-movement can license new binding configurations, since
the anaphor may not undergo A-movement at all in (395b).
3.6.2 There existentials
Lasnik (1999, 2001a) also considers the question of whether the associates of
there expletives can bind from [Spec,TP], as might be expected if associates move
covertly to replace or adjoin to the expletive (Chomsky, 1986, 1995). On the
basis of contrasts such as (396), he concludes that covert movement does not feed
binding:
(396) a. The DA proved [two men1 to have been at the scene] during each
other1’s trials.
b. * The DA proved [there to have been two men1 at the scene] during
each other1’s trials.
This argument depends on an analysis of existential constructions in which the
associate of there raises to subject position at LF. Though there have long been al-
ternatives to this kind of analysis (see e.g. Williams 1994), these alternatives were
not straightforwardly compatible with early Minimalist assumptions. In particu-
lar, given the assumption that agreement is established in a Spec-Head configura-
tion, it was difficult to see how the subject/verb agreement pattern illustrated in
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(397) could be explained unless the postverbal DP ended up in subject position:
(397) There *is/are three men in the room.
More recent work has shown that covert raising of the associate is not the only
possible analysis. An alternative hypothesis is that there itself bears φ-features
valued by those of the subject. This is proposed in the doubling analysis of there
existentials presented in Hornstein and Wiktos (2003), Hornstein (2009, 139).
According to this analysis, an existential sentence such as (398a) has the deriva-
tion in (398b):
(398) a. There is a man in the room.
b. [TP There1 is [vP [?P t1 [a man]] in the room]]
The doubling relation allows φ-features on there to be valued by those of [a man].
When there subsequently raises to T, theφ-features of there value those on T. Since
no direct relation is established between T and [a man], I do not expect [a man]
to behave as if it c-commands the region of the tree c-commanded by T. Binding
is therefore predicted to be impossible in (396b), as desired.
3.7 Typological remarks
3.7.1 Preposition stranding
Reanalysis has been claimed by some authors (e.g. Hornstein and Weinberg 1981)
to account for preposition stranding under wh-movement:
(399) Who did John talk to t?
I do not think that reanalysis is involved in the derivation of P-stranding. How-
ever, it seems likely that both phenomena are linked to a language’s ability to use
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P-Agr complexes to assign Case to prepositional complements.35
Abels (2003) presents an account of P-stranding based on the hypothesis
that P is a phase head only in non-P-stranding languages. If P is a phase, it fol-
lows that any wh-phrase extracted from a PP must move through [Spec,PP]. But
Abels argues that movement of P’s complement to its specifier violates an anti-
locality condition on movement. It follows that preposition stranding is possible
only when P is not a phase (so that the wh-phrase is not obliged to stop off in
[Spec,PP]). Abels also mentions a variant of this analysis according to which P is
a phase head in all languages (p. 227). In this version of the analysis, the locus of
variation is the presence or absence of an additional projection within PP. If this
projection is present, then movement of the complement of P to [Spec,PP] does
not violate anti-locality, and preposition stranding is permitted:
(400) a. * [PP wh [P′ P t]]
(Non-preposition-stranding language; movement from the complement
of P to [Spec,PP] violates Anti-locality.)
b. [PP wh [P′ P [XP ... t]]]
(Preposition stranding language; presence of XP circumvents Anti-locality.)
Let us attempt to situate Abels’ second proposal within the analysis of prepo-
sitional phrases presented in this chapter. I have argued that there is an Agr
projection above PP in English. Adapting Abels’ analysis in (400), we might
suppose that only P-stranding languages have this Agr projection above P. That
is, languages without preposition stranding have the structure shown in (401a),
whereas languages with preposition stranding have the structure shown in (401b):
(401) a. * wh ... [PP t [P′ P t]]
35 See Truswell (2009) for another attempt to link preposition stranding to pseudopassivization
without implicating reanalysis in both (or indeed either, in his case).
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(Movement of the wh-phrase violates anti-locality – non-preposition-
stranding language.)
b. wh ... [AgrP t [Agr′ Agr [PP ... t]]]
(Movement of the wh-phrase respects anti-locality – preposition-stranding
language.)
In (401a), P assigns Case directly to its complement (the wh-phrase); in (401b),
it assigns Case in association with Agr. Just as in Abels’ original analysis, we
can appeal to anti-locality to rule out the movement in (401a). However, since
the framework of this dissertation does not include phases, we cannot use phase
theory to force the wh-phrase to move via [Spec,PP]. Some other condition must
therefore be found to play the role of the Phase Impenetrability Condition. One
possibility is a condition on A-movement requiring the use of all available in-
tervening A-positions. Since the complement of P is an A-position (it is a θ po-
sition), it follows from the generalizations stated in §1.2.12 that [Spec,PP] is an
A-position. Wh-movement from P’s complement is therefore required to go via
[Spec,PP] in (401a), but this violates anti-locality.36 In (401b), by contrast, where
there is an Agr projection above the PP, the complement of P first undergoes A-
movement to [Spec,AgrP] before undergoing any subsequent A-movement. Since
36 It might be objected that there is something rather unnatural about stating the requirement
that intervening A-positions not be skipped in such a manner that a position which is inaccessible
due to anti-locality is still taken into consideration. I think this is a reasonable objection. I will
only note here that a similar objection applies to Abels’ original analysis. Anti-locality is quite
natural when understood as a side-effect of Greed or Enlightened Self-Interest – if a phrase is
the complement of a head, it presumably cannot check any additional features by moving to the
specifier of the same head. However, if we assume that intermediate steps in successive-cyclic
movement are not (necessarily) driven by feature checking, then it is unclear why movement
of P’s complement to its specifier should, when it is an intermediate step in a successive-cyclic
movement, violate anti-locality.
204
A-movement is not required to stop off in intervening A-positions, there is no
requirement that this movement pass via [Spec,PP], and anti-locality can be ob-
viated.
We now see that both preposition stranding and reanalysis require Agr to
project a head separate from P.As mentioned in the introduction, pseudopas-
sivization is attested in a proper subset of those languages which permit prepo-
sition stranding. This is to be expected given that pseudopassivization requires
a v/V-medial Agr head bearing P-features. The availability of independent Agr
projections bearing P-features is necessary, but not sufficient, to ensure that v◦s
able to select an Agr◦ head.
3.7.1.1 Abels (2003) on pseudopassives
Abels (2004) does not give a detailed analysis of pseudopassivization, but he hy-
pothesizes that languages with pseudopassives have P heads which assign Case
only optionally. Abels notes that this analysis – unlike reanalysis accounts – does
not have “the virtue [of capturing] the fact that there needs to be a close rela-
tion between the verb and the preposition to allow pseudopassives...” (p. 246).
Abels’ theory also fails to explain why there are no “pseudo-unaccusatives” or
“pseudo-middles”:37
(402) * [This bed]1 was died in t1.
(Unaccusatives cannot pseudopassivize.)
(403) a. Paper cuts easily.
37 I thank members of the audience at a 2011 LSA talk for pointing out the significance of
unaccusatives in this connection. The absence of pseudo-middles is noted by Fagan (1988) and
Postal (2011), amongst others. See Abels (2003, 234fn141) for a very brief discussion of overgen-




b. * Paper cuts through easily.
(Impossible “pseudo-middle.”)
On my analysis, (402) and (403b) are impossible because the passive morpheme
is crucially implicated in removing the Case-assigning powers of a reanalyzed
preposition. Given Abels’ assumptions, the only function of the passive mor-
pheme in pseudopassives is to suppress the external argument. The Case-assigning
powers of the preposition are removed by an independent (and optional) process.
This predicts, all else being equal, that impersonal pseudopassives such as (404)
should be possible in English:
(404) * It was spoken to John.
Abels does not attempt to explain why (404) is out in English. However, he argues
that it is not clear how serious a problem this sort of overgeneration is for his
theory, given that impersonal passives are attested in many other languages (p.
234fn141). While this is of course true, it should be noted that many attempts to
explain cross-linguistic variation in the availability of impersonal passives have
focused precisely on cross-linguistic differences in the Case-absorbing role of the
passive morpheme (see e.g. Baker, Johnson, and Roberts 1989, 234, Svenonius
2001, 9). Abels’ account of pseudopassives appears to shut off this promising
line of analysis.38
38 In a modification of Abels’ analysis, Truswell (2009) proposes that V may assign Case to
the complement of P when P does not assign Case. Thus in pseudopassives (where P does not
assign Case), the addition of the passive morpheme to V is required to prevent P’s complement
receiving Case from V. It is not entirely clear that (404) is blocked on this account, since some
further condition preventing the passive morpheme from vacuously absorbing Case would be re-
quired. (Otherwise, we are free to choose a Case-assigning P in (404), and the passive morpheme
will harmlessly absorb V’s accusative Case, which would not have been assigned to anything any-
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3.7.2 Binding out of PP
Binding out of PP appears to be possible in some languages which have neither
preposition stranding nor pseudopassivization. For example, the Spanish reflex-
















‘John spoke to George about himself.’
Moreover, as in English, A-movement of the relevant prepositional phrase blocks
binding by the object (compare (325) above):

























‘To George John spoke about himself.’
As in the case of the corresponding English examples, the data in (406) sug-
gest that reanalysis is implicated in (405). Since Spanish has neither pseudopas-
sivization nor preposition stranding,39 it seems that the mere availability of re-
analysis cannot be sufficient to guarantee the possibility of preposition stranding
and pseudopassivization. Conversely, I know of no languages which have prepo-
sition stranding or pseudopassivization but which do not permit binding out of
PP (except where this is independently explained by the subject-orientation of
the relevant anaphor). Thus, these phenomena appear to stand in the following
way.) A condition of this sort would not obviously follow on general “economy” grounds, since
the passive morpheme in (404) would still serve the useful purpose of suppressing the external
argument.
39 Though on preposition stranding in Spanish, see Campos (1991).
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implicational hierarchy:
(407) Pseudopassivization⇒ preposition stranding⇒ binding out of PP.
The second implication is expected for the reasons outlined in the preceding sub-
section; the first is more problematic. If Spanish has binding out of PP then it
must permit reanalysis. But the availability of reanalysis ought to license pseu-
dopassivization – and if (407) is correct, pseudopassivization implies preposition
stranding. What all this suggests is that the complements of Spanish preposi-
tions may undergo covert A-movement to a v/V-medial position, but that this
movement is not predicated on formation of a complex P-Agr head.
I suggest that in languages such as Spanish, P’s complement raises solely in
order to check an EPP feature. More precisely: the v/V-medial Agr head has no
‘P’ feature that needs to be checked, assigns no Case, and has only the require-
ment that its specifier be filled by a phrase bearing φ-features. The idea here is
that a “bare” Agr head has the following properties as compared to a complex
formed of Agr and a lexical head:
(408) For λ a lexical head:
Agr Requires a phrase bearing φ-features in its specifier.
Agr + λ Requires a phrase bearing φ-features in its specifier and
assigns a structural Case determined by λ to this phrase.
Given these assumptions, the DP complement of a Spanish preposition may re-
ceive Case from the preposition and then undergo covert A-movement to check
the EPP feature of a v/V-medial bare Agr head. As in English, this places the DP
in a position where it can c-command into VP-adjoined phrases on its right. Simi-
larly, fronting of the preposition blocks covert movement of the DP to [Spec,AgrP],
so the contrast in (406) is accounted for. The bare Agr head is not involved in
Case assignment, so passivization of the verb cannot have the effect of leaving P’s
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complement without Case. Pseudopassivization is therefore impossible. Simi-
larly, since the case position for the DP remains the complement of P, preposition





The term “successive-cyclic movement” will be used to refer to any movement
which passes through more than one position. So for example, raising of a wh-
phrase to [Spec,Agr], followed by movement to matrix [Spec,CP], counts as an
instance of successive-cyclic movement according to this way of talking. The
formalism defined below makes no distinction between this case and, e.g., move-
ment through multiple +Q specifiers of C.
Given a tree T , a “treelet” of T is a set of nodes t such that there is no node
which does not belong to t yet both dominates a node of t and is dominated by a
node of t. Thus, all subtrees of T are treelets of T , but not vice versa.
4.2 Introduction
We have seen that Merge over Move is a global economy condition. The use of
such economy conditions in early Minimalist work gave rise to a number of of
criticisms. These can be divided roughly into two classes: claims that global
economy conditions were not stated with sufficient precision, and claims that
economy conditions led to an unacceptable explosion in computational complex-
ity. Both classes of criticism are exemplified in Johnson and Lappin (1997).
The aim of this chapter section is to show that Merge over Move, as ap-
plied within the syntactic framework of the preceding chapters, can be stated
precisely and without adverse computational effects. Recent work in mathemat-
ical linguistics allows this goal to be achieved largely with the use of “off the
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shelf” technology. Thus, there will be no original mathematical results presented
in this chapter. Rather, I will show that it is possible to construct a formal speci-
fication of the relevant parts of the syntactic framework, and that it is possible to
construct this specification in such a way that the resulting class of grammars is
known to generate string languages within the class of Mildly Context-Sensitive
(MCS) string languages. Although some caution should be exercised in making
inferences from the recognition properties of the string language,this does sug-
gest that there is nothing fundamentally intractable about Merge over Move.
The key insights that I will make use of are those of Rogers (1998), Moraw-
ietz (2003), and Graf (2010, 2011). Rogers’ monograph was an important devel-
opment in what it is now frequently referred to as model-theoretic syntax. This
is, broadly speaking, the approach to syntactic theorizing in which grammars (or
classes or grammars) are specified in terms of a set of constraints over structures.
Structures which meet all of a grammar’s constraints are models of that gram-
mar. Rogers’ key insight is that many of the constraints to be found in grammat-
ical theories can be concisely stated over trees using weak monadic second-order
predicate logic (henceforth “MSO”). This is first-order logic supplemented with
quantification over finite subsets of the domain. Rogers defines a form of MSO
extended with binary predicates (“dominates”, “precedes”, etc.) for stating con-
straints over trees. He shows, via a result of Rabin (1969), that the class of trees
definable in this logic is the regular tree languages.
There is a very close – but not quite exact – correspondence between the
regular tree languages and the derivation tree languages of context free gram-
mars. Roughly speaking, for any regular tree language L, it is possible to define
a context-free grammar whose derivation tree language is L (and hence whose
string language is the string yield of L). There is, however, an important caveat.
For obvious reasons, the derivation trees of context-free grammars are strictly
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local, in the sense that they can be verified as licit by comparing the labels of
each non-leaf node and its children with the production rules of the CFG. In
contrast, regular tree languages may have non-local conditions on node labeling.
For example, Rogers (1998) gives the example of the regular tree language LAB
consisting of all finite binary {A,B}-labeled trees such that exactly one node is
labeled B. Since LAB clearly includes trees in which B is dominated by A, any
CFG which generated LAB as its derivation tree language would have to include
the rule A→ AB (amongst others). But then, since this rule permits any A-node
to have a B-node as a child, there would be nothing to prevent the generation
of trees containing multiple B nodes. It is nonetheless easy to show that LAB is
a regular tree language. The extension of the Myhill-Nerode theorem to regular
tree languages (Gécseg and Steinby, 1984) gives us (409):
(409) A set of trees T is a regular tree language iff there is a congruence R
of the corresponding term algebra such that R defines a finite set of
equivalence classes and T is equal to the union of zero or more of these
equivalence classes.1
The term algebra corresponding to a regular tree language L is the term algebra
with function symbols f of rank n for every f -labeled n-branching node of a tree
in L, together with constant symbols c for every c-labeled leaf node.2 The terms
of an algebra can be represented as trees – see (410) for an example – and from
now on we will implicitly move back and forth between terms and trees.
1A congruence of an algebra A is an equivalence relation which is invariant with respect to
the operations of A. An equivalence relation is a reflexive, transitive and symmetric relation. An
equivalence relation R over the domain ofA is invariant with respect to the operations ofA iff for
every n-ary operation ofA, R(f (a1, . . . , an), f (b1, . . . , bn)) for all a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn such that R(ai ,bi)
for all 0 < i ≤ n.
2 Gécseg and Steinby do not set things up in precisely this manner. In their presentation, the








Returning now to the case of LAB, note that all subtrees of trees in LAB fall into one
of two classes: (i) those which contain exactly one node labeled B, and (ii) those
which contain no node labeled B. To define a congruence over the term algebra,
we will need to consider a third class of trees not in LAB: (iii) trees which contain
more than one node labeled B. It is easy to verify that the equivalence relation
for which (i)-(iii) are the corresponding equivalence classes is a congruence of
the term algebra. As an example, consider the case A2(x,y), for each possible
pairing of equivalence classes c,c′ such that x ∈ c,y ∈ c′. If both c and c′ are
(i), then A2(x,y) will have two nodes labeled B, so A2(x,y) will always be in the
same equivalence class – (iii). If both c and c′ are (ii), then A2(x,y) will always
be in (ii). If both c and c′ are in (iii), then A2(x,y) will always be in (iii). We
can proceed in this manner to check exhaustively that for any pairing of c and c′,
there are equivalence classes d,d′ such that for any x ∈ c, y ∈ c′, A2(x,y) ∈ d and
B2(x,y) ∈ d′.3 This shows that the equivalence relation is a congruence. By (409),
it then follows that LAB is a regular tree language.
By contrast, consider the language LAnBn consisting of all finite binary {A,B}-
labeled trees such that each tree has the same number of leaf nodes labeled A and
B. We can show that this is not a regular tree language by showing that there is
no suitable congruence of the term algebra. Suppose that LAnBn is regular. Then,
LAnBn is the union of a subset of a finite set of equivalence classes defined by a
3 Strictly speaking, we also have to check the constant terms, but this is trivial.
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congruence. Let the expression (a,b) denotes the subset T ∈ LAnBn s.t. T has a
A-labeled nodes and b B-labeled nodes. Since the number of equivalence classes
is finite, there must be an equivalence class containing both T ∈ (a− k,b + k) and
T ′ ∈ (a+k,b−k) for some k. Then both A2(T ,T ) and A2(T ,T ′) must be in the same
equivalence class. But then this class contains one tree which is in LAnBn (i.e.
A2(T ,T ′)) and one tree which is not (i.e. A2(T ,T )). Thus, contrary to the initial
assumption, there is no subset S of the equivalence classes such that S contains all
and only the trees in LAnBn , and it follows that LAnBn is not a regular tree language.
This result is worth noting primarily because it is potentially counterintuitive,






The derivation tree language of this CFG is a regular tree language, but this only
shows that it is possible to define a regular tree language with this string yield.
The language containing all trees with a string yield of this form is non-regular,
for the reason just given.
There are a number of advantages to working with trees rather than strings.
For one thing, regular tree languages have many of the useful closure proper-
ties that context-free string languages lack. These will frequently be exploited in
what follows. In addition, tree-languages are a better formal approximation of
what we are actually interested in as (generative) linguists: the hierarchical struc-
tures made available by the language faculty. In part, the idea that weak genera-
tive capacity is of marginal linguistic interest stems from Chomsky’s decision to
formalize context-free and transformational grammars as string-rewriting sys-
214
tems. This has the slightly odd consequence that the object of interest (roughly,
the tree language4) plays second fiddle to the string language, which is only of
peripheral linguistic significance. Rather than recovering trees from sequences
of strings, it is arguably more natural to define the relevant class of trees directly.
There are a number of different ways of formalizing tree structures. Rogers
(1998) uses Gorn tree domains (Gorn, 1967) as his intended models. These are
sets of strings in N∗ which can be understood intuitively as paths to nodes from
the root. For example, ε is the root, and 210 is the first child of the second child
of the third child of the root. Trees can also be viewed as a directed acyclic graphs
with labeled edges, with the labels of the edges giving the order of the children.
This graph-theoretic conception of trees will be important in §4.6.5.
4.3 Strategy
The overall strategy for showing that (my particular formulation of) Merge over
Move is computationally tractable has three steps. The first step is to define a
derivation tree language for a toy Minimalist grammar incorporating sideward
movement. This derivation tree language is specified by defining a finite-state
tree automaton which recognizes it. The second step is to set up a mapping from
derivation trees to strings. This mapping is specified using a logical language in
such a manner that the resulting string language is known to be within the class
of MCS string languages. The third step is to define a a regular tree transduction
from a candidate derivation tree to its comparison set for Merge over Move. Why
precisely it is helpful to do this cannot be explained until some more background
information has been provided in §4.7. However, the key idea, taken from Graf
4 Of course, the representations of (say) GB theory appear at first glance to be somewhat
richer than trees labeled with a finite alphabet. This may motivate a move to more general graph
structures, or to higher dimensional trees (see Rogers 2003 on the latter).
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(2010), is that Merge over Move becomes much more tractable when the com-
parison set is specified in this manner, rather than as the set of all convergent
derivations from the same numeration.
It may be worth noting that there is no particular reason for the use of
automata in the first and third steps and a logical construction in the second
step. The formal properties of trees, strings and the mappings between them
have been quite thoroughly investigated, and for any given type of recognizer
or transducer, there is typically an equivalent formulation in both logical and
automata-theoretic terms. The choice here was made solely on grounds of conve-
nience.
4.4 A Minimalist Grammar incorporating sideward movement
This subsection defines a class of Minimalist grammars, which I will refer to
as MGWSM (“Minimalist Grammars with Sideward Movement”). This defini-
tion uses a number of ideas from Stabler (1998, 1999, 2001); Stabler and Keenan
(2003), and Graf (2010, 2011). Since MGWSMs are designed principally to cap-
ture the key properties of derivations involving multiple workspaces and side-
ward movement, a few shortcuts will be taken in other areas. Thus, the resulting
formalism is not quite ready to be taken as a formalized theory to replace the
informal grammatical framework assumed in the rest of this dissertation. It is,
however, able to deal with a number of core grammatical phenomena. The fol-
lowing are some properties of the formalism which it may be useful to state up
front in informal terms:
• Universal Spec-Head-Comp order is assumed. Adjuncts are always on the
right.
• There are two basic classes of operation in a derivation:
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(i) Unary Merge and Move operations. Merge merges a head at the top of
a workspace; Move fills the complement or specifier of a head with a
phrase somewhere else in the tree.
(ii) Binary workspace-combining operations. Combination of two workspaces
is either interpreted as adjunction, or as merger of one workspace as
the specifier of the highest head in the other.
Thus, MGWSM derivation trees are mixed unary/binary-branching trees.
A sharp distinction is made between base-generated and derived specifiers.
• No phrase may have more than one specifier. (Having one derived specifier
and one base-generated specifier is not permitted.)
• Movement is constrained by a very simple and strong formulation of Min-
imality: γ cannot move over or out of β if the feature types of γ are an
(improper) subset of those of β.
• “Short” movement of the complement of a head to its specifier is prohibited.
• All syntactically active features may be valued under either the Head-Complement
configuration or the Spec-Head configuration. (The latter is actually two
distinct configurations, given the distinction made between derived and
base-generated specifiers.)
• Nesting and crossing dependencies are permitted, movement out of a moved
constituent is permitted (but see footnote 19), and remnant movement is
permitted. Additional restrictions could be imposed to block some of these,
if desired.
• Sideward movement is possible only between positions in the tree which
are “neighbors” by the end of the derivation. The following is the relevant
definition repeated from chapter 1:
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α and β are neighbors iff the shortest path from α to β goes along at most
one “bad” branch, where a bad branch is a left branch (i.e. a branch between
a specifier and the XP node dominating it) or a branch leading from an
adjoined element to its host.
• Although the formalism includes adjuncts and movement of adjuncts is
permitted, movement to an adjoined position cannot be encoded. Thus,
as it stands, MGWSMs cannot model, e.g., successive-cyclic movement of
wh-adjuncts, or extraposition to an adjoined position.
• Head movement is implemented in a rather simple form. Sideward head
movement is not possible. Successive-cyclic head movement is permitted,
but it is restricted by the requirement that head movement may not cycle
through a position of the same category twice. This restriction is imposed
to ensure that complex heads can be spelled out using a finite mapping
from sequences of lexical items to phonological forms. If the formalism in-
corporated a more sophisticated morphological component, this restriction
could probably be relaxed. Nunes (1995) and Bobaljik and Brown (1997)
observe that sideward movement offers an elegant means of making head
movement compatible with the extension condition. However, there is no
extension condition as such in the present formalism,5 and at least for the
analysis of the core grammatical phenomena of English, there is no clear
empirical motivation for sideward head movement.
• Covert movement is not implemented.
• The formalism does not recognize any distinction between A and A-movement.
Thus, it does not permit the kind of Minimality-violating A-movements
5 That moved elements generally move to the “edge” of a workspace is ensured by the form of
the mapping of derivation trees to strings.
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which are assumed in the informal framework of the preceding chapters.
This is a fundamental limitation of the formalism, since in cases where
movement is permitted to violate Minimality, it is not possible to deter-
ministically identify the moved phrase from its feature specification. It is
possible to “fake” the availability of Minimality-violating A-movements by
introducing additional linguistically-unmotivated features.
• The formalism does not have any notion of a chain, and I have not at-
tempted to formalize the language-specific chain spellout rules postulated
in chapter 2. However, the method used for mapping derivation trees to
strings in §4.6.5 could easily be extended to allow for full or partial pro-
nunciation of lower copies.
4.5 Informal introduction to MGWSM derivation trees
This subsection provides an informal introduction to MGWSM derivation trees.
This is intended to be more accessible than the formal definition of the set of
licit MGWSM derivation trees. It should also bring out some of the motivations
behind particular features of the formalism.
Let us first consider the special case of derivations which involve only one
workspace. On the assumption that complements follow the heads which sub-
categorize/select for them, these are also the derivations which generate uni-
formly right-branching structures. We can think of such derivations as sequences
of heads, with each head in the sequence taking as its complement a phrase
headed by the head to its right. So for example, a more compact representa-




→ [VP seen him]
Merge(hasT, [VP seen him])
→ [TP has [VP seen him]]
Merge(heD, [TP has [VP seen him]])
→ [TP he [T′ has [VP seen him]]]
(413) heD, hasT, seenV, himD
Given a fairly restrictive X theory, no information is lost when (412) is repre-
sented as (413). For the moment, we will take heads to be pairs consisting of a
phonological form and a label. For example, ‘himD’ in (412)/(413) has the phono-
logical form him and the label D.
The derivation tree for the derivation in (412)/(413) is straightforward and





The ‘+’ signs indicate that the corresponding steps in the derivation are Merge
steps.
An MGWSM must be able to impose subcategorization/selection restric-
tions, so that (e.g.) D cannot take V as its complement. A simple way of doing
this is simply to add to each MGWSM a regular expression specifying the permis-
sible sequences of heads in unary-branching treelets of the derivation tree. For
example, to specify the range of possible clausal spines with heads C...T...v...V,
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the following regular expression could be used:6
(415) ((vV)|(TvV)|(CTvV))+
The expression in (415) allows the simple clausal spines shown in (416), and also





It is clear that the regular tree languages are closed under intersection with con-
straints of the following form, for a given regular expression R:
(418) For any tree T , for any maximal sequence of nodes in T η1, . . . ,ηn,n ≥ 1,
such that ηi+1 is the rightmost7 child of ηi for 0 < i < n, R matches the
string formed by concatenating the labels of each unary-branching ηi
in order.
Thus, we may assume that one component of an MGWSM is a regular expression
specifying permissible sequences of heads.
In order to create structures with mixed left/right branching, it will be nec-
essary to permit multiple workspaces to combine. Workspaces always combine
in pairs. We can therefore represent the operation of combining two workspaces
using a binary branching node in the derivation tree. For example, the vP for
a sentence with structurally complex subject such as “the girl saw the boy” will
have a derivation along the following lines:
6 Where X+ is short for XX*.










The binary branching node is labeled with >. The fact that it is V that projects
when the two workspaces merge is encoded by the order of the sisters (the right
daughter always projects).
Before considering how movement is encoded in derivation trees, we will
need to briefly consider the role of features in driving movement. The theory
of features and feature valuation assumed in the preceding chapters is simple
and easily formalized. Each MGWSM specifies a finite set Φ of feature types (e.g.
{K,φ,θ, . . . }) and finite set Υ of feature values (e.g. {Nom,Acc,2s,3pl, . . . }). There
is no real need to group the feature values according to the feature types for
which they are appropriate. For each feature type φ ∈ Φ , there is a corresponding
unvalued feature, written φ_, and set of valued features {φ[υ] | υ ∈ Υ }.
Each node will now need, in addition to a phonological form and a category
label, a set of valued and unvalued features. For example, in (419), both deter-
miners will bear valued θ features which value unvalued θ features on the v and
V. In this case, as in many others, the actual values of the valued features are of










Notice that in the derivation tree, both the verbal heads are shown with unvalued
θ features. In other words, the derivation trees capture the moment just before
local feature valuation takes place. It is convenient to construct derivation trees
in this way because it has the consequence that all of the unary-branching and
leaf nodes are labeled with lexical items. (There is no v with valued θ features in
the lexicon.)
The simplest case of movement is movement within a unary-branching
treelet of the derivation tree. This corresponds to movement to a c-commanding
position (i.e. non-sideward movement) As a first example, consider the raising of
the object to [Spec,AgrP] to receive Case.The relevant lexical entries are as shown
in (421). The determiner is given a valued ‘D’ feature solely in order to avoid a
Minimality violation when it moves over V; this feature plays no interesting role
in the derivation.










The root of (422) tree is labeled with ⇑ instead of +. The arrow indicates that the
relevant step in the derivation consists of merger of a head followed by upward
movement of another head or phrase to the original head or its specifier. Follow-
ing Stabler (1999), MGWSMs take advantage of Minimality and the Left Branch
Condition8 to avoid the need to specify in the derivation tree itself which phrase
undergoes movement. (This would be impossible, since derivation trees must be
labeled with a finite alphabet, and there is a potentially unbounded number of
moveable heads/phrases.) The phrase which moves is the highest phrase which:
(i) is dominated by the node labeled ⇑,
(ii) is not in or on a left branch, and
(iii) has a set of feature types identical to those of the superscript to ⇑.
If the phrase meeting these criteria cannot enter into a feature valuation relation
with the target, movement is illicit (this may happen if, e.g., both the moved
phrase and the target have valued features of the same type). In the example
in (422), the phrase to be moved is DP, which has unvalued Case features. The
feature set of the DP is copied up to the root node as a right superscript of ⇑, with
the relevant unvalued features replaced by their valued counterparts. Crucially,
apart from the feature set, nothing “moves” within the derivation tree itself – the
8 Ross (1967).
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girl stays in its original position. As we will see in §4.6.5, it is the mapping from
derivation trees to strings which ensures that the girl is pronounced to the left
of T. To avoid unnecessary clutter in derivation trees, it will be useful to replace
the feature set superscripted on the right of the ⇑ with a boxed reference to the
feature set of the moved item:




A little care is required in interpreting this notation. The feature set that 1 re-
places on the root node of the tree is not in fact identical to the feature set of the
node labeled by +theD – rather, it is the set obtained by replacing all the unvalued
features in this set which have corresponding valued features in the feature set
of the root node. In other words, the feature sets superscripted to the arrows are
the feature sets of the moved items after they have taken the opportunity to value
unvalued features in their new position. The two instances of 1 should not be in-
terpreted as “links” between two nodes in the derivation tree – the tree remains
a tree, not a more general graph structure.
Sideward movement is encoded in essentially the same manner as upward
movement, but using⇒ instead of ⇑. The⇒ indicates that the moved phrase is
to be the highest phrase which:
(i) is a neighbor of the node labeled⇒,
(ii) is on a non-left branch, and
(iii) has a set of feature types identical to those of the superscript to ⇑.
225
Again, the arrow is unlicensed if there is no phrase meeting (i)-(iii) which can
also enter into a valuation relation with the node bearing ⇒. Sideward move-
ment differs from upward movement in its ability to target both specifier and
complement positions. The distinction between movement-to-complement and
movement-to-specifier is not, however, explicitly marked in the derivation tree,
since the information is easily recoverable. If⇒ attaches to a leaf node, then the
movemed element will become the complement of that node (hence pronounced
on the right). If⇒ attaches to a non-leaf node, then the moved element will be-
come the specifier of that node (hence pronounced on the left). The⇒ has a right
superscript giving the (modified) feature set of the moved item, just like the ⇑.
The treatement of head movement in the formalism developed here will
be rather prefunctory, but adequate for present purposes. Heads may have in
their feature sets at most one special “head feature” of the form #κ, where κ is a
category label. These features indicate that the head must be targeted by head-
movement of the closest head on a non-left branch bearing κ. Since the presence
of a # feature on a head unambiguously indicates that it is the target of head
movement, there is no need to add any additional diacritic to the derivation tree.
Example (424) shows movement of V to v over an intervening Agr phrase. This








For each possible complex head, an MGWSM specifies a pronunciation. (Since
head movement is constrained by Minimality, and there is a finite bound on
the number of syntactic categories, the number of possible complex heads is
bounded.)
Adjunction is very similar to merge of a base-generated specifier. Again, a
binary-branching node is introduced. The node is labled &, and has the adjoined
elment as its right child and the host as its left child. To illustrate the use of
adjunction, (425b) shows the derivation for the vP of the example of adjunct
control in (425a):
(425) a. The boy climbed the tree without [the boy] falling.
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b. &









Here, the θ feature of v is valued under (sideward) movement. Falling is treated
as an unaccusative of some sort (hence the absence of a v node in the adjunct).
I have assumed that without does not assign Case, but a derivation tree could
equally well be given on the assumption that it assigns Case to the small clause
headed by falling. (The feature valuation conditions, as stated in §4.6, will permit
the right daughter of a node labeled > to enter into a feature valuation relation
with the mother of >.)
I will end this informal overview of the MGWSM derivation tree language
by noting an important constraint on nodes labeled >: no node with this label
may dominate another node with this label. This essentially rules out the pos-
sibility of a head having multiple base-generated specifiers. It is not absolutely
necessary to impose this constraint, but it will save additional fiddling around
later. There is no analogous constraint on &. However, there is an additional
requirement that > may not dominate & (i.e., adjuncts must always merge after
specifiers).
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4.6 The MGWSM derivation tree language
This completes the informal overview of the derivation trees of MGWSMs. We
can now state the requirements on licit derivation trees more precisely. First, it
will be necessary to define the class of MGWSMs itself:
(426) A MGWSM is a 7-tuple 〈∆,K,Φ ,Υ ,Λ,R,Ψ 〉 where:
∆ is an alphabet (for the string language defined by the MGWSM),
which may contain the empty string ε.
K is a set of categories.
Φ is a set of feature types.
Υ is a set of feature values.
Λ is a set of lexical items, where each λ ∈Λ is a 3-tuple of a phono-
logical form (i.e. a member of ∆), a category from K and a pos-
sibly empty set of features. Each feature in the set is a member
of F, where F is the union of:
(i) “valued phrasal features” φ[υ], for φ ∈ Φ and υ ∈ Υ ,
(ii) “unvalued phrasal features” φ_, for φ ∈ Φ , or
(iii) “head features” #κ, for κ ∈ K .
No λ may have a feature set containing more than one member
from (iii). We write each λ as δκ{x1, . . . ,xn}, where δ ∈ ∆, κ ∈ K ,
n ≥ 0, and each xi ∈ F.
R is a regular expression over over the alphabet L.
Ψ is a partial function from non-category-repeating9 non-empty
9 A sequence of (value-extended) lexical items is non-category repeating if no two lexical items
in the sequence have the same category.
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sequences of valued extensions of lexical items in Λ to ∆.
The definition of Ψ makes use of the term “value extension,” which is defined as
follows:
(427) λ′ is a value extension of λ ∈Λ iff every feature in λ′ is valued and the
set of feature types of λ′ is identical to the set of feature types of λ.
F has the subsets FP , consisting of the union of (i)-(ii) of (426), and FH , which is
(iii). Where convenient, we may conflate the values in FH with the corresponding
categories, and vice versa (i.e., ignore the distinction between κ and #κ). The
category of a lexical item λ is cat(λ), its phonological form is phon(λ), its feature
set is fs(λ), and the sets of its head and phrasal features are fsH(λ) and fsP(λ)
respectively. For any set of phrasal features f ∈ FP , we have the corresponding
set of feature types fts(f ) ∈ Φ , which is {φ | φ_ ∈ f , or φ[υ] ∈ f for some υ ∈ Υ }.
As we have seen, each node of a MGWSM derivation tree is labeled with either:
(428) (i) >, &, or
(ii) A head of the form 〈+,λ〉, where λ ∈Λ, or
(iii) A head of the form 〈〈α,f 〉,λ〉
where α ∈ {⇑,⇒}, f ⊂ FP .
For a node η of type (ii)-(iii), λ is given by lex(η). For a node η of type (iii), α is
given by arr(η) and f is given by dfs(η) (the “derived features” of η).
Ideally, we would like to specify the derivation tree language of an MG-
WSM in a manner that brings out the “derivational” character of the informal
syntactic framework which it attempts to formalize. One way to do this is to de-
fine the language in terms of a deterministic bottom-up tree automaton (Gécseg
and Steinby, 1984, 60).10 This approach also has the practical advantage that it
10 Gécseg and Steinby call these “frontier-to-root recognizers” recognizers rather than “bottom-
up tree automata,” but I will follow what seems to be the more usual terminology these days. An
230
makes it possible to allow successive-cyclic movement with very little additional
work.
For a given alphabet Σ, a deterministic bottom-up tree automaton (dbut) is
a Σ-algebra A over a state set Q, with a set Qf ⊂ Q of final states.11 The dbut
accepts a tree t iff tA ∈Qf (when t is understood to be a term of A).
In the case at hand, Σ will contain rank 2 function symbols > and &. In
addition, both a rank 1 and constant symbols will be added for each node label
of the form specified in (428ii), there will be a rank 1 function symbol for each ⇑
node, and both a rank 1 symbol and a constant symbol for each⇒ node.
Minimality, the Left Branch Condition and the Adjunct Island Constraint
conspire to ensure that, at any given stage in a Minimalist derivation, there is a fi-
nite upper bound on the number of accessible phrases with unchecked/unvalued
features.
Consider first the case of single workspaces (i.e. unary-branching treelets
of the derivation tree). We must keep track of all feature sets of nodes in the
workspace which (i) contain unvalued features and (ii) are not dominated by
another node which is an intervener w.r.t. Minimality. If a ⇑ node is subse-
quently merged in the workspace, this information will be sufficient to determine
whether or not it is licensed. Now consider the case of sideward movement. At
initial attempt at defining the class of MGWSM derivation trees made use of constraints stated
directly over the trees in a form of weak monadic second order predicate logic. This was work-
able, and the constraints could be stated quite concisely and transparently. However, the essential
simplicity of the constraints was obscured by complications required to state the conditions on
successive-cyclic movement in representational terms. There was also a rather large intuitive dis-
tance between the logical formulae and the informal syntactic framework which they formalized.
For this reason, it was questionable the extent to which the formalism captured the spirit of the
informal framework.
11 Some aspects of the presentation here follow that of Comon et al. (2008).
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the point in a derivation where a ⇒ node is merged, we cannot know whether
not not it is licensed. This check must wait until the first > or & node is merged.
(Since sideward movement is only possible between neighboring workspaces, we
need only wait for the first such node to be merged.) Thus, we must also keep
track of the features superscripted to each ⇒. We must also be sure to handle
feature-valuation in base-generated configurations. This can be accomplished
simply by storing the feature set of the “current head.”
Given the preceding discussion, the states of our automaton will consist of
q∗, which is a special “crash” state, together with additional states of the following
form:
(429) 〈m,s,c〉, where
m ⊂ P (FP )
(feature sets of phrases accessible to movement).
s ⊂ P (FP )
(feature sets for as-yet-unresolved sideward movements)
c ⊂ F
(feature set of the “current head”)
The set of final (i.e. accepting) states will be defined at the end of this section.
The automaton will be constructed in such a way that it always remains in the
q∗ state once it enters it. Given a variable q over the states in Q, we write m(q),
s(q),c(m), to denote the relevant elements of q (in the case where q , q∗). We will
ignore the following features of MGWSMs in the construction of the automaton:
(i) Head movement
(ii) The role of R.
(iii) The ban on the right child of a >-labeled node being labeled with an arrow.
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(iv) The ban on a >-labeled node dominating a >-labeled node.
(v) The ban on a >-labeled node dominating a &-labeled node.
It is obvious that a dbut is capable of handling these parts of the grammar, and it
would only confuse things unnecessarily to jumble up the machinary for dealing
with (i)-(v) with the core machinary of syntactic feature valuation and phrasal
movement. These features of the grammar will be dealt with briefly in §4.6.2.
The constant symbols, with the exception of those for⇒ nodes, are defined
together with their interpretations in (430). I will use subscripts to indicate the
rank of a symbol (0 for constants).
(430)
〈+,λ〉0 7→ 〈{}, {}, fsP(λ)〉 for all λ ∈Λ
Inserting a lexical item λ into a workspace amounts to setting the feature set of
the “current head” c to the feature set of that lexical item, initializing the set of
accessible head movement categories to λ’s category, and initializing all the other
contextual state information to null values.
Next to be considered are the rank 1 function symbols for each 〈+,λ〉. These
determine whether the new head enters into a valuation relation with the head
below it. If so, the new value of c must be adjusted to take this valuation into
account (we cannot simply copy the feature set of the lexical item). The features
of the lower head are now available for movement (since the movement would no
longer be “short”) and so they must be pushed over to m. In order to implement
Minimality, it is necessary to remove from m any set of features f such that the
feature types of fsP(λ) are an (improper) superset of the feature types of f . These
are the feature sets of nodes which no longer have any hope of being moved,
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since they are dominated by nodes which have at least all of their feature types
and possibly more.12 If the new head bears any head features, we must see if
these can be satisfied by one of the accessible heads lower down. If not, we go
over to q∗. It will be useful to define the valuation of a feature set f with another
feature set f ′:
(431)
val(f , f ′) = {x ∈ f | x is valued} ∪
{x ∈ f ′ | x is valued and there is an unvalued
feature of the same type in f }
We also define the predicates block(f1, f2) and hasun(f ):
(432) block(f1, f2) iff the feature types of f1 are an (improper) superset of
those of f2.
(433) hasun(f ) iff f contains one or more unvalued features.
The rank 1 function symbols and their interpretations can now be given for the
case where α = +. For all λ ∈Λ:
12 As we will see shortly, it is important to remove these feature sets incrementally with each
Merge step, because this ensures that if there are f1, f2 ∈m(q) such that f1 ⊆ f2, then f1 must have
merged later than f2. In other words, we can make good use of the partial order defined by ⊆ over




〈+,λ〉1(q , q∗) 7→ 〈{val(c(q), fsP(λ))} ∪
{f | f ∈m(q) and ¬block(fsP(λ), f )},
s(q),
val(fsP(λ),c(q))〉
if ¬∃f ∈m(q) [hasun(f )∧block(fsP(λ), f )]
otherwise 7→ q∗
The if clause ensures that the derivation crashes if we “hide” a phrase with un-
valued features.
Let us now consider sideward movement. Essentially, all we need do for a
node labeled 〈〈⇒, f 〉,λ〉 is put the feature set f into storage. There is, however,
one question: what do we do if s(q) already contains the feature set f ? Certainly,
this is a possible scenario in the intuitive syntactic framework of the preceding
chapters, For example, in workspace 1 we merge two featurally identical phrases
α and β, then in workspace 2, we merge heads αH and βH which can enter into
valuation relations with α and β. After merger of αH , α can move sideward to
become αH ’s specifier or complement, and after merger of βH , β can move side-
ward to become βH ’s specifier. There is no reason to suppose that any of these
movements should violate Minimality, under the usual understanding(s) of this
condition. It seems, though, that within the formal system, we need to impose
some kind of Minimality-like condition here, since s(q) cannot be a stack or mul-
tiset of unbounded size. The obvious choice is a condition requiring that no node
labeled 〈〈⇒, f 〉,λ〉 may be added to a workspace if s(q) contains a blocking fea-
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ture set for f , or if f is a blocking feature set for some member of s(q).13 It is
unfortunate that it is necessary to impose a condition within the formal system
which has no obvious motivation within the conceptual framework of the intu-
itive system. However, the constraint appears to be empirically innocuous, in the
sense that there appear to be no analyses in the literature on sideward movement
that make use of derivations which violate it.
With all this in mind, we can define the rank 0 and 1 function symbols and
their interpretations for the case where α is 〈⇒, f ⊆F〉. For all λ ∈Λ:
(435)
〈〈⇒, f 〉,λ〉0 7→ 〈{}, {f }, fsP(λ)〉
〈〈⇒, f 〉,λ〉1(q∗) 7→ q∗
〈〈⇒, f 〉,λ〉1(q , q∗) 7→ 〈{val(c(q), fsP(λ))} ∪ {val(f , fsP(λ))} ∪
{f ′ | f ′ ∈m(q) and ¬block(fsP(λ), f ′)},
s(q)∪ {f },
val(fsP(λ),c(q)∪ f )〉
if ¬∃f ′ ∈ s(q)[block(f , f ′)∨block(f ′, f )],
and ¬∃f ′ ∈m(q)[hasun(f ′)∧
(block(f , f ′)∨block(fsP(λ), f ′))]
otherwise 7→ q∗
Some of this is the same boilerplate in (434). The differences are that (i) the fea-
ture set of the moved phrase (modulo valuation) is added to m(q) so that subse-
13 This is a stronger condition than is really required – we could just require that f 3 s(q) –
but it is in line with the strong formulation of of Minimality which constraints other aspects of
movement.
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quent successive-cyclic movement is possible, (ii) f is added to s(q), (iii) we check
that f does not “hide” any phrases with unvalued features, and (iv) the new value
for c is influenced by f , since features in the derived specifier may value features
of the head (and vice versa).
We can now move on to the rank 1 fuction symbols for α = 〈⇑, f ⊆F〉. When
a ⇑ node is introduced, it must check to see if f ∈ m(q), and if it is, check that
f is not blocked by another f ′ ∈ m(q). If a Minimality violation is detected, the
automaton moves immediately to q∗. Otherwise, m(q) must be updated to reflect
the valuation that has taken place. The following defines the rank 1 function
symbols and their interpretations for the case where α = 〈 ⇑, f ⊆F〉. For all λ ∈Λ:
(436)
〈〈⇑, f 〉,λ〉1(q∗) 7→ q∗
〈〈⇑, f 〉,λ〉1(q , q∗) 7→ 〈{val(c(q), fsP(λ))} ∪ {val(f , fsP(λ))} ∪
{f ′ | f ′ , f , f ′ ∈m(q) and ¬block(fsP(λ), f ′)},
s(q),
val(fsP(λ),c(q)∪ f )〉
if f ∈m(q) and ¬∃f ′ ∈m(q)[block(f ′, f )],
and ¬∃f ′ ∈m(q) [hasun(f ′)∧
(block(f , f ′)∨block(fsP(λ), f ′))]
otherwise 7→ q∗





>(q1 , q∗,q2 , q∗) 7→ 〈 {fsP(q1)} ∪ {f ∈ fsP(q2) | ¬block(fsP(q1), f },
s(q2),
val(fsP(λ),c(q2)∪ f )〉




>(q1 , q∗,q2 , q∗) 7→ 〈 {fsP(q1)} ∪ {f ∈ fsP(q2) | ¬block(fsP(q1), f }
s(q2),
val(fsP(λ),c(q2)∪ f )〉





&(q1 , q∗,q2 , q∗) 7→ 〈m(q1),s(q1),c(q1)〉
Finally, the set of accept states can be defined as follows:
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(439)
Qf = {q ∈Q | ¬∃f ∈m(q)[hasun(f )] ∧
s(m) = {} ∧
¬hasun(fsP(c(m)))}
This simply requires that there be no unvalued features remaining at the end
of the derivation. (Since we periodically check that no phrases with unvalued
features have been “hidden,” this is sufficient.)
4.6.1 Value blindness
The automaton defined in the preceding subsection implements the logic for the
“value blind” syntax assumed in this dissertation. Whether or not a movement is
licit is determined solely by the feature types of the target and the moved phrase
(together with Minimality, the Left Branch Condition, etc.) However, it would
be easy to modify the automaton to impose the more orthodox requirement that
each individual movement must lead to the valuation of at least one previously
unvalued feature.
4.6.2 The regular expression R and head movement
A dbut for checking that conditions on head movement are satisfied can be de-




〈α,λ〉0(q , q∗) 7→ {cat(λ)} or q∗ if λ has a # feature.
〈α,λ〉1(q∗) 7→ q∗
〈α,λ〉1(q , q∗) 7→ (q∪ {cat(λ)}) \ {κ | #κ ∈ fsH(λ)}
or q∗ if ∃κ [#κ ∈ fsH(λ)∧κ 3 q]
> (q1,q2) 7→ q2
&(q1,q2) 7→ q1
Qf = P (K)
Note that the forth definition of (440) is stated so as to rule out excorporation.
Dbuts are closed under intersection (Gécseg and Steinby, 1984), so this dbut
can simply be intersected with the one defined in the preceding subsection. A
dbut to check that R is satisfied can be constructed in the same manner as finite-
state string automaton recognizing the string language defined by R. It is also
very straightforward to add additional state to the automaton to ensure that a
>-labeled node never has a right child with an arrow, and to ensure that the other
strictly local conditions on node-labeling are satisfied.
4.6.3 Recap
So far, we have defined a class of regular tree languages, MGWSM. The defini-
tion proceeded via construction of an automaton in such a way that there was
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a reasonably close connection between the operations of the automaton and the
operations of the informal framework assumed in the preceding chapters. How-
ever, the trees of MGWSM do not, in any straightforward manner, yield a usable
string language. The next step is to establish a mapping from derivation trees to
strings. This subsection will state a mapping from MGWSM derivation trees to
strings which yields a string language within the MCS string languages. In par-
ticular, it will be shown that the class of MGWSM string languages is within the
class of the string languages of a certain form of context-free graph grammar, hy-
peredge replacement grammar (Feder, 1971; Pavlidis, 1978; Bauderon and Cour-
celle, 1987).14 I should, however, immediately assure the reader that there are no
hypergraphs in the pages to follow!
The key formal result that I will rely on is presented in Bloem and Engelfriet
(2000). Bloem and Engelfriet investigate the use of MSO to define relations be-
tween graphs.15 We are interested in the special case of defining relations T1 ×T2
between sets of trees, where T1 is a regular tree language.16 Bloem and Engelfriet
show that the range of all MSO-definable tree-to-tree relations over the regular
tree languages is the class of tree languages which can be generated by hyperedge
replacement grammars. In Engelfriet and Heyker (1991), it is shown that the cor-
responding string languages are MCS. Thus, by a rather roundabout route, we
can use MSO to define a constrained mapping from derivation trees to strings.
14 See Drewes et al. (1997) for further references.
15 Since all of the structures we are dealing with here are finite, the question of whether or not
we are permitted to quantify over infinite subsets of the domain will not arise.
16 There are in fact two methods of using MSO to define relations of this sort. The first, of
course, is simply to restrict the domain and range to trees. The second method relaxes the re-
striction on the range. A tree-to-tree relation is defined by “unfolding” the resulting graphs. This
second method allows a wider variety of tree-to-tree relations to be defined, but is too powerful
for our purposes.
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A formal definition of MSO graph transducers (and hence MSO tree trans-
ducers) is given in Bloem and Engelfriet (2000, 10).17 A more informal descrip-
tion of the operation of an MSO graph transducer can be given as follows. A
graph g consists of a set of vertices, Vg, a set of edges, which are pairs of vertices
with labels in Γg, and a labeling function labg assigning each v ∈ Vg a label from
an alphabet Σ. For the case of mixed binary/unary branching trees, we will as-
sume that Γ = {1,2}, with children ordered by the labels of the edges leading to
them. An MSO graph transducer copies each node in the original graph, and then
adds labels and edges to the new nodes in accord with conditions stated over the
original graph. The logical language used to stated MSO graph transductions is
MSO with the predicates labσ (x), which holds in g iff labg(x) = σ , and edgγ (x,y),
which holds in g iff there is an edge from x to y labeled γ . If no γ is subscripted
to edg, edg(x,y) is equivalent to
∨
γ∈Γ edgγ (x,y). The predicate path(x,y) can (as
Bloem and Engelfriet note) be explicitly defined as follows:
17 “An mso graph transducer from (Σ1,Γ1) to (Σ2,Γ2) is a triple T = (C,Φ ,X) where C is a finite set
of copy names, Φ = {φσ,c(x)}σ∈Σ2,c∈C , with φσ,c(x) ∈ MSOL(Σ1,Γ1), is the family of node formulae,
and X = {χγ,c,c′ (x,y)}γ∈Γ2,c,c′∈C , with χγ,c,c′ (x,y) ∈MSOL2(Σ1,Γ1), is the family of edge formulae.
“The copy number of T is #C.
“The graph transduction Tgr : GΣ1,Γ2 → GΣ2,Γ2 defined by T is defined as follows. For every graph
g1 over (Σ1,Γ1), Tgr(g1) is the graph g2 over (Σ2,Γ2) with
– Vg2 = {(c,u)|c ∈ C,u ∈ Vg1 , and there is exactly one σ ∈ Σ2 s.t. (g1,u) |= φσ,c(x)},
– Eg2 = {((c,u),γ, (c
′ ,u′))|(c,u), (c′ ,u′) ∈ Vg2 ,γ ∈ Γ2, and (g1,u,u
′) |= χγ,c,c′ (x,y)},
– labg2 = {((c,u),σ )|(c,u) ∈ Vg2 ,σ ∈ Σ2, and (g1,u) |= φσ,c(x)}




path(x,y) =∀X((closed(X)∧ x ∈ X)→ y ∈ X)
where closed(X) = ∀x,y((edg(x,y)∧ x ∈ X)→ y ∈ X)
In tree terminology, this defines the relation of reflexive domination. Explicit
definitions can easily be given for leaf(x), unary(x), binary(x), and unaryorlf(x).
The last of these holds of both unary-branching nodes and leaf nodes.
We can think of the specification of an MSO graph transducer as an answer
to the following questions (where g1 is the original graph and g2 the output of
the transduction):
(i) For σ ∈ Σ2 and u ∈ Vg2 , what has to hold of u’s original in g1 for u to have
the label σ in g2?
(ii) For γ ∈ Γ2 and u,v ∈ Vg2 , what has to hold of u and v’s originals in g1 for
there to be an edge labeled γ leading from u to v in g2?
Often as not, the answer to (i) is “u always has the same label in g2 as its original
in g1.” This can be expressed by defining the following family of node formulae
φσ :
(442) φσ = labσ (x) for all σ ∈ Σ
This could be read as: “A node u in g2 has the label σ if u’s original in g1 has the
label σ .” The formula in (442) is interpreted within g1, with x assigned to the
original node.
Questions (i)-(ii) presuppose that each node in g2 corresponds to a single
“original” in g1. We can make g2 smaller than g1 by ensuring that for one or more
of the original nodes in g1, there is no label such that the conditions are met for
the corresponding new node to have that label in g2. However, we would also like
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to allow for the possibility that g2 contains more nodes than g1. To do this, we
add a set of “copy names” to the specification of the transducer. If, for example,
our copy names are A, B and C, then each node in g1 has up to three copies in g2.
For each question (i), there will now be three questions: “...what has to hold...for
the A copy of u to have...”, “...what has to hold...for the B copy of u to have...” and
“...what has to hold...for the C copy of u to have...” Similarly, for each question
(ii) there will now be nine questions, corresponding to each possible ordered pair
of copy names.
The answer to an (i)-type question is written as follows:
(443) φC,σ = f (x)
Where C is a copy name, σ is a label in the alphabet of g2, and f is an MSO
formula with one free variable, x. (443) can be read as “There is a σ -labeled copy
u ∈ Vg2 of u
′ ∈ Vg1 iff f (x) is the unique φC formula which is true in g1 under the
assignment x 7→ u′.”
The answer to an (ii)-type question is written in a similar manner:
(444) χγ,C1,C2 = f (x,y)
Where γ is an edge label in Γ2 of g2, C1 andC2 are (possibly identical) copy names,
and f is an MSO formula with two free variables, x and y. (444) can be read as
“There is a γ-edge from a copy u ∈ Vg2 of u
′ ∈ Vg1 to a copy v ∈ Vg2 of v
′ ∈ Vg1
iff f (x,y) is the unique χγ formula which is true in g1 under the assignment x 7→
u′, y 7→ v′.”
4.6.4 Preparing derivation trees for mapping to the string lan-
guage
There are two respects in which the derivation trees of an MGWSM are not ideal
from the point of view of defining a mapping from derivation trees to strings.
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In the next subsection, I will assume that the original derivation trees have been
transformed into trees of a more suitable form prior to linearization. Of course,
it is necessary to ensure that the range of this transformation is a regular tree
language. I will not show this rigorously here, but the changes to be made are
small, and I hope it will be clear that they are entirely innocuous. I will denote
the derivation tree language of a given MGWSM G as D(G).
The changes are as follows:
(i) In nodes of the pre-transformed trees of the form 〈α,λ〉, λ is the original
lexical item and may have some unvalued features. When mapping deriva-
tion trees to strings, it is much more useful to have λ be the lexical item
updated with valued features. Thus, in the transformed trees, each λ is up-
dated in this manner. This conversion can easily be performed by creating
a relabeling bottom-up tree transducer based on the dbut in the preceding
section. The transducer simply duplicates the operation of the automaton,
replacing λ in each unary-branching or leaf node as it goes up the tree, and
leaving all other labels unchanged.
(ii) Intermediate steps in successive-cyclic movements are of no consequence
for linearization. This is especially so given that the form of Minimality
which constrains MGWSM derivations is such that movement in “one fell
swoop” is always licit if successive-cyclic movement is.18 It is therefore
useful to remove arrows indicating intermediate steps in successive-cyclic
movements. For upward movement, this simply requires deleting the rel-
evant arrows. Sideward movement is slightly more complex. Successive-
cyclic sideward movement is impossible owing to the neighbor restriction.
18 Given the form of Minimality which constrains MGWSM derivations, any given phrase either
can or cannot move over another phrase. The addition of intermediate steps makes no difference,
since there is no sense in which a movement is “driven” by a particular feature or set of features.
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However, a phrase which moves sideward may go on to move upward. In
this case, merely deleting the intermediate ⇒ node would yield an illicit
derivation tree. It is necessary also to change the higher ⇑ to a⇒ to get the
desired result.
In the next subsection, it will be assumed that derivation trees have been
modified according to (i)-(ii).
4.6.5 Mapping derivation trees to strings
To begin with, let us consider how derivation trees with no movement opera-
tions can be mapped to strings via MSO tree transducers. All we really have to
do is convert the unary-branching portions of the derivation tree into uniformly
right-branching binary-branching subtrees, in such a way that all of the non-leafs
become leaves. This is achieved by the addition of nodes which correspond to XP
























Every node of g1 is mapped to two nodes in g2. Thus, we will need two copy
names, X (leaf) and XP (phrasal). Leaf nodes in g2 will of course be labeled with
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the phonological forms of the corresponding nodes in g1. (Though we will com-
plicate this slightly in a moment to handle head movement.) Since we are really
only interested in the string yield of g2, it doesn’t matter much how we label the
non-leaf nodes. However, we will see shortly that head movement can sometimes
have the effect that the XP copy of a node is a leaf node in the output tree. For
this reason, it will be convenient to label all XP copies with the empty string ε.
Σ2 will therefore be Σ1 augmented with ε.
Expressions of the form labS(x)(x), where S is an open sentence with param-
eter x, will be used as a shorthand for finite disjunctions of the form (. . . labσ1(x)∨
labσ2(x) . . . ). For example, labcat(x)=v(x) holds for all nodes x of category v.
With these preliminaries in place, node and edge formulae can be defined
as follows:
(446) Node formulae (version 1, to be revised):
φX,σ =labphon(x)=σ (x) for all σ ∈ Σ2
φXP,ε =unaryorlf(x)
(447) Edge formulae (version 1, to be revised):
χi,X,X =false for all i ∈ {1,2}
χi,X,XP =false for all i ∈ {1,2}





This suffices to specify an MSO tree transducer implementing the transformation
in (445). (The only difference being that the nodes labeled • in (445) are labeled
ε in the output of the transduction specified by (446)-(447).)
We must now consider how head movement is to be handled. The first order
of business is to ensure that heads which have been moved are not pronounced
in their original positions. The predicates (x hashdmvdto y) (“x has head moved
to y”) and hashdmvd(x) (“x has head moved”) can be defined as follows:
(448)
x hasmvdto y =
∨
κ∈K
apath(y,x)∧ lab#κ∈fsH(y)(y)∧ labcat(x)=κ(x) ∧
¬∃z[path(y,z)∧path(z,x)∧ labcat(z)=κ(z)]
hashdmvd(x) = ∃y[x hashdmvdto y]
The predicate ‘apath’ (“accessible path”) is like ‘path’ except that it is sensitive
to the restrictions imposed by the Left Branch Condition and the Adjunct Island
Constraint. We can define it by replacing ‘closed’ in (441) with ‘aclosed’, which
is defined in terms of ‘aclosed′’:
(449)
aclosed(X) =aclosed′(X) ∧
∀x,y[x ∈ X ∧ ((lab&(x)∧ edg1(x,y)) ∨
(lab>(x)∧ edg2(x,y)))→ y ∈ X]
aclosed′(X) = ∀x,y[x ∈ X ∧ ((lab&(x)∧ edg1(x,y)) ∨
(lab>(x)∧ edg2(x,y)) ∨
(unaryorlf(x)∧ edg(x,y)))
→ y ∈ X]
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With the predicate hashdmvd(x) available, the node formulae in (446) can
be replaced by those in (450), which ensure that moved heads are not pronounced
in their original positions.
(450) Node formulae (version 2, to be revised):
φX,σ =labphon(x)=σ (x)∧¬hashdmvd(x) for all σ ∈ Σ2
φXP,ε =unaryorlf(x)
Note that, according to the definition of an MSO tree transducer given in footnote
17, if an edge formula specifies an edge from or to a non-existent vertex copy, this
edge isn’t in the output graph. Thus, we can permit the edge formulae to continue
linking XP and X copies of moved heads without any ill effect. Now suppose that
λ2 has head moved in (445). Then instead of the rightmost tree in (445), the











Of course, it will also be necessary to ensure that the moved head is pronounced
in its new position. We return to this shortly.
For now, let us move on to the case of upward phrasal movement within
a single unary-branching treelet, ignoring head movement and sideward move-
ment. Handling this case turns out to be the bulk of the work. In any unary
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branching treelet which contains two upward movements (i.e. which has two
nodes labeled with ⇑), there are three possible configurations of these move-
ments, once the option of successive-cyclic movement has been eliminated. These
are illustrated in (452). X is a feature and ‘.’ is used as an arbitrary value for this
feature. Below the tree is written the resulting order of p1 . . .p7 in the generated
string. For clarity, arrows have been added to show movements. It is important




⇑ 1 λ2{X_,. . . }
+λ3
⇑ 2 λ4{Y_,. . . }
+λ5
+λ6{X[.], . . . } 1
oo
+λ7






⇑ 1 λ2{X_,. . . }
+λ3
⇑ 2 λ4{Y_,. . . }
+λ5
+λ6{Y[.], . . . } 2
oo
+λ7






⇑ 1 λ2{X_,. . . }
+λ3
⇑ 1 λ4{X[.],. . . }
oo
+λ5
+λ6{Y_, . . . } 2
+λ7





The treelet in (452) is the case of ordinary remnant movement; (453) shows coun-
tercyclic remnant movement – which effectively amounts to movement out of
a moved constituent;19 (454) shows movement within a constituent which is
subsequently moved. Another configuration to consider is that which would
be obtained if the lower arrow in (454) pointed at λ4 instead of λ6 (this is not
successive-cyclic movement). However, this configuration is most usefully thought
of as a special case of (454). In (455), the three arrow configurations stacked on
top of each other, with movement driven by the same pair of features in each
case:
(455)
19 There is one significant difference between countercyclic remnant movement and movement
out of a moved constituent: the latter does not allow Minimality to be obviated via “smuggling”
(Collins, 2005). Thus, MGWSMs cannot encode smuggling derivations. Whether or not this is a
good thing is an empirical issue which I will not attempt to settle here.
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+λ1
⇑ 1 λ2{X_,. . . }
+λ3









+λ9{X_,. . . }
+λ10
⇑ 3 λ11{X_,. . . }
+λ12











⇑ 5 λ20{X_,. . . }
+λ21











To implement the mapping, it will be simplest to treat derived specifiers
as left sisters of the head they target. A Spec-Head-Comp structure maps to a
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ternary branching treelet. To give a more concrete example, (456) shows the tree






























(Note that the string yield of this tree matches that which is shown below (452).)
In effect, the right sister of p7 is the trace of the phrase headed by λ8, and the right
sister of p5 is the trace of the phrase headed by λ6. There would be no difficulty
in adding traces and other such annotations to the trees if desired, but this is
not helpful for present purposes.20 The edge label 0 is used to insert specifiers
before the head and the complement. Thus, 0 must be added to Γ2. It will also be
convenient to add 3 to Γ2. When a head gains a complement via movement, we
will add a 3-edge from its XP copy to the moved phrase. The output trees never
20 This section has the rather limited goal of showing that the class of MGWSM string lan-
guages is within the class of MCS string languages. For this reason, I will not exploit MSO tree
transducers to reconstruct “real” trees from derivation trees. This is, however, a potentially inter-
esting research project in its own right. See for example Morawietz (2003), which makes a much
more sophisticated use of MSO tree transductions.
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have any nodes with more than three children, so it is not absolutely necessary
to add 3 to Γ2. However, doing so allows a greater separation of concerns when
specifying the formulae for the transducer.






























Updating the MSO transducer to handle phrasal movement within unary
branching treelets turns out to be quite easy. The basic idea is the following. 2-
edges going from XP copies to XP copies are broken if x immediately dominates
y and y has moved. 0-edges or 3-edges from XP-copies to XP copies are added
if there is an arrow from y to x. A 0-edge is added for movement to a specifier
position and a 3-edge for movement to complement.
(458) Node formulae (version 3, to be revised):
φX,σ =labphon(x)=σ (x)∧¬hashdmvd(x) for all σ ∈ Σ2
φXP,ε =unaryorlf(x)
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(459) Edge formulae (version 3, to be revised):
χi,X,X =false for all i ∈ {0,1,2,3}
χi,X,XP =false for all i ∈ {0,1,2,3}
χ0,XP,X =φ3,XP,X = false
χ0,XP,XP =¬ leaf(x)∧ y hasmvduto x
χ3,XP,XP =leaf(x)∧ y hasmvduto x




The edge formulae are defined in terms of the two-place predicate ‘hasmvduto’









¬edg(y,x) ∧ (Ban on short movement)






hasmvduto(x) = ∃y[x hasmvduto y]
The statement fmatch(x,y) tests that the feature types of x are identical to the
derived feature types of y. The ‘fmatch’ predicate could be explicitly defined as
a (very large, but finite) disjunction of binary conjunctions of the form in (461).
(461)
. . . ∨ (labσ1(x) ∧ labσ2(y)) ∨ (labσ3(x) ∧ labσ4(y)) ∨ . . .
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We can now consider sideward movement. The main task is to define ‘hasmvdsto’
– the equivalent of ‘hasmvduto’ for sideward movement. To do this, we need to
formalize the ‘neighbor’ relation:
(462)




Note that nodes which stand in a reflexive domination relation are not neigh-
bors by this definition. The ‘hasmvdsto’ (“has moved sideward to”) predicate
can now be defined as in (463). As might be expected, it is basically the same
as ‘hasmvduto′, but for the fact that ‘neighbor’ is used to “hop over” to the
neighboring workspace before searching for the moved phrase. The part of (460)
which references the Minimality constraint on upward movement is not required.
If there is a feature-matching phrase in the neighboring workspace which has
moved, this must be the phrase that has moved to y (i.e. to the node which is the
second argument of ‘hasmvdsto’).
(463)






Now we can simply replace every instance of (x hasmvduto y) in (459) with
((x hasmvduto y)∨ (x hasmvdsto y)). We will write (x hasmvdto y) for this dis-
junction. Similarly, hasmvd(x) is equivalent to (hasmvdu(x)∨ hasmvds(x)), and
lab{&,>}(x) is a shorthand for (lab&(x)∨ lab>(x)).
Virtually all that remains to be done is to add an additional copy name to
deal with nodes labeled > and &. We will use B (for “binary”). The translation of
> and & nodes is straightforward: they take as their children the XP copies those
of their original children which have not moved. (This has the slightly odd effect
that derived specifiers have two sisters whereas base-generated specifiers have
one.) There is one complication in relation to movement of phrases with base-
generated specifiers and phrases with adjuncts. This complication derives from
the fact that ‘hasmvdu’ and ‘hasmvds’ predicates will apply not to the nodes la-
beled &/>, but to their left/right children respectively. Thus, simply moving the
nodes picked out by these predicates would have the effect of moving X without
its specifier. When a node is the head of a phrase labeled & or >, we need to
ensure that the entire phrase moves. The following predicates will be useful:
(464)
x headof y = ((lab&(y)∧ edg1(y,x)) ∨
(lab>(y)∧ edg2(y,x)))
(465)
headofp(x) = ∃y[x headof y]
The revised node and edge formulae are as follows:
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(466) Node formulae (version 4, to be revised):
φX,σ =labphon(x)=σ (x)∧¬hashdmvd(x) for all σ ∈ Σ2
φXP,ε =unaryorlf(x)
φB,ε =lab&(x)∨ lab>(x)
(467) Edge formulae (version 4, final version):
Formulae which are identical for all edge labels:
χi,X,X =false for all i ∈ {0,1,2,3}
χi,X,XP =false for all i ∈ {0,1,2,3}
χi,X,B =false for all i ∈ {0,1,2,3}
χi,B,X =false for all i ∈ {0,1,2,3}
Formulae for 0 and 3 edges from and to nodes labeled > and &:
χ0,XP,B =¬ leaf(x)∧∃z[z headof y ∧ z hasmvdto x]
χ3,XP,B =leaf(x)∧∃z[z headof y ∧ z hasmvdto x]
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Formulae for 1 and 2 edges from and to nodes labeled > and &:
χi,B,XP =edgi(x,y)∧ (¬hasmvd(y)∨ y headof x)
for all i ∈ {1,2}
χi,XP,B =edgi(x,y)∧¬∃z[z headof y ∧hasmvd(z)]
for all i ∈ {1,2}
χi,B,B =edgi(x,y)
for all i ∈ {1,2}
Formulae for 0 and 3 edges between unary-branching nodes:
χ0,XP,X =φ3,XP,X = false
χ0,XP,XP =¬ leaf(x)∧ y hasmvdto x∧¬headofp(x)
χ3,XP,XP =leaf(x)∧ y hasmvdto x∧¬headofp(x)
Formulae for 1 and 2 edges between unary-branching nodes:




As an example, (469) shows the output of the transducer for the derivation
tree in (425b), repeated here as (468). The resulting string is incorrect insofar as









































The steps necessary to implement head movement are basically straightfor-
ward, but formally rather ugly and tedious. First, we must decide what to do if
Ψ is not defined for any given sequence of value-extended lexical items. In this
case, we will adopt the convention that the resulting complex head is spelled out
as ε. (In practice, any sensible MGWSM will be specified such that Ψ defined for
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all possible simplex or complex heads, so nothing of significance hinges on this
decision.) The definition of φX,σ in (470) replaces the one in (466). It makes use
of labΩ(x), a predicate which holds of x iff lab(x) ∈Ω, labΩ(x,y), which holds of
x and y iff 〈 lab(x), lab(y)〉 ∈Ω, and so on for higher arities. Each of these predi-
cates can be explicitly defined. φX,σ is specified as the disjunction of a finite set
of formulae φnX,σ ,1 ≤ n ≤ k. In (470), these formulae are defined for 1 ≤ n ≤ 3.
I.e., for simplex heads and for complex heads [H1 H1 H2] and [H1 [H1 H1 H2] H3].
The generalization to higher values of n is straightforward. Since a complex head
cannot contain more than one head of any given category, and since there are a
finite number of categories, there is a finite upper bound on n for for any given
MGWSM. Note that, given the changes to the derivation tree described in the
preceding subsection, none of the lexical items on nodes of any licit derivation
tree will contain unvalued features.
(470)
φ1X,σ = labΩ(x)∧¬hashdmvd(x)∧¬∃y[y hashdmvdto x]
where Ω = {σ ′ ∈ Σ1 | Ψ (lex(σ ′)) = σ or,
Ψ (lex(σ ′)) =⊥ and σ = ε}
φ2X,σ = ¬hashdmvd(x)∧∃y[ labΩ(x,y)∧ y hashdmvdto x ∧
¬∃z[z hashdmvdto y]]
where Ω = {〈σ ′,σ ′′〉 ∈ Σ1 ×Σ1 | Ψ (lex(σ ′), lex(σ ′′)) = σ or,
Ψ (lex(σ ′), lex(σ ′′)) =⊥ and σ = ε}
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φ3X,σ = ¬hashdmvd(x)∧∃y,z[ labΩ′ (x,y,z) ∧
y hashdmvdto x ∧
z hashdmvdto y ∧
¬∃z′[z′ hashdmvdto z]]
where Ω = {〈σ ′,σ ′′,σ ′′′〉 ∈ Σ31 | Ψ (lex(σ
′), lex(σ ′′), lex(σ ′′′))) = σ or,





φiX,σ for all σ ∈ Σ2
By replacing the first line of (466) with the sequence in (470), we now ob-































4.7 Stating Merge over Move using Tree Transducers
Graf (2010) points out that the reference set for Merge over Move, along with a
number of other global economy conditions, is best defined in terms of derivation
trees. Traditionally, as is implicit in definition (14), the reference set for Merge
over Move has was taken to be the set of all convergent derivations from the
same starting numeration. There is, perhaps surprisingly, no empirical evidence
whatever that such a large comparison set is necessary. In every instance where
Merge over Move has been exploited in the literature, the favored derivation and
its competitors (or at least, those of its competitors which linguists have actually
considered) yield trees which have virtually identical geometry. They also have
virtually identical derivation trees, as Graf notes.
Graf shows that the reference set for Merge over Move can be computed by a
linear tree transducer. To figure out whether a given derivation D is licit accord-
ing to Merge over Move, the tree transducer is fed D’s derivation tree, and it is
then determined whether or not the output of the transduction contains a deriva-
tion more greatly favored by Merge over Move. Some additional background is
required to explain the significance of the observation that reference sets can be
specified in this manner. Graf notes that global economy conditions can be mod-
eled in terms of optimality systems (Frank and Satta, 1998; Karttunen, 1998):
(472) An optimality system over languages L,L′ is a pair O := 〈Gen,C〉 with
Gen ⊆ L×L and C := 〈c1, . . . , cn〉 a linearly ordered sequence of functions
ci : Gen → N . For a,b ∈ Gen, a <O iff there is a 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that
ck(a) < ck(b) and for all j < k,cj(a) = cj(b).
Optimality systems are designed as a formal model of optimality theory (Smolen-
sky and Prince, 1993).21 Thus, they specify a generating function and a set of
21 The background material on optimality systems in the next few paragraphs is copied from
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ranked constraints. Each constraint is modeled as a function from generated
structures to a constraint violation count. The optimal input-output pairings are
defined as in (473). This corresponds to the notion of optimality familiar from
standard informal presentations of optimality theory.
(473) Given an optimality system O := 〈Gen,C〉, 〈i,o〉 is optimal with respect
to O iff both 〈i,o〉 ∈ Gen and there is no o′ such that 〈i,o′〉 ∈ Gen and
〈i,o′〉 <O 〈i,o〉.
(474) The transduction induced by O is given by τ := {〈i,o〉 | 〈i,o〉 is optimal
with respect to O}. The output language of O is ran(τ).
Optimality systems, as defined in (472), impose no requirements on what
kinds of language L and L′ are. There is, however, a key result of Frank and Satta
(1998) which holds for the special case where the domain of Gen is a regular
string or tree language:
(475) Let O be an optimality system such that
• dom(Gen) is a regular string/tree language,
• Gen is a rational relation,
• all c ∈ C are output markedness constraints,
• each c ∈ C defines a regular tree language (i.e. each c ∈ C is a binary
constraint), and
• O is globally optimal
Then the transduction τ induced by the OS is a rational relation and
ran(τ) belongs to the same formal language class as dom(τ).
(476) Given an optimality system O, c ∈ C is an output-markedness constraint
iff c(〈i,o〉) = c(〈i′, o〉) for all 〈i,o〉, 〈i′, o〉 ∈Gen.
the useful summary given in Graf’s paper.
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A rational relation, for the case of regular tree languages, is a relation which can
be defined by a linear tree transducer.
For the purposes of this chapter, the significance of Frank and Satta’s result
is as follows. For any given MGWSM, Merge over Move can be modeled using
an optimality system where the both L and L′ are the tree language of the MG-
WSM. Merge over Move is specified as an output markedness constraint, and the
reference set computation (i.e. Gen) is specified using a linear tree transducer.
Unless the transducer is very careful – and the one to be defined here isn’t – it
will generate reference sets containing many trees which are not in the deriva-
tion tree language of the MGWSM. However, the range of the transducer can be
intersected with the derivation tree language of the MGWSM to obtain the de-
sired rational relation. Merge over Move can then select the optimal 〈i,o〉 pairs.
By these means, we can specify the language formed of the set of trees which
are both (i) in the tree language of the original MGWSM, and (ii) compliant with
Merge over Move. The trees of this language will be labeled from the same al-
phabet as the trees of the original MGWSM.22 Thus, the tree-to-tree transduction
defined in §4.6.5, can be used to map this new tree language to an MCS string
language. We thereby obtain a class of grammars incorporating a Merge over
Move constraint which are known to have string languages within the class of
MCS string languages.
As soon as any attempt is made to formalize Merge over Move, it becomes
clear that there are many possible statements of the condition. A number of these
are discussed in detail in Graf (2010), with reference to the analysis of there exis-
tentials in Chomsky (2000). Recall from (14) of chapter 1 the informal definition
of Merge over Move assumed in this dissertation:
22 In fact, as we will see shortly, these trees will be labeled with a slightly extended alphabet,
but the additional diacritics are easily removed using yet another tree transducer.
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(477) Merge over Move: A head or phrase X may not move at a stage S of a
derivation D if there is a convergent derivation D ′ such that
(i)D and D ′ begin from the same numeration,
(ii)D ′ is identical to D up to S,
(iii) at S of D ′, a head or phrase merges in the position that X moves to
at S of D, and
(iv) X later moves in D ′ to value the same features that it did at S of D.
For the moment, let us ignore the effect of condition (iv), which adds additional
complications. A version of Merge over Move incorporating conditions (i)-(iii)
can be stated over MGWSM derivation trees as follows:
(478) For an MGWSM G, a tree T in D(G) is licensed by Merge over Move if
there is no tree T ′ in the Merge-over-Move comparison set such that the
total length of bottom paths to arrow is longer in T ′ than in T .
(479) The bottom paths to arrow of a given tree T of D(G) are all of the paths
in T which lead from bottom nodes to nodes labeled with ⇑ or⇒. (We
only care about the lengths of the paths, so any notion of path will do
here.)
(480) The Merge-over-Move comparison set for a given tree T of D(G) is the set
of trees formed by “swapping” one of the move operations in T with
one of the Merge operations. A swap proceeds as follows. A subtree t
of T is chosen, where the root node of t is labeled with an arrow. A >-
labeled node n is chosen which dominates t, with t′ and t′′ the subtrees
rooted in the left and right children of n. The node n is deleted and
t′′ becomes the child of the former parent of n. The subtree t′ is then
repositioned as a base-generated specifier of t’s root if t’s root is a non-
leaf node, or as the child of t’s root if t’s root is a leaf. The arrow on
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t′ is replaced with a +. The + on t is replaced by an arrow bearing a
randomly chosen feature superscript.
The definition in (480) will be more easily understood with reference to an ex-
ample. (482) is one of the trees which is in the comparison set for (481). In this






















As expected, on the definition of the comparison set given in (480), object-oriented
adjunct control in (481) is blocked by the availability of the convergent derivation
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in (482), in which control is subject-oriented.
There are two barriers to formalizing the definition of the comparison set
in (480) using a linear tree transducer. First, a linear tree transducer can’t, in
general, move a subtree from one location to another. It can only move subtrees
of bounded size. However, in order to achieve the desired effect, it does not
matter if t′ “morphs” somewhat in the course of moving to its new position. All
that matters is that the morphed tree has the same consequences for the rest of
the derivation as t′. Intuitively, given Minimality, the Left Branch Condition and
the Adjunct Island Constraint, there are only a finite number of trees which are
distinguishable in this sense. In fact, we need not rely on intuition here, since
this is immediately confirmed by the extension of the Myhill-Nerode theorem
to regular tree languages. For any given MGWSM, we can construct a finite set
E which contains a single representative selected from each congruence class of
one of the suitable congruences. The tree transducer need only remember which
congruence class t belongs to. It can then delete t′ and insert the member of E
which is in the same congruence class as t′ in the new position.
The second issue relates to the specfication of the constraints of the OT sys-
tem. Constraints must be binary (see (476)), so although counting can be “faked”
using multiple binary constraints, there is an upper bound on how high a count
can be maintained. Thus, we cannot actually count the length of each bottom
path to arrow. In fact, there is no need to count at all. The transducer to the
Merge-over-Move comparison set can be stated in such a way that its range con-
tains, apart from the original derivation itself, only those derivations which are
“better” than the original derivation. Thus, a derivation tree t is optimal iff its
comparison set is {t}. All that is required is a trivial constraint which punishes
the original tree by some amount but which does not punish any other tree. As
we will see, the transducer outputs trees which (if they are not the original tree)
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contain a node marked with a ∗ diacritic. The constraint we require, then, is sim-
ply one which is violated by any tree which does not contain a ∗-marked node.
For any given MGWSM, the transduction from a derivation tree to is com-
parison set for Merge over Move can now be defined as the composition of two
non-deterministic top-down tree transducers. The first of these implements the
full transduction but for the fact that it does not delete the specifier. Instead, it
relabels the parent of the specifier as >∗. The second tree transducer, which I will
not define explicitly here, simply deletes the >∗ node and its left child, such that
the right child of the >∗ node becomes the child of the >∗ node’s former parent. A
∗ diacritic is then added to some other node in the tree, so that the tree does not
incur a violation of the trivial constraint just mentioned.
Non-deterministic top-down tree transducers, like bottom-up tree trans-
ducers, map regular tree languages to regular tree languages. (Non-determinism
adds nothing to the power of a bottom-up tree transducer, but deterministic
top-down tree transducers are rather less powerful than their non-deterministic
cousins.) A non-deterministic top-down tree transducer can be defined as fol-
lows:23
(483) A non-deterministic top-down tree transducer is a 5-tuple A := 〈Σ,Ω,
Q,Q′,∆〉, where Σ, Ω are the alphabets of the input and output tree
languages,Q′ ⊂Q is the set of initial states, and ∆ is a set of production
rules of the form q(f (x1, . . . ,xn))→ t, where f ∈ Σ is of rank n, q ∈Q, and
t is a tree with node labels drawn from Ω∪ {q(x) | q ∈Q,x ∈ {x1, . . . ,xn}}.
The transduction defined by a non-deterministic top-down tree transducer is
specified in (484):
(484) (We write t→ t′ to denote that t′ is obtained from t by applying some
23 The presentation here follows that of Graf (2010, 5).
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rule in ∆ to a single state in t. A sequence t1 → t2 → ·· · → tn may be
written as t1→∗ tn.) For a non-deterministic top-down tree transducer
as defined in (483), the transduction computed is {t′ ∈ TΣ′ | q[t]→∗ t′ for
q ∈ Q′, t ∈ TΣ}, where TΣ and TΣ′ are respectively the sets of all Σ and
Σ′-labeled trees.
The first transducer has a state set Q consisting of states q1, qc, and q2(t),
q3(t), q4(t) and qe(t) for all t ∈ E. Q′ is {q1}, and Σ is the alphabet of the MGWSM’s
derivation tree language augmented with >∗. The state qc is a “copy state”: when
the transducer goes into this state at a subtree t, it simply copies t. The qe(t)
state requires some discussion, since the transition rules for this state are not
defined below. The key point here is that it is possible to define a top-down tree
transducer which finishes only for trees which are members of the congruence
class to which t belongs.24 When the transducer goes into state qe(t) at a subtree
t′, it begins a transduction which finishes if t′ belongs the the congruence class
containing t, and which fails to finish otherwise. (In the case where it finishes, it
does not matter what the output (sub)tree is, since it will be deleted in any case
by the second transducer.)
The transition rules are as follows:
24 Each set of trees in the congruence class is a regular tree language (since the union of any
subset of the congruence classes is a regular tree language). Thus, for any of the congruence




q1(σ ) → σ ∀ σ∈Σ





q1(>(x,y)) → >∗ (qe(t)(x),q2(t)(y)) ∀ t∈E
qe(t)(σ (x1, . . . ,xn)) → . . . n≥0
q2(t)(〈+,λ〉) → 〈〈α,f 〉,λ〉 ∀ α∈{⇑,⇒}, f ⊆F,λ∈Λ
q2(t)(〈+,λ〉(x)) → 〈〈α,f 〉,λ〉(q3(x)) ∀ α∈{⇑,⇒}, f ⊆F,λ∈Λ
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q3(t)(σ ) → σ ∀ σ∈Σ
q3(t)(〈+,λ〉(x)) → 〈+,λ〉(q3(t)(x)) ∀ λ∈Λ, t∈E
q3(t)(〈〈α,f 〉,λ〉(x)) → 〈〈α,f 〉,λ〉(q3(t)(x)) ∀ λ∈Λ,α∈{⇑,⇒}, f ⊆F,t∈E
q3(t)(〈〈α,f 〉,λ〉(x)) → >(qc(t),q4(t)(x))) ∀ λ∈Λ,α∈{⇑,⇒}, f ⊆F,t∈E
q3(t)(〈〈α,f 〉,λ〉) → 〈+,λ〉(t) ∀ λ∈Λ,α∈{⇑,⇒}, f ⊆F,t∈E
q3(t)(>(x,y)) → >(qc(x),q3(t)(y)) ∀t∈E
q3(t)(&(x,y)) → &(q3(t)(x),qc(y)) ∀t∈E
q4(t)(σ ) → σ ∀ σ∈Σ
q4(t)(〈〈α,f 〉,λ〉(x)) → 〈+,λ〉(qc(x)) ∀ λ∈Λ,α∈{⇑,⇒}, t∈E
qc(σ ) → σ ∀ σ∈Σ
qc(σ (x1, . . . ,xn)) → σ (qc(x1), . . . , qc(xn)) ∀ σ∈Σ,n≥1
4.7.1 Condition (iv) of Merge over Move
Condition (iv) of (14)/(477) can be incorporated via some modifications to the
transducer defined above. As a terminological preliminary, we will require a
means of referring to the connection between an arrow in a derivation tree and
the phrase which undergoes movement due to the presence of the arrow. Let us
say that the arrow is “linked to” this phrase. Now consider the arrow which is
moved in the transformation from the original derivation to one of is comparison
derivations. We can implement (iv) by ensuring that this arrow is linked to the
same phrase in both the original and the comparison derivations. Clearly, one
precondition for this is that both arrows have the same direction and feature su-
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perscripts. Thus, the automaton will have to be modified to save the arrow and
its superscript as part of the q2 and q3 states.25 When we compare the compari-
son derivation to its original, we see that the arrow has moved up the tree (e.g.,
compare the position of⇒ in (481) – original – vs. (482) – comparison). We need
to ensure that the arrow does not move up far enough that it ends up being linked
to a different phrase. In the case of a right arrow r, this happens if r moves over
another right arrow r ′ such that the feature types of the feature superscript of r ′
are a superset of those of r. In the case of an up arrow u, the same holds with
regard to crossing another up arrow; it is also necessary to prevent u crossing a
node n whose feature types are a superset of those of the superscript of u. All of
this can easily be ensured if the q2 and q3 states store the direction and feature
superscript of the arrow.
4.8 The MGWSM string language
This chapter has shown that MGWSMs, with Merge over Move, have string lan-
guages within the class of MCS string languages. This strongly suggests that
Merge over Move does not raise any serious issue of computational complexity. I
have not yet placed any lower bound on the class of MGWSM string languages.
It is not necessary really necessary to do this in order to achieve the main aim of
this chapter, which is to show that Merge over Move can be formulated in a non-
computationally-adverse manner. However, since it is not difficult to see that
MGWSMs can at least generate all context-free string languages, it may be worth
going over this quickly.
Consider a CFG in Chomsky normal form, such that every production rule
is of the form A → BC, for A,B,C non-terminals, A → α, for α a terminal, or
25 Since the arrow is moved up the tree, the transducer will have to non-deterministically
“guess” the direction of the arrow and its feature superscript in the transition from q1 to q2.
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S→ ε. To construct an MGWSM which generates the same string language as the
CFG, we proceed as follows. For each rule A→ BC, we add a feature type A to
Φ , add categories A, Al and Ar to K , and add the lexical items to Λ necessary to





Here, the A feature is used to bond the εAl specifier to the εA head. R is used
to ensure that the child of any head of category A is of category Ar . R is also
specified such that heads of category Al can have children of category B, and
such that heads of category Ar can have children of category C. For each rule of
the form A→ α, we add a lexical item ακ{}, and ensure that R is specified such
that nodes of category Ar require children of category κ. If the CFG has a rule




In this chapter, I will briefly review the preceding chapters to give an overview
of the issues discussed in this thesis.
The thesis has developed an approach to the analysis of binding phenom-
ena within a unified theory of grammatical dependencies developed from the
proposals of Nunes (1995), Hornstein (2001), Hornstein (2009). If this approach
is correct, binding relations, understood as chain dependencies, have two essen-
tial characteristics. First, they span multiple thematic positions. Second, they are
pronounced by language-specific spellout rules, not by the default spellout rule.
Ideally, nothing more than this need be said. There are perhaps no grammati-
cal principles or rules of interpretation which pick out binding dependencies as
such.1
Any kind of of chain may be exploited to encode dependencies between
theta positions. Thus, in English, both A-chains and A-chains are exploited in
this manner, yielding reflexive binding and some instances of pronominal bind-
ing. The general moral here is that the search for a universal binding domain, to
the extent that this is still a focus of current work in binding theory, is misguided.
There is no theory of locality whose proprietary domain is binding dependencies.
There are as many binding domains as there are syntactic domains.
The role of c-command in the GB binding theory is taken on in this dis-
sertation by the Merge over Move constraint. In some respects, this constraint
1 There may however be certain extragrammatical or interface principles which do so, such
as (246) of chapter 2, or, if some version of it is correct, Montalbetti’s (1984) Overt Pronoun
Constraint.
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is more relaxed than c-command, since it permits adjunct control and control
into DP possessors. In other respects it is more restrictive, since it imposes a
highest-DP-orientation requirement.
Merge over Move is not sufficiently lax to permit binding out of PP. Chapter
3 has attempted to revive the reanalysis hypothesis to account for the possibility
of binding in this configuration. It has also sketched an analysis of pseudopas-
sivization in terms of reanalysis, and attempted to account for the link between
pseudopassivization and preposition stranding.
Chapter 4 has shown that Merge over Move does not have adverse compu-
tational implications. The class of Minimalist grammars formalized in chapter 4
does not include all of the syntactic technology developed in chapters 1 to 3 (e.g.,
it does not formalize language-specific spellout rules), but it seems unlikely that
the addition of these additional complexities would lead to any adverse interac-
tion with Merge over Move.
I would like to conclude by discussing very briefly an issue which has not
been addressed explicitly in the rest of the dissertation. This is the status of syn-
tactic features with regard to pronouns and reflexives. If the preceding chapters
are correct, it seems that there may be no need to postulate syntactic features dis-
tinguishing different types of pronoun, or pronouns from reflexives. Pronouns
are either base-generated as bundles of φ-features, or are the spellouts of the φ-
features of a copy in a chain. The difference between e.g. a strong and a weak
pronoun may reduce entirely to a difference in phonological form, and may not
be a distinction encoded in the narrow syntax at all. Similarly, restricting our
attention for the moment to bound pronouns which spell out copies in a chain,
it may be that the only difference between a reflexive and a bound pronoun is
phonological. If this is a viable position, we seem to have obtained the best pos-
sible result. The phonological differences are irreducible, so why postulate other
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differences if the phonological differences suffice?
This dissertation leaves unresolved a number of issues regarding the rela-
tion between phonology and interpretation. Lidz and Idsardi (1998) postulated
a level of “phono-logical” form which was the input to interpretation and which
contained both syntactic and phonological information. For example, on Lidz
and Idsardi’s account, the interpretative distinction between reflexives and re-
ciprocals derived from the sensitivity of the relevant interpretative principles to
the phonological distinction between himself and each other. This is not, I think,
as outrageous a proposal as it may first appear. A textbook account of the in-
terpretative distinction between himself and each other would simply postulate
an additional syntactic distinction (perhaps a +/-reciprocal feature) mapping di-
rectly to the phonological distinction rather than via a syntactic intermediary.
Lidz and Idsardi propose to eliminate this redundant feature by having the inter-
pretative distinction linked directly to the phonological distinction. This disser-
tation leaves as an open question the extent to which phonological information
feeds directly into interpretation. This is, it should be emphasized, a robustly em-
pirical issue. There are no weighty conceptual reasons, Minimalist or otherwise,
for supposing that interpretative rules cannot “see” phonological information.
The key is to ensure that we capture the generalization that only a limited set of
grammatical formatives can have any special interpretative effects. (That is, each
other can trigger a special interpretative rule, but John cannot.2) It seems that
we must appeal to a distinction which was implicit in the architecture of early
transformational grammar: the distinction between base-generated morphemes
2 There is a crucial distinction here between special interpretations and special rules of inter-
pretation. In a certain sense, John clearly does have a special interpretation – it can be used to
refer only to people who are called John. However, John does not trigger a special rule of inter-
pretation since it is semantically integrated with the rest of the sentence in the same manner as
any other name.
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and morphemes introduced by transformational rules. Within the framework of
this dissertation, the language-specific chain spellout rules take on the role of the
transformational rules in this respect.
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